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Partition has been proposed as a way to (i) end ethnic civil wars and to (ii) build a 
lasting peace after ethnic civil wars end.  This dissertation builds on partition theory 
and the ethnic security dilemma in three ways, demonstrating empirical support for a 
novel theory of why violence recurs following the end of ethnic civil wars and how 
partition can be used to prevent such violence.  The dissertation begins by introducing 
the puzzle of ethnic group concentration: the social sciences have demonstrated that 
concentrated ethnic groups produce both peace and violence.  The first case study 
discredits the notion that ethnic group concentration produced during ethnic civil 
wars will produce an end to ethnic civil wars.  I conducted detailed field research, 
producing a longitudinal study of ethnic migration and violence in the Georgia-
Abkhaz civil war (1992-1993), which acts as a crucial case.  I conclude that 
partitioning groups does not end ethnic war.  This is the first accurate empirical test of 
the ethnic security dilemma.  Next, the dissertation looks at partition’s ability to build 
  
peace by concentrating ethnic groups in new homeland states, and I argue that post-
partition violence is caused by weak states and the triadic political space 
endogenously created by partitions that do not separate ethnic groups completely.  I 
call this the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma, building on previous ethnic 
security dilemma research.  I test this empirically by introducing an index measuring 
the degree to which partitions separate ethnic groups, and I compare all ethnic civil 
war terminations between 1945 and 2004, demonstrating that partitions which 
completely separate ethnic groups provide a better chance for peace.  Third, I selected 
two cases (Moldova and Georgia) to examine the causal processes of post-war 
recurring violence.  Georgia, which experienced post-partition violence, and 
Moldova, which did not, act as a structured case comparison.  I conclude that mixed 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Political Science Moves to Iraq: 
o Theory, Methodology, and the Puzzle of Ethnic Demography 
2. Puzzle and Contribution 
3. Key Terms and Concepts 
4. Data 
5. Chapter Overview 
 
1 Political Science in Iraq: Exposing the Puzzle of Ethnic Demography 
During 2006 and 2007, Iraq’s civil war reached its apex, with hundreds of 
civilians being killed on a daily basis, highly organized militias controlling huge 
swaths of territory throughout the country, and the national army unable to secure 
control of Baghdad itself.  The civil war had taken on a decidedly ethnic nature, with 
civilians being targeted for death or displacement based on their ascriptive religious 
or ethnic affiliations.  The U.S. government, independent political analysts, and other 
regional actors all sought a realistic strategy to end the internecine bloodshed.  Social 
science scholarship was source of policy advice.  
The Iraqi civil war occurred, coincidentally, at the peak of civil war research 
in the social sciences.  Beginning in the 1990s, when the quantity of civil wars around 
the world reached its highest level of the 20th century, research programs sprung up in 
the fields of International Relations, Comparative Politics, Sociology, Psychology, 
and beyond.  To be sure, the focus on civil violence had long been a staple in 




of internal, contentious politics, was new and attracted intense interest, especially in 
U.S. academic circles following the wars of collapsing Yugoslavia. 
Research on civil wars has developed in stages, both thematically and 
methodologically.  While there has been a consistent and substantial amount of case-
study research on civil wars throughout the post-WWII period, the systematic study 
of civil war accelerated in the post-Cold War era (Bradley 1975; Brovkin 1994; 
Eckstein 1964; Heilbrunn 1962; Pye 1956; Vlavianos 1992).  The initial phase of 
research in the post-Cold War era was dominated methodologically by large-n cross-
national studies and theoretical pieces thematically focused on civil war onset (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003; Posen 1993: 1; Toft 2003; Walter and Snyder 1999).  Thematically, 
this research agenda shifted to civil war dynamics, explaining phenomena such as the 
extent of and forms of violence, rebel objectives, and duration (Azam and Hoeffler 
2002; Buhaug 2006; Derouen and Sobek 2004; Fearon 2004; Valentino, Huth, and 
Balach-Lindsay 2004).  Finally, civil war research shifted to how civil wars end 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2007; Licklider 1995; Walter 2002).  
This dissertation contributes to the literature on civil war termination. 
What did this research tell us, and how could it assist the U.S. government 
trying to end the violence in Iraq?  Research demonstrated that, since the early 1950s, 
civil wars have been longer lasting and more frequent than international wars, 
producing high levels of death and disability (Collier et al. 2003; Derouen and Sobek 
2004; Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003; Licklider 1995).1  Ethnic wars, of the type seen in 
                                                 
1 Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.75) write, “Between 1945 and 1999, about 3.33 million battle deaths 




Iraq, have been especially common, comprising anywhere from 55 percent (70) to 72 
percent (91) of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999 (Fearon 2004).2  Moreover, 
cross-national evidence suggests that ethnic wars last longer than nonethnic wars 
(Fearon 2004; Licklider 1995).3  These numbers are even more troubling given that, 
during the 1990s, more than 200 ethnic minorities and subordinate majorities 
throughout the world were contesting their political status, suggesting that the 
potential for future violence is grave (Gurr 1993; McGarry and O'Leary 1993). 
While most research has focused on civil war onset, a significant research 
agenda has focused on how to end civil wars.  However, in addition to the challenge 
of ending the such wars, one of the vexing and under-explored problems of civil wars 
has been their high recidivism rate, with postconflict countries facing over a 50 
percent chance of experiencing renewed deadly conflict within the first five years of 
establishing peace (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2001; Collier and Sambanis 
2002; Horowitz, Weisiger, and Johnson 2009; Johnson 2008; Walter 2004).4  Despite 
empirical evidence demonstrating both the high recidivism rate, and that ethnic wars 
are particularly susceptible, little work has been done differentiating war onset from 
                                                                                                                                           
These wars involved just 25 states that suffered casualties of at least 1,000 and had a median duration 
of not quite 3 months. In contrast, in the same period there were roughly 127 civil wars that killed at 
least 1,000, 25 of which were ongoing in 1999. A conservative estimate of the total dead as a direct 
result of these conflicts is 16.2 million, five times the interstate toll. These civil wars occurred in 73 
states—more than a third of the United Nations system—and had a median duration of roughly six 
years.”  The number of ongoing civil wars has declined since its peak in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, but it remains high (ranging between 20 and 30 wars over the past 15 years), and recent data 
show a second upward trend beginning in 2004.  See Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted 
Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflict, 2008 (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm, 2007). 
2 Fearon codes his cases as “ethnic,” “nonethnic,” and “ambiguous.”  Ethnic wars made 55 percent of 
all civil wars between 1945 and 1999, and ambiguous wars 17 percent. 
3 Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (September 1995), pp. 681-690. 
4 Johnson (2008) shows ethnic civil war recidivism at 60%.  “Deadly conflict recurrence” is defined as 




war recurrence, or explaining ethnic civil war recurrence in particular (Derouen and 
Sobek 2004). 
1.1 How to End Ethnic Civil Wars 
As we will see in the first theory chapters (Chapter Two), several theories 
have been put forward for successful ways to end ethnic civil wars.  One dominant 
strategy is a realpolitik focus on military victory.  Increasing military ability and 
better military strategy have been a central approach to winning wars from time 
immemorial (Sun Tzu 1910).  This was the approach ultimately chosen by the Bush 
administration in 2007 to deal with Iraq, and the choice made by the U.S. and Soviet 
Union for most civil wars during the Cold War (Fearon and Laitin 2007; Regan 
2000), and was achieved by increased external support for the central Iraqi 
government. 
The dangers of this approach, especially for ethnic civil wars, are twofold.  
First, ethnic civil wars tend to last a long time and intervention has not been 
demonstrated to bring a swift end to violence.  Some evidence suggests that 
interventions actually prolong civil war violence (Regan 2002).  Second, such 
military victories achieved by one party in an ethnic war, in contrast to a negotiated 
solution by all parties to the conflict, are often accompanied by large-scale ethnic 
massacres (Licklider 1995).  Thus from a humanitarian point of view, neither strategy 
achieves its goal as they tend to bring great human suffering.  Just as relevant, with 
U.S. forces already heavily invested in Iraq at the start of 2007, it was far from clear 
whether the U.S. government could find the political will to increase military support 




A second approach has focused on the need for third-party security guarantees 
to overcome the problem of credible commitment (Fearon 1998; Walter 2002).  
Under this understanding of civil war violence, wars do not end because weaker 
parties fear the post-settlement environment in which they need to decommission 
their weapons, leaving them vulnerable if the stronger party reneges on commitments.  
By creating third-party guarantees, warring parties would more easily reach 
agreements, ending wars without the need for military victory.  For the case of Iraq, 
this approach was also unlikely to succeed given that the presence of a third-party 
(the U.S.) was unable to enforce agreements or even bring warring parties to the 
negotiating table. 
Since the mid-1990s, one solution to ending ethnic civil wars that has gained 
international policy and scholarly attention has been partition (Downes 2001; Downes 
2004; Galbraith 2006; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998; Kaufmann 2006; McGarry 
and O'Leary 1993; Mearsheimer 2000; Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995).5  The 
debate surrounding partition emerged at the end of the Cold War as ethnic conflicts 
came to the forefront of Western policymakers’ attention and international boundaries 
were once again open to large-scale change.  Still, Western governments have 
demonstrated ambivalence toward partition, opposing the recognition of several de 
facto partitions, such as Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan, recognizing others, such as 
Kosovo’s separation from Serbia, and further promoting the incorporation of 
partitions into peace plans that ended civil wars in Sudan, Papua New Guinea, and 
                                                 
5 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary present a taxonomy of macro-political forms of ethnic conflict 




Indonesia.6  The negotiations that surrounded Kosovo’s final status further reflected 
ambivalence, with proposals to separate Kosovo from Serbia being fiercely contested 
within the European Union.  Moreover, there is still the possibility of a further 
partition of Kosovo into majority Albanian and Serbian regions.7 
As Iraq’s civil war heightened, partition became a central consideration in the 
debate over Iraq’s future and how best to minimize the humanitarian disaster 
unfolding as a result of the ethnically-based killing and displacement that was 
occurring in the country (Galbraith 2006; Gelb 2006; Kaufmann 2006).8 
Debates over partition traditionally focused on the normative goal of self-
determination as a general tool for regulating ethnic conflict (Kumar 1997; Mansergh 
1978; McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Schaeffer 1990; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997).  Yet 
                                                 
6 Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the war between the Khartoum government and 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army included provision for a referendum on independence 
for the South.  See International Crisis Group, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain 
Peace,” Crisis Group Africa Report, No. 96 July 25, 2005.  Similarly, the 2001 peace agreement 
between Papua New Guinea’s government and the separatists in Bougainville included a referendum 
on independence.  See the Bougainville Peace Agreement at the Conciliation Resources website: 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/png-bougainville/key-texts37.php. Indonesia’s long-running 
ethnic civil war with East Timor ended with the UN sponsored partition of East Timor (Doyle and 
Sambanis (2006). 
7 The Dutch foreign minister, Maxime Verhagen, became the first European foreign minister to state 
that partition of Kosovo into majority Albanian and Serb political territories would be an acceptable 
outcome on August 28, 2007.  This was followed by a similar comment by Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s 
foreign minister, on August 31, 2007.  See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Dutch Minister Says 
Partition of Kosova Acceptable” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 160, Pt.2, August 29, 2007; and, 
“Russia Rules Out Crossing ‘Red Line’ on Kosova, but Would Accept Partition” RFE/RL Newsline, 
Vol. 11, No. 163, Pt. 2, September 4, 2007.  As far as I am aware, no state has actively lobbied for a 
further partition of Kosovo, though some have suggested that such an outcome would be acceptable if 
Kosovo and Serbian leaders accepted this compromise.  For discussion of the debate within the 
European Union over recognition of Kosovo independence, see “The Waiting Game,” Economist, 
September 27, 2007, p.33.  Russia’s opposition to recognition and the United States’ support are well 
known. 
8 One of the earliest proposals on partition came from Leslie H. Gelb, “The Three-State Solution,” New 
York Times, November 25, 2003.  See also the symposium, “Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Partition, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy” sponsored by the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C., January 15, 
2003.  On September 27, 2007, the U.S. Senate passed a non-binding measure calling for Iraq to be 
divided into federal regions, with the likely outcome of separate Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni states.  See 
Alissa J. Rubin, “In Iraq, Repeated Support for a Unified State,” New York Times, October 1, 2007.  





this policy was also intricately linked to resolving ethnic conflict.  As Donald 
Horowitz (1985: 589) stated over twenty years ago: “separating the antagonists – 
partition – is an option increasingly recommended for consideration where groups are 
territorially concentrated.”  Nevertheless, partition was largely abandoned as a policy-
goal after several perceived failures following World War Two, including India-
Pakistan and Israel-Palestine. 
In the 1990s, at the height of civil war violence globally, partition re-emerged 
as a solution specific to ethnic civil wars.  As Nicholas Sambanis (2000, p.438) noted, 
“its intuitive appeal…has been shaping scholarly and policy opinion on how to end 
ethnic civil wars.”  Academics such as John Mearsheimer, Stephen Van Evera, and 
Chaim Kaufmann concentrated on partition as a humanitarian tool, as a means of 
minimizing deaths and reducing human suffering once ethnic civil wars had begun.  
Partition, in this latest guise, was proposed as means to end ethnic civil wars. 
According to this body of research, the cause of violence during ethnic civil 
wars is driven by the ethnic security dilemma (Posen 1993).  While the first 
generation ethnic security dilemma theory was designed to explain ethnic civil war 
onset, the second generation sought to explain the dynamics of violence and 
migration during ethnic civil war.  Fearful of ethnic massacres, ethnic militias have 
an incentive to “save” ethnic kin located within territory controlled by enemy ethnic 
kin groups.  Similarly, those same ethnic militias have an incentive to preemptively 
“kill or drive out enemy populations before the enemy does the same to it, as well as 




This creates a vicious cycle of violence that cannot end until the populations are 
separated. 
As a result of the ethnic security dilemma, multi-ethnic regions of 
intermingled populations face the greatest likelihood of violence and ethnic targeting.  
This dynamic, which is a hallmark of ethnic civil wars, leads to increasingly 
homogenous territories and cycle of violence that cannot end until ethnic groups are 
separated and the ethnic security dilemma comes to an end.  Once ethnically 
homogenous territorial units are created, ethnic militias are less murderous because 
their territories have defensive value only. 
This creates a policy prescription that both ends wars and prevents human 
suffering.  Under these conditions, partitioning groups into defensible enclaves where 
they can protect themselves militarily, provides the best chance for ending ethnic 
wars and establishing an enduring peace.  Deaths and suffering are reduced by 
establishing humanitarian corridors during the war to allow “trapped” populations to 
move to territories controlled by their ethnic groups.  This “unmixing” of populations 
would occur anyway during ethnic war, but by organizing it “humanely” via third-
parties, there should be less human suffering because separation would not be 
executed by enemy ethnic groups intent on ethnic cleansing at all costs.  As John 
Mearsheimer (1993) asked during the Bosnian ethnic civil war, “Wouldn't it make 
better sense to move populations peacefully rather than at the end of a rifle barrel?”  
Indeed, when scholars and policymakers have proposed partition, it has been as a last 
resort, not to achieve self-determination, but to end ethnic wars when widespread 




Based on a decade of theoretical and empirical research, many proposed the 
partition of Iraq as the only realistic solution to its civil war.  Several unique aspects 
of Iraq’s ethnic civil war lent themselves to partition.  The accelerating speed with 
which religious targeting and displacement occurred between 2005 and 2007 strongly 
suggested the emergence of an ethnic security dilemma between the Shiite and Sunni 
communities, where families whose homes were in the “wrong” area were threatened 
with death if they did not leave (Cockburn 2006; Kaufmann 2006; Ridolfo 2006).9 
In fact, the separation of ethnic groups reached such levels that, by 2006, Peter 
Galbraith (2006) stated, “The case for the partition of Iraq is straightforward: It has 
already happened.”  The question for the US government, according to advocates of 
partition, was whether to assist the remaining trapped minorities to move to regions 
controlled by their own militias or to allow the civil war to do this on its own, with 
disastrous humanitarian consequences. 
1.2 The Puzzle of Ethnic Demography 
Partitioning groups as a means to end violence presents a puzzle in the 
literature.  Concentrating ethnic groups into homogenous territories, argues the ethnic 
security dilemma, decreases the likelihood of violence.  Yet decades of research has 
demonstrated that concentrated ethnic groups increase the likelihood of inter-ethnic 
violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000; Laitin 2004; Toft 2003; 
Walter 2003).  Empirically, the role of concentrated groups being correlated with an 
increased likelihood of ethnic rebellion against the state is powerful.  Fearon and 
Laitin (1999, p.16), for example, found that “regional concentration of minority group 
                                                 
9 See also special edition of Forced Migration Review, “Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: The Search for 




[was a] powerful and robust factor. . . far more likely to see large-scale ethnic 
violence than urban or widely dispersed minorities.”  Similarly, the “group 
concentration” variable from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR) is routinely 
statistically significant as an independent variable in any regression model where 
“ethnic rebellion” is the dependent variable. 
The theoretical relationship between regional concentration and violence is still 
disputed.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that concentration acts as a proxy for a 
“regional base” that increases a group’s ability to wage war against the center.  
Regional concentration, they argue, provides ethnic militias with distinct advantages 
over the state’s armed forces, such as unique knowledge of the territory and the 
ability to hide amongst ethnic kin. 
Monica Toft (2003), on the other hand, argues that a regional homeland acts as 
“issue indivisibility” between the host state and the ethnic group, decreasing the 
likelihood for compromise and increasing the likelihood for violence: 
Majorities and groups concentrated in a region of a state, especially if that 
region is a homeland, are more likely to regard control over territory as 
indivisible than are groups that are minorities, dispersed, or urbanized…if 
[both state and ethnic group] represent their interests over the disputed 
territory as indivisible, then violence is likely. 
The positions of these scholars present a clear puzzle when juxtaposed with the 
position of partition advocates: how can group concentration both lead to an increased 
likelihood of peace and violence?  David Laitin (2004, p.357), in his critique of 




perplexing position, since it would be difficult to explain why group concentration 
has such a violent effect on groups that have not yet been at war, but a peaceful effect 
on groups that have ended a war….it merits scrutiny.” 
2 My Dissertation’s Contributions 
How can ethnic group concentration lead to both long-term peace and 
violence?    My dissertation addresses this puzzle and presents a convincing 
explanation of how and under which conditions, partitioning ethnic groups can 
increase the likelihood peace.  I achieve this through theoretical, methodological, and 
empirical contributions.  In this dissertation, I also identify and address three specific 
gaps in the partition literature, and I use a nested research design to build theory, 
identify causal mechanisms, and empirically test theoretical arguments. 
2.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Theoretically, I focus attention on the need for de facto statehood in addition 
to demographic separation.  Demographic concentration alone, I argue, will increase 
the likelihood of violence by increasing the capability of the group to wage war 
against the center; but group concentration with statehood decreases the motivation to 
fight the center.  Almost all ethnic civil wars are separatist by nature, and providing 
statehood to these ethnic militias will reduce the need for further rebellion.  Further, 
statehood also permits standard practices of deterrence between states, with each 
building up its military and alliances in a bid to avoid future conflict.  These factors 
are evident whether statehood is de jure (Bangladesh in 1972) or de facto (Northern 




credible commitment by permitting the smaller party to retain its military when it 
establishes a separate homeland state. 
While I stress the importance of statehood, I also distance myself from 
previous pro-partition scholars by arguing that demographic separation and statehood 
will not end ongoing ethnic civil wars.  The causes of violence during civil wars, I 
argue, are too complicated to reduce to demographic intermingling, as the 2G ESD 
assumes, and therefore violence is likely to continue even if groups unmix into 
separate, defensible enclaves or independent states.  In Chapter Three, I conduct an 
empirical test of this assertion. 
Building on the ethnic security dilemma tradition, I argue that several of its 
theoretical insights can, however, be applied to post-war conflict recurrence.  I call 
this the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD).  This Third Generation 
is similar to the first two generations in that it also emphasizes the key components of 
demographic intermingling and anarchy as key predictors of violence.  While 
partition will create peace in a war zone, I argue that partitioning ethnic groups will 
help facilitate long-term peace-building once an initial cessation of violence has been 
established via other means.  Such partitions need to include both statehood (de facto 
or de jure) and demographic separation. 
Yet, where the 2G ESD focuses on ethnic intransigence as the micro-
foundation of continued violence within intermingled groups, I focus on the triadic 
political space endogenously created by partition as the cause of renewed conflict.  
The triadic political space consists of three actors: (i) the host state, (ii) the stay-




same ethnic group as the stay-behind minority.  For reasons outlined in the theory 
chapter, I argue that the homeland state poses the greatest danger to conflict renewal, 
taking advantage of opportunities to re-assert control over territories with its kin 
group members.  The key factor for conflict renewal, if a stay-behind minority is 
present, is the balance of power between the post-partition states.  If one side gains an 
advantage in the initial post-war period, conflict is likely to re-erupt. 
In a direct challenge to the 2G ESD, I argue that the stay-behind minority can 
peacefully co-exist with enemy ethnic groups even after a devastating ethnic war 
involving large-scale ethnically-based massacres.  The 2G ESD argues that stay-
behind minorities will inevitably clash with the host state and its members due to 
fears and anger created during the ethnic civil war.  I argue that enemy ethnic groups 
can and do collaborate with each other even after brutal ethnic wars, provided there 
are appropriate incentives created by the state.  To accomplish domestic peace, I 
emphasize the role of anarchy as a central component in the ethnic security dilemma, 
arguing that exiting anarchy through strong state-building is an important parallel 
mechanism for peacebuilding. 
Exiting anarchy plays two roles.  First, state-building allows the government 
to establish incentives that induce collaboration (e.g., through physical punishment or 
material gain).  Ethnic group preferences and ethnic group behavior need not 
coincide as long as the state is strong enough to induce collaboration (Kalyvas 2006; 
Kalyvas 2008).  Even if members of a stay-behind minority prefer to be ruled by their 
ethnic kin, they can still collaborate peacefully with a regime run by the enemy ethnic 




important because it reduces the host state’s external vulnerability and hence reduces 
the opportunity for irredentist action by the neighboring homeland state. 
The bottom line for post-partition states, therefore, is not the presence of stay-
behind ethnic minorities, per se.  Rather the bottom-line is strengthening the state (i) 
to induce minority collaboration and (ii) to reduce the state’s vulnerability to external 
attack by the minority’s homeland and maintain a balance of power with it.  This is 
easier said than done since post-war states in general are extremely weak, and post-
partition states have the additional burden of state-building and guarding a new, 
previously non-existent border.  Since state-building is problematic, stay-behind 
minorities are likely to increase the risk of violence. 
In sum, while partitions are helpful to reduce the risks of violence, they create 
problems if they leave stay-behind minorities.  To increase the likelihood of long-
term peace, partitions should demographically separate ethnic groups. 
2.2 Conceptual Contribution 
This brings me to the conceptual contribution of this dissertation.  Political 
science has focused on “civil war termination,” conflating two distinct and 
qualitatively different forms of termination: (i) the initial cessation of violence and 
(ii) the establishment of long-term peace.  This conflation has been dealt with recently 
by some IR scholars, but the problem has remained in partition scholarship (Doyle 
and Sambanis 2006; Page Fortna 2008).  Given the high recidivism rate of civil wars, 
ending the initial violence is therefore only part of the solution.  My dissertation 




ongoing violence (Chapters Two and Three) as well as partition’s ability to build 
long-term peace. 
2.3 Methodological and Empirical Contributions 
My methodological and empirical contributions in this dissertation are 
threefold.  First, methodologically, my research design enables me to test, for the first 
time, the 2G ESD.  I argue that the 2G ESD (often labeled “partition theory”) has 
never been properly tested empirically.  Looking through the literature on partition, I 
count at least 15 articles that offer specific empirical tests based on the 2G ESD (e.g., 
Bloom and Licklider 2007; Downes 2001; Downes 2004; Fearon 2004; Johnson 
2008; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998; Kaufmann 2006; Kaufmann 2007; Laitin 
2004; Lindley 2007; Sambanis 2000).  Each of these, however, suffers from an 
inappropriate research design that does not permit testing of whether partition ends 
the violence of ethnic civil war.  No scholar to date has structured a research design to 
test whether separation into defensible enclaves will lead to an end of ethnic civil 
war, including both partition’s leading proponent (Chiam Kaufmann) and its leading 
critic (Nicholas Sambanis), although both claim to have concluded empirical tests.  
Without an accurate empirical test, both sides of the debate remain at the level of 
theoretical conjecture. 
This gap in the literature is all the more alarming when we consider that this 
theory has been promoted as a policy prescription, most recently during the height of 
Iraq’s civil war.  If humanitarian corridors had been established to separate ethnic 
groups as partition advocates proposed, would this have the ended the war?  The 




Conceptual Flaw in Dependent Variable 
The level of data required for such a test is highly demanding, requiring 
detailed information about migration patterns and violence during an ethnic civil war.  
Instead of conducting such research, IR scholars wedded to this theme have chosen 
convenient short-cuts as proxies to test partition theory.  The fatal methodological 
flaw in each of these designs is a conceptual focus on the wrong dependent variable.  
To test whether separation into defensible enclaves (independent variable) leads to an 
end of violence (dependent variable), one needs to draw from a universe of cases that 
includes all ongoing ethnic civil wars.  However, scholars have instead drawn from a 
universe of cases that includes all civil war terminations and tested whether the civil 
war recurs.  Such research designs permit us to test whether partition prevents civil 
war recurrence, but do not test whether partition ends ongoing violence, the key claim 
made by partition advocates and the claim used by policy-makers to justify the use of 
partition in Iraq and elsewhere. 
To address this research flaw, I present a “crucial case” (Eckstein 1975) based 
on the Georgian ethnic civil war with the Abkhaz (1992-1993).  Drawing on primary 
research collected during field trips conducting in 2008, I use a combination of 
interviews, archival material, and secondary sources to track levels of violence and 
migration patterns that occurred during the ongoing war.  I demonstrate that 
separation did occur during the ethnic civil war, as the 2G ESD would predict, but 
that the war carried on, and even escalated, refuting the key claim made by partition 




Empirically, I also contribute to the field by testing my 3G ESD through a 
large-n empirical test of all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004.  
While there have been other cross-national tests of partition’s ability to prevent 
conflict recurrence, these have not included the key variable of demographic 
separation (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Sambanis 2000).  I construct an original 
index that captures ethno-demographic separation resulting from ethnic civil war, and 
I gather data on all relevant wars from this period.  I find strong, supportive evidence 
that ethnic civil wars ending in separate ethnic homeland states with high degrees of 
ethno-demographic separation are less likely to experience conflict recurrence than 
other forms of ethnic civil war termination. 
My methodology is a nested design, joining a growing number of scholars that 
combine methodological techniques (Laitin 2002; Tarrow 1995).  Such a mixed-
methods methodological approach combines the advantages each method can bring 
individually as well the “synergistic” value provided by a combined approach 
(Lieberman 2005).  This approach allows us to understand general relationships as 
well as to find specific causes of events (Lieberman 2005, p.436).  In my dissertation, 
I am interested in the general relationships between ethnic minorities and civil war 
violence as well as the specific causes of post-partition peace and violence in 
Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Pridnestrovie. 
By using case studies, I am also able to more accurately trace the 
micromechanisms of my theory and compare it to the leading alternatives.  In fact, 
there has also been a clear methodological trend in the civil war literature, moving 




and my dissertation, methodologically, contributes to this trend.  While cross-national 
studies have been extremely insightful, productive, and have established much of the 
civil war research agenda, there has also been a growing awareness of their 
limitations in theory testing and theory building, largely due to their aggregate, 
macro-level variables.  This realization was epitomized by the efforts of leading 
large-n scholars to encourage greater case study research (Collier and Sambanis 2003; 
Sambanis 2004), as well as recent efforts by Fearon and Laitin (2007) to introduce 
“random narratives” as an alternative research method.  To date, case-study research 
has focused on violence during war, recruitment patterns, motivations of violence, 
and others (Arjona and Kalyvas 2006; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Humphreys 
and Weinstein 2008; Kalyvas 2006; Oyefusi 2008; Weinstein 2007; Wood 2003).  
My dissertation concentrates on both the end of ongoing violence and on conflict 
recurrence, which is relatively new to this field of study. 
 And, by focusing on civil war termination and exiting the trap of repeated 
violence onset, I contribute to one of the key topics emerging now in the literature.  
As Sydney Tarrow (2007, pp.596-597) stated in a recent review of the literature, 
“There is, finally, the question of how countries get out of insurgencies….What are 
the factors and the mechanisms that are likely to produce postwar civil peace?...In this 
era of intractable civil wars, this may well be the next phase in civil war studies.” 
Finally, as all of my cases come from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
region, my cases make empirical contributions to their respective area studies 
literature.  While much literature has focused on the causes of ethnic wars in Georgia 




there has been no Western scholarly work detailing (i) the dynamics of violence 
during the wars in Georgia and Moldova, (ii) the cause of conflict recurrence in 
Abkhazia in 1998, and (iii) and a credible explanation for the absence of ethnic 
violence in Moldova despite the presence of large stay-behind minorities on both 
sides of the partitioned country after 1992.  
3 Data 
The data for my dissertation comes from several sources.  First, the three case 
studies of my dissertation were built primarily on nine months of field research in the 
partitioned territories of Moldova-Transnistria and Georgia-Abkhazia during 2008.10  
I made two trips to each Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Transnistria, which each 
lasted approximately two months.  I conducted over 150 interviews during this 
period, concentrating on civilians displaced during the war as well as members of the 
government and armies at the time of the conflict.  Second, I use archival material, 
which proved indispensable to understand the migration and violence occurring 
during and after the civil conflicts, especially in Georgia-Abkhazia.  Third, I use news 
articles from the time of the conflict to help triangulate data from interviews, and I 
also draw on expert opinion and other secondary sources.  I detail this further in the 
individual case study chapters. 
My large-n, cross national study was built using two sources.  First, I drew on an 
extant database of civil war and partition constructed by the World Bank (Sambanis 
2000).  I built on this by (i) extending the database temporally and (ii) adding an 
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original variable to capture ethno-demographic separation, which I constructed using 
secondary sources of ethnic civil wars around the world between 1945 and 2004. 
4 Concepts 
4.1 Civil Wars 
The term civil war is used to distinguish one type of large-scale political violence 
from inter-state wars and other forms of intra-state collective violence, such as riots, 
pogroms, and brawls (Brass 1996; Horowitz 2001; Sidel 2006; Tilly 2003; Varshney 
2002).  Much of the sociology and political science literature of the past 50 years has 
used a variety of labels for processes that could be subsumed in a definition of civil 
war, such as revolutions, insurgencies, rebellions and some forms of ethnic conflict 
(Gurr 1970; Parsa 1989; Tilly 1978).  While there is no single definition of what 
constitutes a civil war in the social science or policy-related literature, there are 
general components to a civil war with which most definitions concur.  A generally 
accepted definition includes criteria such as (i) armed conflict involving 
representatives of the state as one actor and at least one other domestic actor as a 
competitor; (ii) conflict over a contested political issue; and (iii) conflict resulting in a 
certain number of deaths and/or casualties exceeding a certain threshold for each 
party (Baev 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Gates 2004; Small and Singer 1982). 
The first authoritative definition in the political science literature came from the 
Correlates of War project (COW), which began including civil wars in its dataset in 




set at 1,000 battle-related deaths, including civilians, during the duration of the 
conflict (Sarkees 2000; Singer and Small 1994; Small and Singer 1982).11 
Other scholars have built on this definition, using slight variations, particularly 
related to the death count threshold over time (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Gleditsch et al. 2002; Licklider 1995; Sambanis 2004).  Fearon and 
Laitin’s (2003) dataset, for example, includes a minimum of 1,000 deaths (including 
civilians) but add two specific qualifiers: a yearly average of at least 100 deaths, and 
at least 100 killed on each side of the conflict; Sambanis (2004: 829-830) probably 
has the most comprehensive definition for cross-national, quantitative studies, 
generally following the trend begun by COW but with a more specific criteria to 
capture start and end dates.  Gleditsch et al. (2002) move beyond civil war by 
including any “armed conflict” in their dataset; an armed conflict has at least 25 
battle-related deaths.  Other scholars, not troubled by the construction of cross-
national datasets, choose broader definitions.  Kalyvas (2006: 17), for example, 
defines a civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign 
entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities,” 
although he also appears to accept the necessity of a death threshold.12 
My dissertation relies on both cross-national and case-study data.  As I build on a 
previous data collection effort used by Sambanis (2000) for my cross-national test of 
                                                 
11 The body-count aspect of the definition has changed over time, originally requiring 1,000 battle 
deaths for each year, which was changed in 1992 to include only a total of 1,000 deaths during the 
duration and including civilian deaths.  Sambanis (2004: 822) raises questions about the degree to 
which civilians are included in the death count. 
12 Kalyvas states, “Civil wars are distinguished from coups when a certain fatality threshold is crossed, 
entailing significant military operations.”  See Kalyvas (2006) page 19, footnote 4.  Although see 




partition, I adopt his definition, which is virtually identical to that used by COW.13  
My case studies fit the definitions of civil war identified by each author presented 
above.  I describe the specific details of the ethnic civil wars in their respective 
chapters. 
4.2 Civil War Termination 
Ideally, we would mark the end of a civil war occurs when the violence itself 
ends.  Deciding when, precisely, a civil war ends, however, is almost always a 
difficult task.  In ideal-type cases, the civil war would end with either (i) a complete 
military victory that coincides with an end of military fighting, or (ii) a signed peace 
agreement that coincides with the end of military fighting.  Part of the problem is the 
absence of reliable data on deaths for monthly or even annual periods.  As Fearon 
(2004: 279) notes,  “Given this lack [of annual data], it seems that the standard civil 
war lists often rely implicitly on the presence of a formal peace agreement or truce to 
indicate the end year of many conflicts. That is, a formal agreement or truce followed 
by a significant reduction in killing that lasts for some period of time.” 
Probably the most difficult problem is deciding whether a resumption of 
violence is war recurrence or whether the war never, in fact, ended.  Given that a 
death threshold is deemed critical to virtually all definitions of civil war, and given 
that we are normatively interested in ending the killing of civil wars, I view this as the 
                                                 
13 Sambanis (2000: 444) defines a civil war as, “A civil war is defined as an armed conflict that has (1) 
caused more than one thousand deaths; (2) challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized 
state; (3) occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; (4) involved the state as one of the 
principal combatants; (5) included rebels with the ability to mount an organized opposition; and (6) 
involved parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end 




most important indicator, with war termination achieved when battle-deaths drop 
below 25 for at least one year.14 
4.3 Ethnic Civil Wars 
In the social science literature, “ethnic conflict” refers to conflicts involving 
ascriptive group identities, identities that are both in some sense “visible,” very 
difficult, if not impossible, to change, and that are often based on an individual’s 
descent, such as language, religion, or race (Chandra 2006; Horowitz 1985; Varshney 
2002).15  Identities are difficult to change primarily because of their visibility, but 
also because of local knowledge and in-group policing.  In the social science 
literature, these are also called communal, identity, or sectarian conflicts, and are 
often distinguished from socially-based conflicts, such as class (Hechter 2004).  I use 
the term “ethnic” because it is more common, and therefore familiar, in the literature. 
The concept of ethnic conflict does not assume primordial identity in the sense 
that groups are fixed and unchanging, nor does it require fixed individual identities.16  
Advocates of the ethnic conflict category need only accept that ethnic identity 
becomes given under certain conditions.  In fact, the concept of an “ethnic war” is still 
compatible with mainstream constructivist understandings of individuals sharing 
multiple, overlapping identities, some of which become more salient than others 
depending on the context (Barth 1969; Brubaker 2004; Wimmer 2008).17  In 
                                                 
14 There several other definitions; for example, Fearon (2004: 279): “War ends are coded by 
observation of either military victory, wholesale demobilization, or truce or peace agreement followed 
by at least two years of peace.” 
15 Horowitz (1985, p.53), for example, defines ethnicity as ascriptive identities that include “color, 
appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof.” 
16 Some scholars do not agree.  Kaufmann (1996: 140), for example, states that “ethnic identities are 
fixed at birth.” 
17 Rogers Brubaker (2004) has long challenged his colleagues to move beyond “constructivist clichés” 




precolonial Rwanda and Burundi, for example, Hutu and Tutsi identities were 
flexible, but this was certainly not the case during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when 
some Hutus targeted all Tutsis because of their ethnic identity (Hintjens 1999).  In the 
words of one individual caught up in the Bosnian ethnic civil war, “I am a Croat....I 
was Yugoslavian, and now I am a Croat. I always knew that I am a Croat, but I didn’t 
feel it so much. Now, you have to be Croat, Serb, Muslim, Jewish or whatever....For 
me personally, these identities didn’t interest me at all: my being a Croat wasn’t 
important. But now, you have to be” (Fahy and Mogul 1995).  Another Bosnian 
stated it even more succinctly, “Before this crisis I didn't even know if I was a Serb or 
a Croat” (McGeough 1991). 
It is the specific use of violence in civil wars that mark some as “ethnic.”  
More often than not, it is violence that targets specific categories of people; it is not 
the “ethnic identity” that causes the violence, in other words, but rather the violence 
that creates the relevant ethnic identity during war (Tilly 2003).  There are several 
mechanisms involved in the activation of this identity which can be drawn from the 
dynamics of contention literature; these are primarily part of a process of polarization 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).  The most important are either “category 
formation” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 143), if identities are invented anew, 
or “boundary activation” (Tilly 2003: 75-76), when a shared identity exists but 
                                                                                                                                           
practice of reification works: “As analysts, we should…try to account for the ways in which - and the 
conditions under which - this practice of reification, this powerful crystallization of group feeling, can 




violence is used to activate or reinforce it in opposition to others.  Several other 
mechanisms may also be at work.18 
It is this component of an ascriptive identity, and the politicization of that 
identity through violence, that distinguishes ethnic civil war from other forms of large 
scale political violence, such as revolutionary wars, coup-related wars, or resource-
based wars (Aspinall 2007; Besancon 2005; Fearon 2004).19  The ascriptive 
component can lead militant organizations to identify entire ethnic groups as loyal or 
disloyal within a country’s population – regardless of how one may self-identify – in 
a way that ideological conflicts cannot.  In fact, ethnic group members have gone to 
great lengths to find out who is a member of an “enemy” group, including the use of 
census data in Nazi Germany, electoral lists in Sri Lanka, and identity cards in 
Rwanda (Hintjens 1999; Kaufmann 1996; Seltzer 1998).  As a result, members of one 
ethnic group are far less likely to fight for the opposing side, dividing communities 
and potentially making postwar reconciliation in an intermingled state very difficult.20  
In ideological wars, by contrast, loyalties are more fluid both during and after 
combat.21 
                                                 
18 For example “convergence,” where contradictions at one end of the political spectrum drive actors of 
one identity into a closer alliance, and “attribution of threat,” which distinguishes between the presence 
of a threat and the recognition of the threat by the group. 
19 There may be an interaction effect between resource and identity conflict; see Aspinall (2007) 
20 This is not to say that cross-ethnic appeals are not possible.  As other scholars have pointed out, even 
during ethnic wars it is possible to find individuals from the rebellious ethnic group working for the 
government.  Kaufmann argues this may occur when there is “extreme power imbalance,” which 
would be consistent with Kalyvas’s (2006; 2008) argument that civilians will provide support to 
whichever actor has military dominance locally, although most of his cases come from colonial wars.  
This may explain how the Russian government was able to co-opt local rebel leaders and their 
followers(e.g., Akhmad Kadyrov and the so-called Kadyrovtsy) only after taking territorial control of 
most of Chechnya’s urban centers. 
21 Ideological conflicts may sometimes display fixed or inflexible identities.  For example, during the 
Russian civil war of 1917-21, members of certain classes (e.g., “kulaks”) were targeted for deportation 
or death.  For evidence of the extreme class-based nature of the early Soviet state , see Nicolas Werth, 




Numerous definitions of ethnic civil war exist, but typically they combine the 
definitions of civil war and ethnic conflict discussed above (Esty et al. 1995; 
Sambanis 2006).  Ethnic civil wars are typically coded when one party to the conflict 
is an ethnic group seeking changes in their status or government policies toward 
them, whether that be an end to repression, increased power at the center, or secession 
(Sambanis 2001).  More recently, scholars have begun disaggregating “ethnic civil 
wars” into sub-categories, differentiating ethno-secessionist from other forms of 
ethnic war (Chapman and Roeder 2007). 
In political science, scholars continue to debate whether and to what degree 
ethnic civil wars are different from other civil wars, but there is significant theoretical 
and empirical evidence to suggest that, at least in some areas, they should be seen as 
qualitatively different (Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Fearon 2005; Licklider 1995; 
Sambanis 2001; Sambanis 2006).22  Scholars have identified the “uniqueness” of 
ethnic civil wars as they relate to onset (DeFigueiredo and Weingast 1999; 
Huntington 1996; Jenne 2007; Kaufman 1996; Kaufman 1996; Kaufman 2001; Posen 
1993; Snyder 2000; Toft 2003), dynamics (Downes 2008; Kaufmann 1996; Sambanis 
2006), and termination (Bloom and Licklider 2007; Kaufman 2006; Licklider 1995; 
Sambanis 2000; Svensson 2007).  The concept of ethnic conflict and ethnic war is not 
without its critics (Chandra 2006; Crawford and Lipschutz 1998; Gilley 2004; 
Mueller 2000).  These criticisms, however, primarily concern what definition should 
                                                                                                                                           
145-146.  In the Colombian civil war of 1948-62), some members of society believed that being a 
liberal or a conservative was genetic: “They [Conservatives] cut the genitals off other men so that they 
wouldn’t procreate any more Liberals.” Former priest Walter J. Broderick, quoted in Bert Ruiz, The 
Colombian Civil War (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2001), p. 59.  
22 For one example of the debate: Barbara Walter (2002), states that her data identify no difference 
between ethnic and other forms of civil war vis-à-vis war termination, but Stuart J. Kaufman (2006, 
202-203) suggests that five of her six cases of ethnic war which are coded as “successes” should, upon 




be used and the scope conditions for its use, rather than abandoning the concept 
altogether. 
4.4 Partition: Statehood and Demography 
In the past, partitions were understood as a ‘fresh division’ of some territory, 
usually executed by a sovereign (often great) power occurring at the time of 
decolonization (Schaeffer 1990).  Meanwhile, debates over partition focused on the 
normative goal of self-determination (Kumar 1997; Tullberg and Tullberg 1997).  
This changed in the mid-1990s when academics such as Van Evera, Mearsheimer, 
and Kaufmann concentrated on partition as a mechanism to end ethnic civil wars, as 
humanitarian tool to minimize deaths and reduce human suffering once war had 
begun. 
Under this humanitarian variant, the word “partition” has been presented as 
either (i) the demographic separation of warring ethnic groups into defensible 
enclaves (Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998) or (ii) the demographic separation of 
warring ethnic groups into separate, sovereign states (Downes 2004; Mearsheimer 
1993).  The latter variant has come to dominate the pro-partition argument, in 
recognition of the difficulties posed by reintegrating ethnic groups under a single, 
post-war state, and the need to translate those “enclaves” into a longer-term solution 
(Downes 2001; Kaufmann 2007).  I address both of these concerns in later chapters.  I 
argue, for example, that reintegration is possible as long as the state is sufficiently 
strong to induce collaboration.  I also argue that separation into defensible enclaves 
does not produce an end to ongoing violence and will not produce a long-term 




4.5 De Jure or De Facto Statehood 
There is some debate as to whether de jure or de facto statehood is necessary 
to end ethnic civil wars, but these arguments are one of degree: the key component is 
statehood.  According to Max Weber, a state is an entity that “claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force within a given territory” (Gerth and Mills 1958).  As 
Salehyan (Salehyan 2007, p.219) states, 
“Internally, states have the power and authority to establish rules of the 
political game, regulate opposition activities, and suppress challengers to its 
dominance. States may also regulate which types of flows—finances, goods, 
people, and so on—may cross their borders. In short, international boundaries 
define the sovereign jurisdiction and geographic territory of modern states.” 
 
The key component of statehood for partition, as we will see in later chapters, is the 
core Weberian notion of controlling force within a given territory.  Partition need not 
be recognized internationally as two sovereign states, but the partitioned territory 
needs have two or more territories controlled unilaterally by separate armed forces.  
These territories are demarcated by boundaries that act as lines of defense (Salehyan 
2007, p.220). 
Both de jure and defacto statehood provide the necessary defensive 
capabilities to reduce the ethnic security dilemma and avoid the problem of credible 
commitments that would appear if the two groups attempted to reintegrate within one 
state (Kolsto 2006; Pegg 1998).  De jure statehood might increase the likelihood for 
peace by improving defense capabilities (e.g., the ability to procure weapons) and 




statehood is more likely to create an enduring peace (Chapman and Roeder 2007).  
However, since both de facto and de jure statehood take care of the key security 
concerns, both are, in principle, acceptable as part of the definition for partition, when 
combined with complete ethno-demographic separation.  Increasingly, the notion of 
sovereignty is questioned in IR literature, and several scholars have begun treating de 
facto sovereign units as separate units in the state system, subject to IR theories and 
explanations (e.g., Krasner 1999; e.g., Vinci 2008).  As a recent review summarized, 
while various authors disagree on many aspects of de facto states, there is agreement 
that de facto states “are remarkably robust, state-like entities” (Kolsto 2006, p.727). 
5 Chapter Overview 
I conclude this introductory chapter with a brief overview of each chapter in this 
dissertation and the major findings it presents.  It is hoped this will both provide a 
grand overview of the dissertation and permit people to identify which chapters will 
be of greater interest for more in-depth reading. 
5.1 Chapter 2: Theories of Ending Ongoing Ethnic Civil War Violence 
This is the first theory chapter and focuses on the first half of civil war 
termination: theories of how ongoing civil wars end.  I divide theories into three sub-
groups: (i) realpolitik; (ii) negotiated solutions and the problem of credible 
commitments; and (iii) the second generation ethnic security dilemma (2G ESD).  I 
identify weaknesses in the first two sub-groups and concentrate on partition as a 
solution to the ethnic security dilemma.  The partitioning of warring ethnic groups, it 
is argued, should end the ethnic security dilemma and bring peace.  However, 




adequate consideration alternative factors that could prolong ethnic civil war 
violence.  Equally important, empirically, this theory has never been properly tested 
in the literature.  This sets the stage for chapter three, which is the first empirical test 
of the second generation ethnic security dilemma. 
5.2 Chapter 3 
Chapter three uses a single, crucial case to test the ethnic security dilemma.  I 
use an ethnic civil war with high levels of death, displacement, ethnically-based 
massacres, vilification of the enemy, ethnic migration into ethnically homogenous 
territories, and a war that ended in complete ethno-demographic separation.  In short, 
the case matches extremely well with the type of war for which partition advocates 
advocate partition.  As a crucial case, if I do find evidence of partition’s success, it 
only provides mild support for the theory, since the partition is highly likely to 
produce a war-end, according to the theory.  Nevertheless, since no scholars have 
properly conducted a process tracing of this event, the research is valuable in its own 
right.  If I cannot identify a causal impact between partition and war end, it will call 
into question the ethnic security dilemma as an explanation.   
Using process-tracing, I track violence and migration during the Georgian-
Abkhaz civil war (1992-1993) and demonstrate that separation into defensible 
enclaves occurred, just as the 2G ESD predict, but that the violence of war did not 
end.  I uncover a previous, little-known partition that occurred during the war but 
once this partition had taken place, the war continued for several months and 
concluded with a major humanitarian catastrophe and a second, better-known 




generation ESD.  Further, the catastrophe that followed the first ethno-demographic 
partition raises grave doubts about the humanitarian justification for partition.  
However, while wars may end for reasons other than demographic separation, I 
develop the 3G ESD that focuses on post-war peace endurance since the recidivism 
rate of ethnic civil wars is so high. 
5.3 Chapter 4 
This is the second theory chapter and it focuses on this second phase of “civil 
war termination,” examining theories of how to maintain peace once an initial 
cessation of violence has taken hold during ethnic civil wars.  I divide the theories 
into three categories: (i) capacity, (ii) motivation, and (iii) trust.  I build on the first 
and second generations of the ethnic security dilemma, developing the third 
generation that emphasizes post-war peace. 
My theory argues that demographic separation with statehood ends the ethnic 
security dilemma and increases the likelihood of peace in a post-conflict environment.  
However, it challenges the microfoundations emphasized in the 2G ESD, arguing that 
intractable inter-ethnic relationships are not at the heart of conflict recurrence.  
Instead, the 3G ESD argues that it is a combination of the triadic political space 
created by incomplete partitions and the balance of power that emerges in the post-
partition environment.  If stay-behind minorities exist, the chances of renewed 
warfare depend largely on a state’s capacity to defend itself relative to its neighbor 
rival. Many things reduce state capacity, including infrastructure damage caused by 
the civil war, internal armed opposition, state-building strategies, etc., and I deal with 




5.4 Chapter 5 
This chapter is a cross-national test of the 3G ESD.  It examines all ethnic civil 
war terminations in between 1945 and 2004 (n=80).  It introduces a new index to 
measure ethno-demographic separation, and the results demonstrate that ethnic civil 
wars that ended with a partition into separate states and complete ethno-demographic 
separation maintained peace for at least five years.  I run a statistical test using the 
index and I compare the results to all other ethnic civil war terminations.  This is 
strong evidence in support of the 3G ESD.  These data are part of a nested design, and 
I turn to case studies Chapter Six to supplement the results of chapter five and 
evaluate the causal mechanisms of the theory through process tracing, which cannot 
be accomplished through the cross-national examination. 
5.5 Chapter 6  
Chapter six is a set of two case studies: post-war Abkhazia, a state that emerged 
following the Georgian-Abkhaz civil war, and post-war Pridnestrovie, a state that 
emerged following the Moldovan-Pridnestrovie civil war.  Abkhazia had a large 
ethnic Georgian stay-behind minority and, as the 3G ESD predicts, violence ensues.  
However, the key difference between the 2G and 3G ESD is why and how violence 
ensues.  Such micromechanisms could not be established using the aggregate data in 
the cross-national study.  The 2G argues that ethnic groups cannot cooperate 
following intense ethnic wars.  The 3G argues that they can cooperate where the state 
is strong.  I disaggregate the Abkhaz state and demonstrate that (i) violence was 
caused by the triadic political space, with armed groups entering Abkhazia from 




state-building had failed, shifting the balance of power in favor of the Georgian state.  
Where the Abkhaz state was comparatively strong, there was no violence. 
The Moldova-Pridnestrovie case study examines a “non-event”: the lack of 
violence in Pridnestrovie following their ethnic civil war (1992).  Both Pridnestrovie 
and Moldova had large stay-behind minorities that, according to the 2G ESD, should 
have resulted in violence.  The results of the case study bring into relief the 
importance of state-building.  I demonstrate a little-known fact about the Moldovan 
civil war: Pridnestrovie had effectively separated from Moldova and consolidated its 
rule before the civil war began.  When the war did occur, it was short in duration and 
isolated geographically, leaving both Moldovan and Pridnestrovie security 
apparatuses intact and (i) able to induce collaboration among the stay-behind 
minorities and (ii) reduce the opportunity for attack from the neighboring republics in 
the post-war period. 
5.6 Chapter 8 
This concluding chapter summarizes the results of the dissertation, suggests 
future areas of research, and puts forward some policy recommendations, for Iraq, 





Chapter 2: Theory: Partition as a Solution to Ethnic Civil War 
Theory 




As discussed in Chapter 1, this dissertation focuses on two elements of 
“resolving” ethnic civil war: (i) ending ongoing violence and (ii) building an enduring 
peace.  These elements are conceptually distinct but frequently conflated in the 
literature.  Ending war emphasizes mechanisms to lower heightened levels of 
violence and disengage combat forces, resulting in (a frequently fragile) peace.  This 
is distinct from peace-building, which addresses the high recidivism rate of ethnic 
civil wars, seeking means to assist conflict-prone countries to exit the recurring cycle 
of violence; the emphasis is therefore on maintaining peace once it has been 
established.  Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the first meaning of war termination and 
Chapters 4 through 7 focus on the latter. 
In this chapter I discuss various explanations for ending the ongoing violence 
of civil war termination that are dominant in the field of comparative politics and 
international relations.  I narrow in on the ethnic security dilemma that has been used 
as a theoretical backdrop to promote the use of partitioning countries specifically to 
end ongoing ethnic civil war. 




Explanations of ethnic civil war duration are dominated by three approaches, 
each with a specific theory of how civil wars end: (i) realpolitik and balance of 
power, (ii) credible commitment problems, and the (iii) ethnic security dilemma.  The 
first two approaches affect ethnic and non-ethnic wars, although I make an original 
contribution below by arguing that credible commitment problems for ethnic wars are 
more acute.  Other explanations for duration, such as regime type (Goemans 2000), 
prospect theory (Bauer and Rotte 1997; Levy 1996), or veto players (Cunningham 
2006), are less relevant to comparisons with partition because there is little prospect 
for direct intervention to hasten the end of war.  Since I am interested in how to end 
ethnic civil wars, I therefore do not address these latter theories. 
3 Realpolitik: Military Victories 
The most common cause of civil war termination is military victory, which is 
typically a function of balance of capabilities or military strategy: wars end when one 
side gains an upper-hand militarily to defeat its opponent, and wars continue when 
their balance of capabilities are equal (Fearon and Laitin 2007; Toft 2006).23  
Realpolitik has also proven to be a powerful explanatory power in ending interstate 
wars (Bennett and Stam 1996). 
There are a variety of ways to achieve an upper hand in civil wars, such as 
strategic choices on the battlefield, but strong external support for one actor is a clear 
mechanism (i.e., certification or brokerage) that could hasten the end of civil wars 
(Balach-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2000).  For example, civil wars could 
end when a foreign power either enters or exits a conflict: US withdrawal from the 
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Vietnam War, leading to a North Vietnamese victory, and increased US assistance to 
Turkey during its war against the Kurdish Workers Party in the 1990s, leading to the 
end of that war.  The withdrawal of great power support at the end of the Cold War 
has been proposed as a possible explanation for the dramatic decline in the number of 
civil wars since its peak in 1994.  Finally, not only foreign governments, but also 
diaspora communities can impact the balance of power.  Sri Lanka’s long-running 
ethnic civil war experienced a dramatic shift after 9/11 when funding the Tamil 
Tigers from abroad became riskier when the international community began to 
legislate and punish funding for “terrorist organizations” more forcefully.  The 
reduction in funding allowed the Sri Lankan government to gain the upper-hand 
military, leading to a dramatic decline in the fortunes of the Tigers, and a military 
victory for the government by spring 2009. 
There are conflicting empirical results as to exactly whether and how external 
support ends civil war.  For example, Regan’s (2002) results suggest that 
interventions lengthen all wars; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) suggest 
that it may hasten military victory for one side but prolongs the end for negotiated 
solutions; and Fearon and Laitin (2007) suggest that a sudden change during the war 
will produce termination.  While military victory is not specific to ethnic civil war 
termination, criticisms of the “peace through victory” approach cite an increased 
likelihood of ethnic massacres (e.g., genocide) following victory as one dangerous 
outcome specific to ethnic civil wars (Licklider 1995).  A similar criticisms related to 




by refugee flows (Forsberg 2008; Lake and Rothchild 1998; Moore and Shellman 
2006). 
4 Negotiated Solutions and the Problem of Credible Commitment 
Despite the frequency of military victories, academic research and policy 
preferences on ending civil wars have largely focused on negotiated solutions, 
especially in the past two decades (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Stedman 
1997; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002; Zartman 1985; Zartman 1995).  
Research has focused on getting parties to the negotiating table, and in the post-Cold 
War environment began focusing on implementation due to the difficulty of 
transforming ceasefires into peace agreements that endure (Stedman 2002). 
Explanations for the inability to reach negotiated settlements in civil wars 
narrow-in on the key difference between resolutions for inter-state and intra-state 
wars: the need for one party to disarm, creating a problem of credible commitment 
(Fearon 1998).  Agreements between governments and rebels require rebels to 
disarm, but by disarming, the rebels lose key leverage that brought the government to 
the negotiating table.  If the government later reneges on its commitments, 
weaponless rebels have severely diminished options.  Barbara Walter (2002: 21) 
states: 
As groups send their soldiers home, hand in their weapons, and surrender 
occupied territory, they become increasingly vulnerable to a surprise attack; and 
once they surrender arms and cede control of territory, their rival can more 
easily seize control of the state and permanently exclude them from power. 
 
Thus any promises the government makes in a peace agreement are not credible.  
Given the risks associated with negotiated solutions, rebels are less likely to pursue 




why war termination involving powersharing agreements are so rare for civil wars, 
why military victories are so common, and why civil wars are so much longer than 
inter-state wars.24 
5 Problem of Credible Commitments for Ethnic Civil Wars 
While it has not been addressed in the literature, the problem of credible 
commitment can be seen as particularly acute in ethnic civil wars; I term this an 
augmented and expanded problem of credible commitment.  In non-identity conflicts 
it is the rebel organization that fears being a sucker if it were to disarm: disarming 
could lead to the arrest or destruction of the leadership and armed forces, in addition 
to losing gains achieved in peace agreements.  However, in an ethnic civil war, when 
groups have been targeted because of their ethnicity, the fear of failure suffuses all 
members of the group, not just the organization.  Being the sucker, and thus losing the 
war and the peace, could lead to massacres and genocide, a statistically significant 
likelihood when governments win ethnic wars.  The “actor” is now the group, not the 
organization, and this compounds the problem. 
Given group fears, there are several reasons why negotiated solutions are less 
likely to be signed.  Most critically, it is easier to motivate group members to carry on 
fighting and supporting the war against difficult odds, given the alternative is 
potentially genocidal.  Second, there is lower likelihood that organizations will be 
able to bring all group members onside in the event that an agreement is reached.  
Even if an organization can be convinced to enter an agreement, its group members 
may not provide support, fearing long-term consequences.  Third, it is easier for 
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splinter groups to emerge as “spoilers” since group identity can be used as a resource 
and be exploited by ethnic entrepreneurs seeking a base of support.  In essence, there 
are many more individuals affected by the problem of credible commitments and 
therefore many more individuals that need to be satisfied by potential resolutions of 
the problem making it a more difficult obstacle to overcome. 
6 Solutions to Credible Commitments: Third Party Guarantees 
Two solution have been proposed to overcome the problem of credible 
commitments and end civil wars.  The most widely discussed is third-party security 
guarantees (Walter 2002).  If states cannot commit to terms in a peace agreement on 
their own, then an external actor with a credible enforcement mechanism (i.e., armed 
force) could theoretically resolve the dilemma.  Walter presents this solution with 
evidence demonstrating its validity.  If credible enforcement mechanisms are created, 
rebel organizations will be more likely to implement peace deals and decommission 
rebel armies. 
Yet there are at least three problems with this solution.  First, if rebels can look 
ahead and see that government promises are not credible, why do they sign peace 
agreements without third-party enforcement mechanisms that only later break down? 
This occurred several times in the long-running Sri Lankan civil war.  Second, how, 
specifically, are peacekeepers able to enforce power-sharing mechanisms?  Even 
well-armed peacekeeping missions rarely possess the military strength and political 
will to directly interfere with the political process in a given country to veto decisions 
of the government.  Yet, agreements are nevertheless implemented with weak peace 




power-sharing agreement between government and rebel forces.  Yet, while a 
peacekeeping force was introduced, they were not given a detailed mandate to 
enforce a given number of cabinet seats.  When the government removed former 
rebels from positions in the government, the peacekeepers could not act. 
Third, peacekeepers are designed to assist only in the transitional period, yet 
the problem of credible commitment continues over the long-term, as governments 
will still have an incentive to renege on promises after third-parties depart.  Why do 
rebels not anticipate this problem?  Thus, if the problem is credible commitments, 
third-party enforcement mechanisms do not appear to be enough, unless they are 
comprehensive and permanent, which they almost never are.  This suggests that other 
factors may be at work. 
7 Solutions to Credible Commitment Problems: Partition 
An alternative solution to the problem of credible commitment is partition.  
Partition addresses the core issue of the problem directly.  By permitting the division 
of territory between rebel and state leaders, the problem of credible commitment is 
resolved by turning the intra-state conflict into an inter-state conflict, with separate 
armed forces.  For ethno-secessionist conflicts, by far the largest percentage of ethnic 
civil wars, this is promising because the nature of territoriality during the war is 
typically missing in ideological and other forms of civil war where capture of the 
center is at the heart of the conflict.25  This may help explain the empirical 
observation that ethnic wars more frequently end in partition than non-ethnic wars 
(Sambanis 2000). 
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Despite its resolution of credible commitment problems, leading scholars in IR 
have not recommended partition as a solution: Walter does not discuss this option in 
her work, and Fearon (2004) explicitly condemns partition as a solution, predicting 
greater global instability if it were to be adopted by great powers.  In fact, when 
partition emerged as a solution to ethnic civil wars in the 1990s, problems of credible 
commitments were not invoked as the rationale.  Instead,   partition advocates 
introduced a unique theory for ethnic civil war dynamics: the ethnic security 
dilemma. 
8 The Ethnic Security Dilemma during War 
The security dilemma derives from the realist tradition of international 
relations (Glaser 1997; Jervis 1978).  A security dilemma can develop when, in an 
anarchical system, one state’s defensive action makes other states feel less secure, 
prompting them to build up armaments, drawing two or more states into a potential 
military confrontation, even where none originally sought it.  Barry Posen (1993) 
applied this concept to ethnic conflict, initiating an extensive research program within 
the social sciences that continues to this day.  Examining situations of “emerging 
anarchy” that results from failing states, Posen likened ethnic groups to states in the 
international system.  Given the lack of a central government to enforce the peace, 
distrustful ethnic groups are forced to rely on themselves, engaging in defensive 
actions that seem threatening to the rest, heightening tension, and possibly leading to 
violence. 
Importantly, the demographic mixture of populations influences the intensity 




confines of another, an offensive strategy may come to dominate, to save their 
brethren “from a horrible fate” (Posen 1993: 32); conversely, ethnic militias have an 
incentive to preemptively expel members of the out-group located inside their own 
territory to remove the out-group’s incentive for an offensive strategy. 
As a theory of ethnic war onset, however, the micro-foundations are under-
specified.  Most centrally, what is the process by which identities gain salience in this 
emerging anarchy?  As discussed above, group identities do not by themselves 
constitute politically relevant units, but are usually “activated” via violence.  Ethnic 
groups do not fear other groups until a threat is attributed to them, which typically 
occurs through collective violence, although other factors could be involved (Tilly 
2003).  In other words, collective violence is probably the cause of the ethnic security 
dilemma, not the result.  The ethnic security dilemma is therefore probably a better 
explanation for violence and migration after ethnic war has begun. 
Chaim Kaufmann (1996; 2006) has proposed the ethnic security dilemma to 
explain the dynamics of migration and violence during war.  I call this the Second 
Generation (2G) Ethnic Security Dilemma because it builds on the component parts 
of Posen’s First Generation: demography, sovereignty, and anarchy.  The 2G ethnic 
security dilemma is more consistent with my expectation since the violence of ethnic 
war has already heightened the salience of group identity and groups have attributed 
threats to other groups, thus completing the polarization process (McAdam, Tarrow, 
and Tilly 2001).  As Downes (2004: 236) confirms, “[i]ntermingling by itself…does 
not cause ethnic wars in the first place; it is the effect of the war that makes 




state that “the search for security motivates groups in divided societies to seek to 
control the state or secede if the state’s neutrality cannot be assured” (Saideman et al. 
2002: 106-107, italics added).  Indeed, in an ethnic civil war the biased nature of the 
state has already been demonstrated, and all threatened groups must mobilize for self-
defense. 
Once war has begun, due to real or perceived threats, virtually all individuals 
become trapped by their ascriptive characteristics, forced into rigid, opposing sides, in 
part because they can be identified easily by the enemy.  While not everyone is 
mobilized for war, it is rare to find members of one ethnic group fighting on the 
opposing side.26 As Kaufmann (1996: 139) states: 
Ethnic wars…generate intense security dilemmas, both because the escalation 
of each side’s mobilization rhetoric presents a real threat to the other, and 
even more because intermingled population settlement patterns create 
defensive vulnerabilities and offensive opportunities…Once this occurs, the 
war cannot end until the security dilemma is reduced by physical separation of 
the rival groups. 
 
Other scholars have identified ethnically mixed regions as particularly prone to 
violence during war, prolonging the war itself.  In discussing the former Yugoslavia, 
Hurst Hannum (2004, p.280) states, “Keeping ‘trapped’ Serbs within Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (and trapped Croats within the latter) may have actually 
contributed to continuation of the violence, since peaceful means of redrawing 
                                                 
26 Kalyvas has been at the frontline of demonstrating when and where group members may defect, such 
as during colonial war.  See: 
Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press,  
Kalyvas, Stathis. 2008. Ethnic Defection in Civil War. Comparative Political Studies 
 




borders seem to have been excluded.”  The incentive for violence and the uprooting 
of hundreds of thousands continued. 
The solution is therefore separation (Kaufmann 1996, p.161-162): “Unless 
outsiders are willing to provide permanent security guarantees, stable resolution of an 
ethnic civil war requires separation of the groups into defensible regions.  The critical 
variable is demography, not sovereignty…demographic separation dampens ethnic 
conflicts even without separate sovereignty.” 
Critically, for this dissertation, the ethnic security dilemma is “a theory of how 
ethnic wars end” (Kaufmann 1996, 137).  The violence of these wars takes on a logic 
of its own and continues until groups separate into defensible cantons (i.e., partition), 
after which the incentive for further violence ends.  Partition advocates acknowledge 
that ethnic wars can also end through military victories by the state, or long-term 
international military commitments to enforce a truce, such as that seen in Bosnia.  
The problem with those solutions, as mentioned above, is that the former comes with 
an increased risk of genocide, and the latter is rarely forthcoming from third parties in 
sufficient numbers and strength (Stedman 2002).  Without a complete victory or 
large-scale intervention, the war will not end until the warring groups are separated. 
Waiting for groups to separate on their own also carries great humanitarian 
risks, as the driving force behind separation is the continued massacres and military 
actions designed to homogenize territories.  Partition advocates therefore advocate 
that the international community intervene to less inhumanely produce separation.  As 
one legal advisor for the International Committee for the Red Cross stated (quoted in 




You cannot stop ethnic cleansing as long as there is a political will to effect 
such a policy. […].  If it is the authorities themselves that direct the police and 
the municipal authorities to carry out this kind of policy, then we can make all 
the protests we want but succeed only in making it more humane.  They will 
still carry out ethnic cleansing, but perhaps in a certain manner that at least 
preserves the lives of the victimized population. 
9 Partition and the End of Ethnic Civil War 
Since the ethnic security dilemma drives violence and migration, partitioning 
warring groups ends the war.  Importantly, other factors that may have caused the war 
to erupt in the first place are irrelevant once the ethnic security dilemma dynamics 
take over.  As Kaufmann (1996: 137) states boldly: “solutions to ethnic wars do not 
depend on their causes.”  Since that statement, other empirical tests have indeed 
suggested that this is the case.  Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 44) write that “there exist 
important qualitative differences between the problems of war onset and war 
continuation or termination.  Empirical evidence to date confirms that some of the 
variables that influence civil war onset do not have equivalent power in explaining 
war duration.” 
10 Critique of the Ethnic Security Dilemma and Partition 
As a theory of how ethnic civil wars end, the ethnic security dilemma is 
extremely parsimonious, with a simple explanatory variable (separation of groups 
into separate cantons or states) and a powerful dependent variable (end of ethnic civil 
war).  Yet, I present two major critiques: one theoretical and one empirical.  Most 




for civil war violence and assumes that the unique logic of the ethnic security 
dilemma trumps all other factors.  Civil wars are complex affairs and almost certainly 
contain multiple motivations and dynamics, which are conveniently ignored by 
partition advocates, who reduce violence and migration to the ethnic security 
dilemma alone. 
For one, the social science literature on civil wars increasingly emphasizes the 
importance of organizations in explanations of violence and the duration of internal 
wars (Collier and Hoeffler 2003; Weinstein 2007; Mueller 2000).  Once these 
organizations of violence are established, operating with stable sources of funding, 
can we really expect they will cease their violence if their ethnic kin are suddenly 
concentrated homogenously in a new homeland?  There are many reasons to question 
that assumption, and other scholars have identified a broad range of factors that may 
lead to the continuation of violence.  Once a violence-generating organization has 
been established, there may be material incentives for its leaders to perpetuate the 
conflict as a means of extracting greater rents from society (King 2001). 
The 2G ethnic security dilemma has helped advance the field of civil war 
studies in several ways.  While I argue that it seems improbable that such a theory 
could explain the end of ethnic civil war violence, I argue that is should still be a 
powerful explanation of migration, violence, and group concentration during ethnic 
civil wars.  
However, even if we assume that theoretically the ethnic security dilemma 
overtakes other causes of violence, and despite the theory’s widespread attention over 




439) raised a similar concern when he stated, “However intuitive [partition theory’s] 
reasoning may be, it is nothing more than a series of unsubstantiated assertions. 
Beyond a handful of self-selected cases, partition theorists have not presented proof 
that partition is the only viable and credible solution to ethnic civil war.” 
I go further than Sambanis, however, and argue that partition theory has never 
been properly tested empirically, even through case studies.  Looking through the 
literature on partition, I count at least 15 articles that offer specific empirical tests 
based on the “Kaufmann Argument” (e.g., Bloom and Licklider 2007; Downes 2001; 
Downes 2004; Fearon 2004; Galbraith 2006; Galbraith 2006; Gelb 2003; Johnson 
2008; Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998; Kaufmann 2006; Laitin 2004; Lindley 2007; 
Mearsheimer 2000; Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995; Sambanis 2000).  Each of 
these, however, suffers from an inappropriate research design that does not permit 
testing of whether partition ends the violence of ethnic civil war.  The critical problem 
is a conceptual flaw with scholars focusing on the wrong dependent variable.  Each 
piece of research, from single case studies to large-n cross national studies, includes 
only “war-ends” in their universe of cases.  These studies then examine whether 
violence recurs in the proceeding years.  While this is appropriate for testing whether 
partition builds an enduring peace (a topic we will return to in Chapters 4 through 7), 
it is highly inappropriate for testing whether partition ends ongoing war. 
Kaufmann’s (1996: 159) seminal article on the topic in fact admits that he 
does not test his hypotheses appropriately: “Testing this proposition directly requires 
better data on the attitudes of threatened populations during and after ethnic wars than 




supplemented by investigation of individual cases as deeply as the data permits.”  The 
problem is that no one has gone “deeply” enough into the data to test the theory, and 
no one has constructed a research design to systematically gather the necessary data.  
Further, in addition to the conceptual flaw, each case study used to test partition to 
date has relied exclusively on secondary data, which is particularly dangerous when 
dealing with war; Kalyvas (2006: 32-51), for example, identifies five potential biases 
that can occur in war-related literature which should strongly caution scholars from 
relying solely on secondary evidence for this topic.27 
This gap in the literature is all the more alarming when we consider that this 
theory has been promoted as a policy prescription, most recently during the height of 
Iraq’s civil war in 2006-2007 (e.g., Galbraith 2006; Kaufmann 2006).  If 
humanitarian corridors had been established to separate ethnic groups as partition 
advocates proposed, would this have the ended the war?  The answer is that we do not 
know, since the theory has never been appropriately tested. 
This brings me to the first two hypotheses I will test in the dissertation related 
to migration patterns.  The 2G ethnic security dilemma predicts that, during ethnic 
civil wars, ethnic groups should migrate to regions under the territorial control of its 
ethnic kin.  This produces the following hypotheses: 
H1 During ethnic civil wars, territories will become increasingly ethnically 
homogenous. 
 
                                                 
27 These biases can affect those writing on civil wars or the quality of information available to writers 
on civil wars – each of these could affect literature available to scholars relying on secondary literature.  
The biases are (i) taking sides in a conflict (partisan bias); (ii) political framing of civil wars (political 
bias); (iii) obtaining information from urban locations despite violence being fought predominantly in 
rural areas (urban bias); (iv) focusing on violence instead of peace (selection bias); (v) problems with 




H2 During ethnic civil wars, members of ethnic groups migrate to regions under 
the territorial control of ethnic kin members. 
 
 
The third hypothesis relates to the consequences of ethnic separation.  The 2G 
ethnic security dilemma (sometimes referred to as “partition theory”) predicts that, 
once populations are separated, the violence of war will end: 
H3 Complete separation of ethnic groups will lead to the termination of ethnic 
civil war. 
 
Observationally, if one can identify the date when ethno-demographic separation has 
been achieved, the end of the ethnic civil war should follow immediately or soon 
thereafter.  We can also create two related sub-hypotheses with observable 
implications.  First, that greater separation should lead to lower levels of violence 
during war, since the incentives for violence decrease; and second, the greater the 
separation should lead to fewer civilian casualties during war, for the same reason. 
H3a The higher the degree of ethno-demographic separation during ethnic civil 
war, the fewer the battles there will be. 
 
H3b The higher the degree of ethno-demographic separation, the fewer the civilian 
casualties there will be. 
 
In Chapter Three, I develop a detailed systematic test of partition’s ability to end 
ethnic civil war by examining migration and violence spatially and temporally during 
Georgia’s 1992-1993 separatist ethnic civil war.  The results carry both confirmation 
of the 2G ethnic security dilemma and negation.  While I find support that the ethnic 
security dilemma leads to separation and increasingly homogenous regions, the result 
vis-à-vis war end are decidedly negative: full separation did not lead to the war’s 
termination.  Worse, despite separation, the war ended in a humanitarian catastrophe 




Chapter 3: Partition and the End of Ongoing Ethnic Civil War: 




Chapter Two introduced the reader to the Second Generation Ethnic Security 
Dilemma (2G ESD) theory, which argues that (i) ethnic civil war leads to 
demographic separation and that (ii) complete demographic separation of ethnic 
groups leads to the end of ethnic civil war.  I argued that the theory was too 
reductionist, that the causes of violence during war were too complex to have ethno-
demographic separation lead to peace.  I also argued that previous empirical tests of 
2G ESD (often referred to as “partition theory”) had been methodologically flawed, 
not permitting an accurate evaluation of the theory.  This chapter provides an 
empirical test of the 2G ESD through a single case study of the Georgian-Abkhazian 
ethnic civil war (1992-1993).  I use primary sources to track patterns of migration and 
violence both spatially and temporally during that war to assess whether the main 
tenets of the 2G ESD are accurate. 
 
2 Introduction 
Several diverse options have been put forward to help bring civil wars to an 
end, including third-party security guarantees (Walter 2002), peacekeeping operations 
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006), military aid (Herbst 1996/97; 
Regan 2000), and standing aside to allow warring factions to fight it out, leading to 




One option that has gained significant attention since the 1990s has been the 
use of partition, to divide warring ethnic groups into separate homelands.  Advocates 
of partition accept several paths to ethnic war termination but argue that separating 
warring ethnic groups is the best one under certain conditions.  In particular, this 
option should be considered when ethnic war and massacres have already begun but 
long-term commitments of well-armed ground forces are not forthcoming from the 
international community.  Under such conditions, partition offers a realistic policy 
alternative that achieves humanitarian objectives without the need for long-term troop 
commitments.  Foreign troops need intervene only for a short period of time to 
establish humanitarian corridors, permitting ethnic groups to cross to “their” newly 
created homeland state.  While population transfers are a travesty, under partition’s 
plan they are conducted by foreign troops, who will be more humane than enemy 
militias who are engaged in ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity.  
Partitioning warring ethnic groups has been recommended during warfare in such 
diverse areas as Bosnia, Rwanda, Israel-Palestine, Sudan, Serbia, and, most recently, 
in Iraq.  Remarkably, given the gravity of such a proposal, little empirical evidence 
has been conducted to assess whether partition would really work to end the war. 
Not only has little empirical testing has been completed, but the extant tests 
have suffered from a methodological flaw that has prevented reliable conclusions.  
While the ethnic security dilemma theory predicts that, during ethnic civil war, 
separation of ethnic groups into separate homelands will lead to an end of ongoing 
violence, scholars have only empirically tested whether partition prevents ethnic civil 




universe of cases selected by scholars has been restricted to ethnic civil wars that 
have ended, neglecting ongoing ethnic civil wars.  In other words, even if partition 
prevents war recurrence, we do not know whether partition ends ongoing war – and 
ending ongoing war is the raison d’etre of partition as a policy tool. 
In this chapter I correct that deficiency and use the Georgian ethnic civil war 
in Abkhazia (1992-1993), a war which ended in partition, to construct a “crucial 
case” research design (Eckstein 1975).  I find supporting evidence of the ethnic 
security dilemma – the driving force behind partition theory – of ethnically targeted 
violence, and of homogenization of territories.  As the ethnic civil war progressed, 
ethnic Abkhaz and ethnic Georgians indeed sought safety within territory controlled 
by their own ethnic kin.  There was also evidence of militias targeting ethnic 
outgroups, encouraging them to flee, as the ethnic security dilemma would predict. 
However, I find no support for the proposition that ethnic partition ends 
ongoing ethnic civil wars.  In fact, my research uncovers a remarkable but little-
known aspect of the Georgian-Abkhaz war: while the war itself does end in ethno-
demographic partition, there was an earlier, separate ethno-demographic partition that 
occurred during the war, yet the war continued.   
The warring ethnic groups separated into homeland states, as the theory would 
predict, but the war carried on.  In fact, despite the separation, the Abkhaz side 
continued attempts at territorial gain, eventually succeeding, which led to a wave of 
humanitarian suffering through mass ethnically-based death and migration, the exact 
suffering that partition is supposed to prevent in ethnic civil wars.  As a crucial case, 




conditions for the theory are far more limited than previously imagined, and at worse, 
the theory is wrong. 
Partition did not end the war, I argue, because other strategic objectives drove 
the violence long after ethnic separation had occurred.  Despite the ethno-
demographic separation into militarily defensible enclaves, both sides were intent on 
retaking lost territory it deemed to be part of its homeland, with neither side was 
militarily capable of defeating its opponent.  Drawing on theories of realpolitik and 
balance of capabilities, I suggest that the war ended as a result of two other factors: (i) 
the Abkhaz forces took advantage of increased external support while (ii) the 
Georgian side both made a militarily strategic blunder (it was “the sucker” in a 
problem of credible commitments) and imploded internally when an intra-Georgian 
civil war simultaneously erupted. 
2.1 Overview of Chapter 
I begin with a brief overview of the relevant theory and causal mechanisms 
associated with partition theory.  Second, I present the research design methodology 
used.  Third, I present the empirical findings.  After concluding that separation had 
earlier occurred without the war’s termination, I briefly discuss how the war did end, 
identifying several factors related to balance of capabilities – not ethno-demography – 
that were decisive to the war’s termination.  Finally, I conclude by discussing both the 
importance of these results for foreign policy and how ethno-demographic partition 
may still be important in preventing war recurrence. 




The ethnic security dilemma argues that the violence of ethnic wars trap 
individuals by ascriptive features and society polarizes along identity lines.  Ethnicity 
identifies friend and foe rigidly, making cross-ethnic appeals extremely difficult.  As 
a result, individuals can only rely on the support of militaries comprised of their own 
ethnic kin, and militaries can only rely on recruits from their own ethnic group.  
Areas of mixed-demography create offensive opportunities and defensive 
vulnerabilities.  Offensive opportunities exist because ethnic militias can rely on the 
support of kin members in other regions and thus can (i) expand territorially while (ii) 
protecting those kin members from persecution by enemy ethnic militias.  Defensive 
vulnerabilities exist for exactly that reason: if enemy minority members exist within 
one’s territory, enemy ethnic militias may try to attack to expand territory and “save” 
their kin members.  As a result it is within the each side’s interest to act preemptively, 
(i) eliminating enemy ethnic out-group members within their territory (through 
expulsion or death) and (ii) attacking other regions where kin members are located to 
save them before those members are massacred or expelled. 
Once this dynamic is underway, say partition advocates, the war cannot stop 
until at least one of three things occurs: a third party intervenes to forcefully end the 
conflict; one side militarily defeats the other; or ethnic groups are partitioned into 
separate states.  The last option is called “partition” in the current generation of ethnic 
civil war literature.  Importantly, Chaim Kaufmann (1996: 137), partition’s leading 
advocate, stresses its ability to end ethnic civil wars: this is, he parsimoniously 
argues, “a theory of how ethnic wars end.” 




Based on the theory, I produced three hypotheses to be tested in the dissertation.  
The first two were based on the dynamics of the ESD: 
H4 During ethnic civil wars, members of ethnic groups migrate to regions under 
the territorial control of ethnic kin members. 
 
H5 During ethnic civil wars, territories will become increasingly ethnically 
homogenous as the war continues. 
 
The third hypothesis relates to the consequences of ethnic separation: 
H6 Complete separation of ethnic groups into defensible enclaves will lead to the 
termination of ethnic civil war. 
 
We can also create a related sub-hypothesis.  Greater separation should lead to lower 
levels of violence during war, since the incentives for violence decrease; for example, 
the greater the separation should lead to fewer civilian casualties during war.  After 
all, as Kaufmann (1996, p.137) argues, “Separation reduces both incentives and 
opportunity for further combat, and largely eliminates both reasons and chances for 
ethnic cleansing of civilians.” 
H3a The higher the degree of ethno-demographic separation during ethnic civil 
war, the lower the level of violence. 
 
4 Methodology 
Given the micro-level empirical detail required on population migration and 
violence, I use a single-case research design.28  By focusing on an ongoing war and 
not the war-end, I draw my case from an appropriate universe of cases and avoid the 
                                                 
28 One can think of an ideal large-n, cross-national study, but the data is simply unavailable, and it 
seems unlikely that the data could be realistically gathered.  At a minimum, we would need to track 
patterns of ethno-demographic concentration at some time interval during a war (i.e., the percentage of 
ethnic minorities “trapped” in each other’s homeland).  To collect such data relying on secondary 
sources appears to be impossible.  The closest effort of which I am aware was attempted by the 
Minorities at Risk Project (MAR), which tried to collect approximate data on ethnic minority 
concentration levels in countries during peace time for two time points (1960 and 1992).  However, the 





methodological problems found in previous research.  Simultaneously, I evaluate the 
causal claims of partition theory through process tracing, examining migration and 
violence (George and Bennett 2005).  In fact, the civil war literature has turned 
sharply in favor of case study research in recent years due, in part, to the difficulties 
of specifying causal mechanisms and processes through large-n cross-national 
statistical analyses of civil war terminations, in addition to other problems such as 
data availability and data aggregation at the national level (Kalyvas 2006; Sambanis 
2004; Tarrow 2007).  Large-n scholars Collier and Sambanis (2003, p.301) remark 
that “[t]he difficulties associated with distinguishing between rival mechanisms on 
the basis of limited quantitative results are becoming clearer.”  Sambanis’s solution is 
to confront the quantitative findings with the case study research to draw out the 
mechanisms with greater specificity.  Further, such within-case analysis frequently 
develops a theory’s scope conditions and causal mechanisms further, making it a 
valuable exercise on its own. 
4.1 Case Selection: Crucial Case 
Since this is the first test of its kind for partition theory’s prediction that 
ethno-demographic separation will lead to the end of ethnic civil war, I have chosen a 
“crucial case” research design.  Harry Eckstein (1975) has said the case “must closely 
fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory’s validity.”  Crucial cases “offer 
valuable tests because they are strongly expected to confirm or disconfirm prior 
hypotheses” (McKeown 2004, p.141).  I have selected a case study in which the 
theory is most likely to confirm hypotheses; if the evidence fails to demonstrate 




My case, the Georgian-Abkhaz civil war (1992-1993) should confirm the 
hypotheses for several reasons.  First, this is a core ethnic civil war and is coded as 
such by the leading civil war datasets that include such a variable (Fearon 2004; 
Licklider 1995; Sambanis 2000).  I use an ethnic civil war with high levels of death, 
displacement, ethnically-based massacres, vilification of the enemy, ethnic migration 
into ethnically homogenous territories, and a war that ended in complete ethno-
demographic separation.  In short, the case matches extremely well with the type of 
war for which partition advocates advocate partition.  As I demonstrate below, 
recruitment patterns, rhetoric, and targeted killings all support the notion that 
ethnicity was a core aspect of this civil war, and this created an ethnic security 
dilemma.  Further, this war ended in complete ethno-demographic separation, as the 
theory would predict (Dale 1997; Johnson 2008), and is considered a case of partition 
by both advocates and critics of partition (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Sambanis 
2000).  Through process tracing, the case study should therefore be able to 
demonstrate the causal link between partition and peace if it exists. 
When I began this research, I intended to use process tracing and assess 
whether and how the ethno-demographic partition that occurred at the end of the war 
had in fact contributed to the war end.  As I began to trace the process of separation 
and violence back in time, I discovered a very complicated picture of territorial 
division and ethnic migration throughout the war.  I therefore changed my approach 
and began at the start of the conflict, examining (i) which side controlled which 
territory, (ii) how many “enemy” ethnic group members remained in each territory, 




to the striking observation that Abkhazia experienced complete ethno-demographic 
partition during the course of the war, but the violence of war did not abate. 
4.2 Sources 
Putting together accurate data on activity during a contentious event, such as a 
civil war, is riddled with problems (Davenport and Ball 2002; Kalyvas 2006).  I try to 
deal with the inherent biases, misinformation, and incomplete information by relying 
on four distinct sources of information.  First, I interviewed approximately 150 
civilians who had been in Abkhazia during the war.  I used structured and semi-
structured interviews, enabling me to compare results about migration patterns during 
the conflict as well to remain open to other details participants may have had to offer 
(Arthur and Nazroo 2003); I detail that approach later in the paper.  My goal was to 
see when and where people moved during the war.  Second, I interviewed 24 military 
and government personnel from both sides of the conflict.  These individuals included 
then-government ministers, aides, colonels, officers, and soldiers.  I used semi-
structured interviews, focusing on a list of key themes to understand what they 
understood to be the ethno-demographic situation during the war and how that 
influenced their war-time decisions (Wengraf 2001). 
Third, I rely on several pieces of archival data.  I used documents from a joint 
Abkhaz-Georgian commission that operated during the war to help civilians move to 
areas controlled by their own ethnic kin militias.  I also have data on civilian deaths, 
put together by the Georgian Ombudsman’s office, as well as published material on 
the ethnic composition of armed forces.  Fourth, I used secondary sources, including 




international news articles from the time of the conflict, and (iii) local and foreign 
books published about the conflict. 
4.3 Overview of Georgia, Abkhazia, and the War 
Abkhazia is located in the north-west corner of the internationally recognized 
borders of Georgia (See Map 1).29 To its north sits Russia, to its west is the Black 
Sea, and to its south-east is the Georgian region of Samegrelo. Abkhazia has an area 
of 3,300 square miles (similar in size to Conneticut, Kosovo, and Cyprus), which is 





On the eve of the war, ethnic Abkhaz were concentrated in the eponymously 
titled Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.  Despite being the titular group, 
ethnic Abkhaz were only 18 percent of Abkhazia’s population (2 percent of Georgia’s 
                                                 




total population) while ethnic Georgians formed a plurality of 46 percent; other 
significant groups included the Armenians at 15 percent, and the Russians at 14 
percent (Zhorzholiani et al. 1995: 79).  These demographic numbers were the result 
of Tsarist Russian policies of forced Abkhaz expulsion, as well as the in-migration of 
various ethnic groups during the Tsarist and Soviet era (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983; 
Blauvelt 2007; King 2008; Kvarchelia 1998; Suny 1994). 
In 1991, as the Soviet Union unraveled, ethnic Georgians within Georgia 
voted overwhelmingly for independence while the Abkhaz (and other ethnic groups, 
such as Armenians and Russians) within Abkhazia overwhelmingly voted to remain 
within the Soviet Union (Suny 1994: 326-329).30  In the spring of 1991, Georgia had 
declared its independence; by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and 
by July 1992, the Abkhaz autonomous parliament had effectively declared its 
independence from Georgia (Cornell 2002; Sverev 1996).31 
On August 14, 1992, armed forces representing the Georgian government 
(predominantly paramilitaries)32 entered Abkhazia and the war began; PRIO’s Centre 
                                                 
30 In the March 17th 1991 all-union referendum, Abkhazia’s non-Georgian population overwhelmingly 
voted to preserve the Union; in the March 31st all-Georgian referendum, ethnic Georgians voted 
overwhelmingly for independence.  Abkhaz boycotted the all-Georgian referendum, and Georgians 
boycotted the all-Union referendum.  See Conciliation Resources, “Georgia-Abkhazia: Chronology”. 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/chronology.php accessed 08/10/08. 
31 Abkhazia did not make a formal declaration of independence at that time, but reinstated its 1925 
constitution, a year in which Abkhazia was the Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet 
Union, and independent but with special treaty ties to Georgia.  Since the Soviet Union did not exist in 
July 1992, meaning Abkhazia was a union republic in a country that did not exist and where all other 
union republics had achieved independence, this can effectively be seen as a declaration of 
independence.  Some reports also stated that the leader of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, on a trip to 
Turkey, had requested diplomatic support to gain international recognition.  See, for example, Turkish 
National News Agency report from July 27, 1992 as reported in the BBC Summary of Wrold 
Broadcasts, 07/30/92, “Abkhazia ‘Strong Enough to Fight Georgia’”. 
32 In 1992 there were several paramilitary units, although the two major factions were the Mkhedrioni, 
controlled by Jaba Ioseliani, and Georgia’s National Guard, controlled by Kitovani.  These were 
ostensibly under the control of the civilian government, although the degree to which Shevardnadze 
wielded any power vis-à-vis these forces is subject to debate.  Kitovani’s National Guard forces were 




for the Study of Civil War’s dataset codes the war’s onset for this date.  Despite 
intensely inter-mixed regions, cities, towns, villages, and families, and despite 
relatively peaceful relations at the individual level for decades, if not centuries, the 
war polarized communities along ethnic lines.  Shelling, aerial bombardments, and 
several (generally unsuccessful) offensives continued during this period until 
September 1993, when the Abkhaz side launched a major offensive and successfully 
took complete control of Abkhazia, effectively ending the war by September 30.33  
Under the United Nation’s aegis, a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ was signed 
December 1, 1993, and a more formal ‘Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of 
Forces’ was signed in Moscow on May 14, 1994.  PRIO codes the war’s end at 
December 1, 1993. 
While exact numbers of death and disability stemming from civil war is 
always problematic, an approximate number of total deaths is estimated to total 8,000 
with 18,000 wounded and 240,000 displaced from their homes (International Crisis 
Group 2006: 1; Mooney 1995: 197).34  Abkhazia’s population at the war’s outset was 
525,000, while Abkhazia’s population is currently around 200,000. 
5 Ethnic War and the Ethnic Security Dilemma 
                                                 
33 September 30 is the date frequently used to mark the end of the war in written sources, and the day 
used by Abkhazia to mark Victory Day, as this is the day Abkhaz forces reached the Inguri river, 
which was the pre-war administrative border between Abkhazia and Georgia.  Field research among 
villages in upper Gali (Zone 6) suggest that Abkhaz forces did not arrive there to secure complete 
control of Abkhazia until October 1st and 2nd, so these dates may be more appropriate (e.g., interviews 
with residents from Okum, Chkhortal, Mukhuri: IG-75, IG-76, IG-77, IG-78; Jvarezi, Georgia 
06/23/08).  The Abkhaz did not take control Kodori at this point, a sparsely populated valley in the 
mountains.  Abkhaz forces took control of lower-Kodori (town of Lata) in March 1994, and upper-
Kodori in August 2008. 
34 These are International Crisis Group Figures, and probably refers to estimates of permanently 
displaced; if one includes all the displaced, including many Abkhaz, Armenians, Russians, Greeks, 




There is substantial evidence demonstrating the ethnic character of the war 
and that the 2G ESD dynamics occurred as the theory would predict.  Observable 
implications of an ethnic security dilemma would include: ethnically-based targeting, 
real or perceived ethnically-based massacres and victimization, mono-ethnic patterns 
of recruitment and participation, perceptions of group fear of the out-group, 
polarization of identities, ethnically-based migration patterns, and homogenization of 
territories.  Evidence exists for each. 
In terms of ethnic targeting, there is no better summary than a Human Rights 
Watch Report (1995: 1) based on a detailed investigation during and after the civil 
war: 
The combination of indiscriminate attacks and targeted terrorising of the 
civilian population was a feature of both sides….The practice was adopted 
first by the Georgian side, in the second half of 1992, and later, more 
effectively, by the Abkhaz side. The parties terrorised and forced the enemy 
ethnic population to flee, or took members of the enemy population hostage 
… entire villages were held hostages on the basis of the ethnicity of their 
population. 
 
One scholar, Erin Mooney (1995: 198), stated that “[e]thnically-motivated acts of 
brutality have been committed on both sides, and with such regularity that they 
cannot be dismissed as sporadic, unintentional or individual incidents.”  Catherine 
Dale (1997: 87), a scholar conducting ethnographic work on migration in Abkhazia, 
concluded, “Much Abkhaz migration during the war can be attributed to fear of ethnic 
violence…[and] [a]lmost all displaced Georgians state clearly that they left because 
their lives were in danger precisely because they were Georgian.” 
One report by the Unrepresented Peoples Organization (Overeem and UNPO 




“In areas controlled by Abkhazian authorities during the war, there is evidence of 
anti-Georgian violence, including extra judicial killings, burning and looting of 
houses and of property.”  Georgian forces also purposefully destroyed culturally 
significant but militarily insignificant targets, such as the Abkhazian national 
archives, and the Abkhazian Institute of Language, Literature and History (Sverev 
1996; Personal Interview, Director of National Library of Abkhazia, Sukhum, 2008). 
Equally important, for the ethnic security dilemma, people on each side 
perceived there to be ethnic-targeting during the war, and each group’s leaders 
framed the conflict in those terms.  After all, it is not necessarily the massacres that is 
critical for the ethnic security dilemma, but the perception that a massacre occurred, 
engendering feelings of mass fear and ethnic polarization, sharpening identity 
salience. 
Stories of ethnically-based looting, rape, beatings, and murder poured across 
the border into Abkhaz controlled territory during the first months of the war, which 
sharpened enmity and instilled fear in the Abkhaz as to what a Georgian-dominated 
government would bring.35  The principal, newspaper for the Abkhaz in Gudauta, 
their temporary homeland capital during the war, carried regular articles about 
Georgians targeting Abkhaz and threatening anyone who attempted to protect ethnic 
Abkhaz (e.g., Respublika Abkhazia 1992).  One of the most infamous quotes to 
emerge from the war, was made by Gia Q’arq’arashvili, a colonel in the Georgian 
                                                 
35 Dalila Pilya, an ethnic Abkhaz, meticulously recorded the stories of Abkhaz refugees that arrived in 




armed forces, who threatened in a television interview that he was prepared to see the 
entire Abkhaz population killed (Sukhumi Television 1992).36 
Similarly, there was a widespread belief among ethnic Georgians that Abkhaz 
forces burned alive hundreds of Georgians, drank Georgian blood, and played polo 
using the severed head of a Georgian man, which was reported in papers at the time 
and in many personal interviews (e.g., Pringle 1992; e.g., Schmemann 1992; personal 
interviews, Tbilisi, Zugdidi 2008).  It is not relevant, for the ethnic security dilemma, 
that reporters could find no evidence of at least some of the reported massacres 
(Korlov 1992), it is only relevant that they were believed during the war, causing fear 
and migration.  Georgian leaders encouraged this perception.  For example, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, then head of Georgia’s government, described the situation of 
Georgians living under Abkhaz control with the following words: “According to 
reliable sources reaching us from the occupied territory, mass executions of the 
Georgian civilian population, widespread torture, rape and other atrocities are being 
committed” (Narayan 1992). 
Finally, there was widespread evidence of low inter-group trust.  Weapons 
were kept within ethnic groups, and there were credible reports of mixed families 
from all over Abkhazia divorcing during the war itself (Personal Interview, 
Bendeliani, Zugdidi, 05/29/08).37  This adds to the notion of ethnicity being a short-
                                                 
36 “I can guarantee the separatists that if from us 100,000 Georgians die, then all 97,000 of you who 
support Ardzinba will die…”  This was a televised interview on August 25, 1992. Q’arq’arashvili’s 
reference to 97,000 was the total number of ethnic Abkhaz in Abkhazia based on the 1989 Soviet 
census, and Ardzinba was the Abkhaz pro-independence leader.  This quote may have been taken out 
of context (personal interview with Q’arq’arashvili, Tbilisi, 07/03/08), although this is irrelevant for 
the ethnic security dilemma, where the perception of being credible is important.   
37 There was an organization established in the 1990s to help such families, Union of Georgian-Abkhaz 
Mixed Familities, as a result of cooling heads in the aftermath of the civil war, with partners seeking 




cut to trust, and the war accurately portrayed as an ethnic war.  This is not to say that 
no guns were given to Georgians – there were ethnic Georgians in the Abkhaz 
military, but their numbers were miniscule, as I discuss below. 
Prior to the war’s onset, the Abkhaz leadership had formed a mono-ethnic 
National Guard and had begun a policy of removing ethnic Georgians from leadership 
positions within the Abkhaz regional government (Cornell 2002, 168; Sverev 1996).  
According to government sources on both sides of the conflict, during the war it was 
rare to find Abkhaz fighting on the side of the Georgians and Georgians for the 
Abkhaz.  Identifying recruitment patterns for the armed forces is difficult, since there 
are no publicly available lists of soldiers who fought on either side of the war.38  I did 
find a list of those who died fighting for the Abkhaz side during the war (Pachulia 
1997).  I took this list and asked two Abkhaz in Abkhazia and two Georgians in 
Georgia to look through the list and mark whether the last name was (i) definitely 
Georgian; (ii) could possibly be Georgian or (iii) was definitely not Georgian.  Out of 
approximately 1,770 names, a maximum of 61 were selected as “possibly Georgian” 
(3.45 percent) and an average of 19 identified as “definitely Georgian” (1.07 percent), 
leaving over 95 percent as definitely non-Georgian. 
While relying on last names to ascertain ethnicity is a crude measure and is 
bound to make some mistakes, it can demonstrate trends, and the technique is used by 
other academics in the former Soviet space (e.g., Casu 2009).  The number of 
Georgians identified also fits with the Abkhaz Minister of Security’s personal 
estimate of the army’s ethnic composition, which he claims included less than 10 
                                                 
38 There is one partial list of Georgian soldiers that was apparently found by the Abkhaz at the end of 




percent non-ethnic Abkhaz (Personal Interview, Lakoba, Sukhum, 03/12/08).39  The 
remaining 10 percent, he said were primarily those arriving from regional ethnic 
groups to the north, such as Chechens and Adyghe, which formed the Confederation 
of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, widely known to have sent soldiers to support 
the Abkhaz during the war (Billingsley 1998; Derluguian 2005: 267-273).  There are 
other indicators, such as the Hero of Abkhazia Award, of which I found only one 
percent given to ethnic Georgians, but they are more open to government 
manipulation.40  In addition, there were numerous stories relayed to me about the lack 
of trust between groups over weapons (e.g., IG-103, 05/28/0, IA-118, 06/06/08).41 
6 Spatial and Temporal Changes in Abkhazia’s Ethno-Demography 
What follows is a longitudinal analysis over the 14 months of war, 
disaggregating the state into zones of territorial control as my unit of analysis.  By 
focusing on zones of control, I can identify the approximate ethnic make-up of each 
                                                 
39  There was a Russian news report from the time of the war when an Abkhaz parliamentarian, Viktor 
Loginov, suggested the non-Abkhaz figure was closer to 30-40 percent.  There is no way to verify the 
claim or to know where this figure came from.  
TASS. 1992. Russians in Abkhazia Abandon Their Homes. ITAR-TASS, October 15. 
40 This is less reliable since it is a government decision and, since the government’s master narrative is 
one of ethnic conflict, there is potential bias in favor of awarding some ethnic groups more awards than 
others.  Having said that, the Abkhaz government does stress that the Georgian government waged an 
immoral war and that many ethnic Georgians recognized this and supported the Abkhaz cause, so this, 
too, is part of the government’s narrative  
Lakoba, Stanislav. 2008. Personal Interview (03/12/08). Sukhum, Abkhazia..  While no single public 
source exists with a list of all the Heroes of Abkhazia, I spent a couple of days in the National Library 
of Abkhazia going through all books published on the war, and I recorded every “Hero of Abkhazia” 
that I found (61).  Only one of the 61 (1.64 percent) was ethnic Georgian.  No such estimates were 
forthcoming from the Georgians. 
41 Examples of lack of trust with weapons include one ethnic Georgian manager of a large factory in 
Georgian-controlled territory mentioned that he had a team of armed security guards in place as 
standard practice long before the war began, but once the war was underway, while many ethnic 
Abkhaz continued working at the factory, no Abkhaz worked as an armed guard (IG-103-05/28/0). 
Similarly, one ethnic Abkhaz recalled being surprised to find an ethnic Georgian in Abkhaz territory 
asking to fight on the Abkhaz side.  Initially they refused to give him a gun: “as a Georgian, it was 
risky to give it to him” (IA-118-06/06/08).  For sourcing of interviews, I use a format that protects the 
identity of those requesting anonymity.  For most civilians, I did not request their name.  Instead, I 
noted the location and date of the interview, which I keep in a database with a unique number.  I note 




zone to see whether and when zones become ethnically homogenous.  Since zones of 
control change during the course of the war, I present “phases” of the conflict – three 
in total – that capture the evolution of territorial control and ethnic migration.  I focus 
exclusively on regions within Abkhazia, instead of the whole of Georgia, since the 
civil war did not occur outside that region.  While there were other ethnic groups 
affected by the war, most of whom left during the war (e.g., Russian, Greek, Jewish 
populations),42 I focus exclusively on the two main warring parties – ethnic Abkhaz 
and ethnic Georgians – to evaluate arguments of the 2G ESD. 
6.1 Capturing Flight: Witness Testimonies 
To reconstruct the process of ethno-demographic separation, I first conducted 
over 140 interviews with members of the civilian population who were located in the 
conflict zone during the war to ask about migration and ethnic separation.  I covered 
all major cities and towns (8), and many villages (33) that comprise the six major 
regions of Abkhazia (Map 1 indicates places I visited to interview people during my 
field research).  The zones indicated relate to regions of fighting and will be 
introduced and discussed further below. 
                                                 
42 The Russian Federation evacuated ethnic Russians throughout the war; Israel sent a plane to collect 
most of the Jewish population, and Greece sent a ship to collect most of the Greek population.  
Armenians are known to have contributed more to the Abkhaz effort, including the Bagramyan 
Battalion, established in spring of 1993, although individuals from all ethnic groups contributed to the 











I had to spend more time in the eastern region because there was no natural 
border, such as rivers or mountains, delineating the “Eastern Front” of the war, so 
tracking the border required greater attention. 
I asked ethnic Georgians, ethnic Abkhaz, and others to describe (i) if and 
when they left their homes, (ii) what ethnicity their neighbors were, (iii) if and when 
those neighbors left their homes, and, for those people that stayed in their homes for 
at least most of the war, I asked them (iv) whether there was some point during the 
war when most of the Abkhaz or Georgians had left their neighborhood or village.  
These interviews typically lasted 20 minutes, but sometimes lasted as long as an hour; 
they were conducted almost exclusively in Russian but occasionally were conducted 
in Georgian through a translator into Russian. 
I covered these “locations” in two steps, due to the uniqueness of this war’s 
termination.  First, I traveled to the actual locations in Abkhazia, where I interviewed 
individuals who live there today.43  Typically, I would arrive in a village and find 
people by approaching their home, introducing myself, and asking if I could learn 
more about migration during the conflict.  Fortunately, Abkhaz and Georgian 
tradition is famed for its hospitality and I was rarely turned down.44  In every village, 
the stories were fairly uniform; given that these villages are relatively small, after a 
few interviews, I could get a general picture.  In urban centers, such as Sukhum or 
                                                 
43 There are a very limited number of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia outside the Gal region [Zone 6]. 
Ethnic Georgians outside Gal almost all come from “mixed families,” typically a Georgian woman 
married to an Abkhaz man; I spoke to some of them. 
44 Occasionally, people would tell me that they simply did not want to talk about it, but this was 
exceptional.  As one example, in the village of Merkaul, one woman, who had lost her son in the war, 




Gagra, the stories are more complicated since the physical size of space is much 
larger, and stories were less uniform.  Nevertheless, the pattern is fairly evident and 
supported by other sources, such as news articles, as I will present. 
Second, I traveled to over 15 “collective centers” and many more private 
homes, which house refugees/internally displaced people (IDPs)45 throughout 
Georgia.  Collective centers are essentially large, state-owned buildings to which 
displaced Georgians fled during the war; these include former resorts, hotels, 
kindergartens, factories, hospitals, warehouses, and dormitories.  Each collective 
center houses anywhere from five to 50 or more families who fled Abkhazia.  By 
visiting these collective centers, I could find ethnic Georgians who had lived in 
Abkhaz cities, towns, and villages during the war, even if they no longer live there 
now. 
6.2 Potential Bias and Other Data Problems 
There is, of course, a serious risk of bias in the stories relayed to me.  After 
all, one can expect that ethnic Georgians in Georgian controlled territories during the 
war would downplay the number of ethnic Abkhaz who fled (to demonstrate that 
ethnic Abkhaz were not victimized and did not need to leave), and that ethnic 
Georgians in Abkhaz controlled territories would exaggerate the number of Georgians 
who fled (to emphasize the fear and victimization that befell ethnic Georgians).  
There could be other individual motivations for including, excluding or interpreting 
                                                 
45 The words refugee and internally displaced person is controversial and politically loaded in this 
context; I use the terms interchangeably in this paper but the meaning is someone who was forced to 
leave one’s home for fear of persecution.  Technically, according to the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, a refugee is a person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, 
is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 




facts.  While some interviewees gave idiosyncratic information about the degree to 
which ethnic groups stayed or fled, I found a high degree of consistency between the 
groups.  There were systematic differences, but they were typically in the explanation 
for why people fled, not if and when.  For example, an Abkhaz in the village of 
Kyndyg explained that he left because he was attacked and his house burned by a 
Georgian paramilitary (IA27, 06/11/08), while a Georgian from the same location 
told me that there was no violence against the Abkhaz in his village during the war 
(“nikto ikh ne trogal!”), but that Abkhaz nevertheless left because they either wanted 
to fight or feared that they would be targeted in the future (IG97, 07/01/08).  
Fortunately, these differences do not impact my results since the important aspect for 
my research is when they left, regardless of why.  In addition to that bias, there are 
also the common problems of memory failure, and telescoping (incorrect placement 
of events) that are common when asking individuals to recall events in the past. 
(Sudman and Bradburn 1982). 
I addressed these potential biases by triangulating sources: First, I relied on 
multiple accounts from members of the same ethnic group from each location.  I also 
used the seasons and other indicators of time (e.g. “do you remember if there was 
snow on the ground when this happened?”).  Second, as discussed above, I made sure 
to get “both sides” of the story by interviewing both Abkhaz and Georgians who had 
lived in a given village when the war began.  Third, I corroborated the stories I heard 
from civilians through interviews with the military and government as well as through 





7 Three Phases of the Georgia-Abkhaz Ethnic Civil War 
I now present three phases of the war, discussing both the establishment of 
effectively separate states controlled by Georgians and Abkhaz, as well as the degree 
of ethnic separation. 
7.1 Phase 1: Territorial Division and Initial Civilian Flight 
This period established preliminary, if uncertain, lines of territorial control for 
the Abkhaz and Georgian forces, and sparked an initial migratory flow.  The first 
phase occurred between August 14th and September 28th, 1992.   
7.1.1 Territory: 
Each side consolidated control in regions where their ethnic kin dominated 
numerically in the pre-war era, as the ethnic security dilemma would predict.  The 
Abkhaz were demographically dominant in (i) two urban centers (Gudauta and 
Tkvarchal), (ii) one administrative region (Gudauta Region – Zone 2 in Map 2), and 
(iii) the northern half of another administrative region (Ochamchira Region – Zone 5a 
in Map 2); the Abkhaz side gained control over each of these territories during this 
initial phase of the war.  Meanwhile, ethnic Georgians had a plurality in every other 
region and urban center, and they consolidated control over these, including an 
amphibious landing in the Gagra region (Zone 1).  Ethno-demography proved a 
decisive predictor of spatial control, despite the lack of territorial contiguity between 
these spaces. 
The administrative district of Ochamchira (Zone 5) split in half during this 




lower region, surrounding the main highway (5b), coming under Georgian control.  
This became known as the “Eastern Front” during the war. 
Map 2: Abkhazia by Zones 
 
 






An initial migration began during this period which, as the ethnic security 
dilemma would predict, primarily involved Georgians moving to Georgian-controlled 
territories and Abkhaz moving to Abkhaz-controlled territories, although the 
migration was far from complete, as witnesses on both sides confirmed. 
Abkhaz in Zones 4 and 5B, for example, began seeking shelter in Zone 5A.  
As one Abkhaz (IA98, 02/22/08), located in Gulripsh (Zone 4) at the start of the war 
stated, “Of course we left, we all left, you couldn’t stay, the Mkhedriontsy [Georgian 
paramilitary] were already here.” 
I visited almost all villages in Ochamchira (Zone 5).  Some predominantly 




vacated early in the war during Phase 1.  This included Stary Kyndyg, Pshap, Atara, 
Adziubzha, Talmysh and Dranda, where local Abkhaz and Armenians spoke of 
heading north towards the mountains, where Abkhaz dominated.  These were villages 
close to the main highway, perhaps easier to target by marauding Georgian 
paramilitaries.  Typical of comments from Georgians I met who had lived in this 
region was that of a man I met in Zugdidi, Georgia: “They all left quickly, headed for 
the mountains, they didn’t stick around, well, maybe the odd one here and there (nu, 
byli, koe gde, koe gde)” (IG87, 07/01/09).  Many Abkhaz males from Zone 5B spoke 
of hiding in forests initially, returning to their homes at night (“The Georgians 
controlled Tamysh by day, but we controlled it by night” IA31, 06/11/08). 
Those Abkhaz and Georgians in villages north of the highway experienced 
less dislocation, although many villages were already ethnically homogenous and 
Georgian paramilitaries were not as prevalent.  Georgians from Kochara, an 
ethnically Georgian village in Zone 5A, spoke of sending children to safety outside 
Abkhazia in September, but many remained (IG74, 06/23/08), and Abkhaz forces did 
not enter the village.  Ethnic Georgians from Tkvarchal, a city in Zone 5a, also 
reported leaving the city in the initial weeks, although these were either children or 
people connected with the Georgian government (e.g., IG99-101, 05/27/08); several 
others reported remaining until later in the war.  Ethnic Abkhaz I spoke with 
confirmed that some Georgians left, but claimed that they left just before the war 
began, not after it had begun (e.g., IA49, 06/13/08).  This is an example of stories not 




Remarkably, some mixed villages, such as Merkaul, actually divided within 
the village itself based on ethnic settlement patterns.  In pre-war Merkaul, Georgians 
largely lived in the southern half of the village and Abkhaz in the upper half, although 
there was much inter-mixing.46  While both Georgians and Abkhaz spoke of inter-
ethnic harmony in the pre-war period, when the war began, Abkhaz established 
fortifications starting in September against incoming Georgian forces, with stay-
behind minorities within the divided village moving to “their side” (IA36-I40, 
06/11/08).  In some villages near the border of Zones 5 and 6, such as Bedia and 
Agubedia, ethnic Georgians in Abkhaz dominated villages appeared to remain 
initially, although this information comes from Abkhaz alone and I could find no 
ethnic Georgians from those villages specifically to confirm this.  Paramilitary units 
did not come to these regions during this period.  Zone 6 was almost entirely ethnic 
Georgian and there appeared to be little in the way of migration. 
Migration from other Georgian controlled territories occurred, but was far 
from complete at this stage.  Both Georgians and Abkhaz from Zone 1 referred to 
migration, primarily with Abkhaz moving to Zone 2.  Georgians referred to most 
Abkhaz men “disappearing” but claimed that many Abkhaz women, children, and the 
elderly remained (e.g., IG-17, 07/03/08).  When I interviewed Abkhaz, meanwhile, 
they referred to large-scale migration to the safety of Zone 2 (e.g., IA106, 06/14/08), 
but several remained in Gagra’s rural areas.  Migration of Abkhaz from Zone 3, 
where the regional capital of Sukhum is located, appeared to be one of the most 
                                                 
46 Not every individual moved along ethnic lines; for example, I spoke to one ethnic Georgian who 
lives in Merkaul today, the wife of an Abkhaz.  As she (IA40-06/11/08) explained to me, “pure 





intense, although not complete. Both Abkhaz and Georgians described large-scale 
flight from Sukhum, but it was acknowledged that a limited number of Abkhaz 
remained, often in hiding, seeking protection from friends with Georgian names (e.g., 
IA-107, 06/20/08; IG-83 05/25/08).  Several Georgians reported that some Abkhaz 
returned to Sukhum after a ceasefire was declared two weeks into the war on 
September 3, 1992 (IG-85-85, 05/25/08). 
These personal statements describing an exodus are supported by other news 
reports, academic articles, and NGO reports.  HRW (Human Rights Watch 1995: 6), 
for example, states that in Sukhum, “[m]any, mostly Abkhaz, left in those first 
weeks.”  An academic article (Mooney 1995: 200) from the time, states that writes 
“The attacks [by the Georgians at the start of the war]…had the effect of driving most 
Abkhaz out of the regional capital of Sukhumi during the last two weeks of August.” 
In sum, migration had begun, but was at a preliminary stage with much inter-
mixing remaining. 
7.2 Phase II: Fall of Gagra, Increased Migration, and Solidifying Homeland 
States 
 
The second phase began October 1st, and lasted for approximately two to four 
weeks.  This second stage in the war finalized borders for the proceeding ten months 
and initiated a short, intense wave of migration with Georgians and Abkhaz seeking 
shelter in their homeland states. 
7.2.1 Territory 
During this phase, Abkhaz armed forces began an assault on  Zone 1 in order 




Burke 1992; Mooney 1995: 201; Schmemann 1992; TASS 1992).  Within days, they 
had secured victory, although large-scale migration continued for some weeks.  This 
was one of the first major battles during the war as both sides had weeks to prepare 
armed forces following the start of hostilities in August.  In particular, ethnic kin 
groups from the newly established Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus were providing soldiers to support the Abkhaz side, escalating the conflict 
(Derluguian 2005). 







Migration following this battle was large-scale, from both ethnic groups, and 
lends weight to the ethnic security dilemma, where real or perceived massacres lead 
to greater fear and migration.  The most immediate flight was of ethnic Georgians 
from Zone 1, leaving to the border with Russia (e.g., Leselidze, Gantiadi) and then on 
to Sochi and beyond.  Several IDPs from Gagra, currently in Tbilisi, spoke of fleeing 
their homes when the Georgian army decided to abandon Gagra.  Four of the five I 
spoke with did not know any Georgians that stayed behind, aside from some elderly 
Georgians: “We left on October 1…our Abkhaz neighbors remained.  Other 
Georgians joined us in Leselidze.  I only know one Georgian who remained, a mother 
with two children, she was a teacher, and her Abkhaz students protected [zashishali] 
her” (IG92-07/01/08).  I found one woman (IG88-07/03/08) who had stayed behind 
with her mother until early November, who recalled seeing only one other Georgian, 
“all the others had left.”  The Russian Black Sea fleet was also documented 
evacuating thousands of Georgians from Gagra (Human Rights Watch 1995: 32).  
Further, one Abkhaz official, Georgy Gulia, reported to the Associated Press at the 
time that “there were practically no Georgians” in Gagra at the time the city was 
captured (Shargorodsky 1992), while Georgia’s permanent representative to Moscow, 
Petre Chkheidze, declared that armed Abkhaz were forcing all Georgians to leave 
territory controlled by the Abkhaz (Interfax 1992). 
Meanwhile, there was increased flight of Abkhaz from Sukhum.  “We now 
realized this would not end soon,” was how one Abkhaz female described her flight 
in early October (IA19-02/26/08).  As another Georgian (IG102-05/28/08) told me, 




Abkhaz did to Georgians in Gagra.”  Whatever the reason, flight from the city, of 
what remained of the small Abkhaz community, was evident and confirmed by both 
sides. 
Finally, along the Eastern Front in Zone 5, several Abkhaz I interviewed 
reported leaving at the end of September and during October, mentioning that the 
situation had become more dangerous by then (e.g., IA30-06/11/08). 
In sum, this period established borders and instigated further flight, especially 
Georgians from Zone 1 and Abkhaz from Zones 3-5. 
7.3 Phase III: Low-Scale, Constant Migration 
The third phase is a long period stretching from November 1992 to Summer 
1993.  There are minor border changes, but the central characteristic of this period is 
a low-level migration, often with government help, that solidifies ethnic 
homogenization of territories.  Based on the data I gathered, I have determined that 
the groups were largely separated by the end of 1992 and completely by the end of 
spring 1993. 
7.3.1 Territory 
  There were only a few small battles to act like “triggers” during this period, 
unlike the first two phases mentioned above.  In Zone 5, along the Eastern Front at 
the end of November 1992, Abkhaz forces took control of the ethnic Georgian village 
Kochara.  This is exemplary of the ethnic security dilemma.  Kochara was along the 
Eastern Front, but inside Abkhaz controlled territory (Zone 5A).  Since the village 




the Abkhaz precisely because the Georgian forces could use it as a staging ground 
(offensive opportunity) for an attack on the regional capital, Tkvarchal. 
David Pilya, commander of the Eastern Front, explained why securing 
Kochara was deemed necessary: “Look at where Kochara is located, if the Georgians 
wanted, they could cut the Eastern Front in half, severely weakening our supply 
routes to positions further west.  We had to control Kochara.”  Victory was quickly 
secured and, according to prior Georgian inhabitants currently outside the conflict 
zone (Djvarezi), the entire Georgian population fled (IG79-81-06/28/08).  A visit to 
Kochara in 2008 revealed a ghost town. 
The second significant border change did not occur until July 1993, long after 
each side’s territory was “unmixed.”  Ethnic Georgian villages north of Sukhum, such 
as Shroma and Kamani, were attacked, this time as part of a new offensive strategy to 
take Abkhazia’s capital from the north, according to government and military 
personnel (personal interview Lakoba, Sukhum, 03/11/08, and Tsukhba, Sukhum, 
06/13/08).  The Abkhaz secured these villages, and the ethnic Georgians all left, 
maintaining territorial homogeneity.  There were several other offensives during this 
period, but they did not result in significant border changes. 
7.3.2 Migration 
As the war dragged on, more out-group members felt increasingly insecure 
and vulnerable.  Realizing that the war would not end soon, the remaining out-group 
members from both sides began seeking safe-havens in regions controlled by their 
own kin groups.  These reports I heard echo some other eyewitness reports cited in 




Already by November 1992, there were few principally Georgian locales 
within Abkhaz territorial control.  One concentration was located in and near 
Tkvarchal, but even these were depleted by the end of December.  I spoke to two 
Georgians (IG100/1-05/27/08), for example, whose parents left from Tkvarchal “in 
November or December, when it became difficult to live there anymore.”  More 
importantly, the Abkhaz commander of the Eastern Front, David Piliya, remarked on 
the unease with which Georgians lived in villages around Tkvarchal.  Referring to the 
village of Akvasa (Zone 5A), for example, he said that by November, “Village 
leaders approached me and asked to leave; they were scared.  We helped them to 
leave, created a passage for them into Gali [Zone 6] over the next couple of weeks.”  
Piliya described the difficulties of maintaining security given the polarized ethnic 
environment: 
I did my best to protect them [Georgians], we established additional security, 
but this was a war, the population of Tkvarchal swelled from 20,000 to 60,000 
and there were a lot of young Abkhaz who had seen their relatives being killed 
by Georgians.  We tried to maintain security, but of course things happen, it 
wasn’t always possible to protect them.  This was a war.” 
 
On December 14 1992, a helicopter left from Tkvarchal to Gudauta as part of a 
regular series taking civilians to Gudauta and bringing military and humanitarian 
supplies back.  The helicopter crashed, with Abkhaz blaming Georgians for shooting 
it down.  Piliya emphasized that this event was a catalyst for further Georgian 
outflows from Tkvarchal and beyond.  “By the end of December,” Piliya confirmed, 
“there were very few Georgians left in the region.”  The lack of Georgians was 
further confirmed by the commander of Georgian forces, Gia Q’arq’arashvili, who 




interview, Tbilisi, 07/03/08).  To the best of his knowledge, he claimed, “there were 
no Georgians there in December…well, there may have been a few, but nothing 
significant…all the Georgians who wanted to leave had left.” 
There were Georgians who spoke of Abkhaz who remained, for example in 
Ochamchira city (5b), but they acknowledged that most had left.  In the city 
Tkvarchal, more Abkhaz insisted that Georgians had not fled the city at all and 
remained throughout the war.  This was the only location where I had strongly 
conflicting stories: over seven separate ethnic Georgians I met from Tkvarchal 
claimed they had left by December 1992 and claimed that all their friends had left and 
they knew no Georgians who remained, yet eight ethnic Abkhaz and one ethnic 
Georgian I spoke with on a brief visit to Tkvarchal all claimed that no Georgians left 
during the war.47 
In fact, the paucity of mixed demography by the end of 1992 was apparent all 
over Abkhazia, and confirmed by the Minister of Security and a colonel in the 
Abkhaz army (personal interview Lakoba, Sukhum, 03/11/08, and Tsukhba, Sukhum, 
06/13/08).  This is also consistent with other reports I found written from the time.  
For example, Thomas Goltz (1993) visited Sukhum in February 1993 and notes that, 
while some Abkhaz remained, most had left the city.  A Human Rights Watch (1995: 
34) site visit to Sukhum in August 1993 described Sukhum this way: “The pre-war 
population of Sukhumi was about 120,000; at the height of the fighting, and after the 
Abkhaz had been driven out, its population fell to some 50,000, mostly Georgians.” 
                                                 
47 Some of them said that Georgians had left before the war began.  This could be a problem with 
memory and an understanding of when the war actually “began” since Phase 1 did not affect Tkvarchal 




One ethnic Georgian, Alu Gamakharia (Personal Interview, Kutaisi, 
05/28/08), who managed a factory in Sukhum, summed up the three phases of 
migration this way: “I had about 200 Abkhaz working in the factory at the start of the 
conflict…about 50 left right away…after the Abkhaz took control of Gagra, many 
more left immediately…after that I don’t remember exactly when or why, but there 
were fewer, the situation became more difficult here…we protected them, many had 
to live on the factory grounds, it was difficult, so they left…in March there were 
maybe 30 left, I’m not sure, but there weren’t many…”  I then asked about the end of 
August, and he replied, “By the end of August?  I don’t recall any Abkhaz working 
with us by then.” 
8 Abkhaz-Georgian Civilian Exchange Program 
The absence of significant “trapped minorities” is confirmed by a joint 
commission established by the Abkhaz and Georgian sides to exchange civilian 
populations during the war.48  According the Georgian side, such an exchange was 
initially rejected, fearful that this would encourage the Abkhaz to mistreat Georgians, 
encouraging them to leave.  As the war continued, however, a decision was made to 
pursue an exchange for humanitarian reasons. 
Requests were made in the form of a written document with a list of people 
that wanted to leave from a certain area, such as a village or town.  Requests could be 
as few as two names on a piece of paper, or as many as 200.  I spoke to the organizers 
of each side of the Commission, Beslan Kolbakhia and Paata Zakareishvili, although I 
managed to receive archival data only from the Georgian side.  I went through the 
                                                 
48 Committee for the Question of Hostages and Soldiers Missing in Action; the committee also dealt 




files and counted (i) the number of requests per month and (ii) the number of people 
trying to leave; I present the results in Graph 1.  As one can see, the number of 
requests and aggregate number of people both peak in March 1993, tailing off by the 
end of June to 0.  Zakareishvili (Personal Interview, Tbilisi, 07/02/08) stated that the 
process began in winter and that “all Georgians who wanted to leave were able to.”  
When I asked why the numbers declined in June and after, he stated that there were 
so few Georgians in Abkhaz territories to begin with, and that after June there were 
none left, or at least none that wanted to leave.  Surprisingly, given the incentives the 
Georgian side has to vilify the Abkhaz side, Zakareishvili said he firmly believed that 
any Georgians who wanted to leave were given the opportunity by the Abkhaz, and 
he believes all who wanted to leave did.49  He did not exclude that small numbers of 
Georgians remained, but said they did not want to leave (e.g., they could have been 
part of mixed families). 
 
Graph 1 
                                                 
49 Zakareishvili did mention that occasionally Georgians on the list would already be dead when they 













































(0) (0) (0) (0) (19) (0) (238)(331)(28) (4) (12) (0) (0) (0) (7)




The bigger story from these numbers is that the total number of civilians 
exchanged from the Georgian side by June was a mere 632.  There were some 
additional lists within the archival documents that were ambiguous, such as lists 
without any dates or other markings but even these only numbered 1,599.  Even 
including the ambiguous people, at most the total was 2,231 Georgians exchanged, 
which lends strong weight to the aforementioned voices of civilian accounts that few 
“trapped minorities” were left after December 1992, and that almost none were 
present by the end of spring 1993.  The rise of requests in October stems from Phase 
4 of the war, which will be addressed below.  
8.1 Out-Group Members who Remained 
While most out-group members had left by the end of 1992, many witnesses I 
met with did report some non-Abkhaz remaining in Georgian controlled territories 
and Georgians in Abkhaz territory.  This consisted principally of two categories of 




Protection meant strong ties to the other ethnic group, such as being part of a “mixed” 
family, typically a Georgian female and Abkhaz husband (Dale 1997: 83).  I recall 
one Abkhaz from a village in Zone 5a explaining that most Georgians had left but 
that a few remained, and those that were people who “had someone to watch their 
back [imeli kogo-nibud’ za spinoi].” (IA-06/20/08).  In other words, there may have 
been pockets of out-group members, but they were few, scattered, and appeared to 
stay of their own volition. 
9 Existence of Separate Defensible Enclaves 
To resolve the ethnic security dilemma, according to the 2G ESD, each group 
has to develop separate defensible enclaves or de facto states they can use to defend 
their ethnic kin.  There is ample evidence that each group had achieved this by the 
end of Phase II.  The existence of the Georgian state is a matter of public record, and 
it joined the United Nations in 1991.  The Abkhaz state’s territorial boundaries have 
been detailed in the previous sections, and the borders are available on Map 2.  The 
Abkhaz government itself was already in existence prior to the war’s onset as a result 
of Abkhazia’s regional autonomy (Bgazhba and Lakoba 2007; Cornell 2002; Suny 
1994).  Members of the government, including members of parliament, moved to 
Zone 2 in the first days of the war, providing continuity and a continuously function 
body throughout the conflict; this was reported in the press at the time and in personal 
interviews with members of the Abkhaz government, such as Sokrat Jinjolia (e.g., 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1992; Lakoba 2001; TASS 1992).  There was a 
full cabinet of ministers that functioned throughout the war (Mayak Radio 1993), a 




Agence France Presse 1993; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1992), there were 
Abkhaz government sponsored press-conferences (e.g., TASS 1992), and an official 
government newspaper (Respublika Abkhazia).  Crucially, the Abkhaz received 
official military support from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus, as well as unofficial military, diplomatic, and financial support from 
Russia (Cornell 2000; Derluguian 2005; Goltz 1993).  While Zone 5a was not 
territorially contiguous with the rest of Abkhaz controlled territory, regular shipments 
of weapons and soldiers were sent to the exclave, and the region never came under 
assault by the Georgian armed forces.50 
10 The Violence Continues 
Despite the absence of mixed demography, effectively by the end of 
December 1992, and despite the existence of separate homeland states for each group, 
this did not prevent further military assaults, and these assaults led to large scale 
deaths.  This is extremely damaging to the 2G ESD, as the ethnic civil war is 
supposed to end. 
Kutol, a Georgian village along the Eastern Front (Zone 5), for example, was 
captured by Abkhaz forces in early January, leading to mass displacement (Human 
Rights Watch 1995: 28; TASS 1993).  News reports present dozens of border 
conflicts, shelling, and aerial bombardments in each month of 1993, at a level 
consistent with the autumn of 1992 when demography was more intertwined (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 1993; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1993; 
                                                 
50 Officially, Tkvarchal received only humanitarian supplies, but several Abkhaz military officials 
confirmed weapons and troops were flown in, and this has long been asserted by Georgians (personal 





BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1993; Burke 1993; McDowall 1993; Schegoleva 
1993; TASS 1993). 
Most of the major offensives were being led by the Abkhaz (Billingsley 
1998), and interviews with the Abkhaz war-time leadership stressed the territorial 
nature of their goals.  In an interview with Stanislav Lakoba (Personal Interview, 
Sukhum, 06/09/08), Abkhazia’s Minister of Security, I asked how ethnic Abkhaz in 
Sukhumi helped or hindered battle strategies during 1993.  Looking perplexed, he 
said, “that was not a consideration.  Our goal was to liberate Abkhazia, we were 
fighting for our land.”  Colonel Tsukhba (Personal Interview, Sukhum, 06/13/08) 
similarly stressed that, as far as he knew,  there were few ethnic Abkhaz in Georgian-
controlled territories in spring and summer 1993 and that they were not central to the 
military strategy. 
10.1 Phase IV: The End of the War and Mass Georgian Migration 
Perilously, for partition’s ability to end ethnic war, in September the war 
escalated dramatically, causing widespread civilian victimization, deaths, and a 
hemorrhaging of refugees, months after partition had occurred. 
On September 16th 1993,51 Abkhaz forces launched an assault on Sukhum from 
the north, taking the city after an 11-day battle.  When Georgia decided to abandon 
the city, the victory over Sukhum turned into a rout, with Georgian defenses 
collapsing, and Abkhaz forces reaching, on September 30th, the Inguri River, which 
was the pre-war border between autonomous Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. 
                                                 
51 There were credible reports of earlier attacks on September 14, 1993 in Ochamchira to cut the 




This final Abkhaz advance was accompanied by a mass-exodus of ethnic 
Georgians, in excess of 150,000.  I spoke with dozens of these Georgians, virtually all 
of whom left between the 20th and 30th of September.  The most striking aspect of 
Phase IV, for the purposes of this study, is that the amount of death and displacement 
associated with this final border change is greater than that of the previous three 
phases combined.  Given that partition is premised on humanitarian goals, this war 
termination is particularly troubling. 
For comparative evidence on death, I turn to information I obtained from 
Georgia’s Ombudsman for Abkhazia, Murman Chkhotua, who had lists of civilian 
deaths from the conflict.  I received 354 pages of documents listing victims’ name 
and age, as well as date, location, and cause of death.52    I have entered the data into a 
spreadsheet to display the results graphically.  As the following graph demonstrates, 
the worst of the civilian deaths occurred in September and October, 1993, after 
complete separation had occurred.  
Graph 2: Ethnic Georgian Civilian Deaths by Month 
 
                                                 
52 Those with missing data included civilians without a location or without a date of death.  The 
Ombudsman explained that they gathered as many details as were available for each individual death.  
There was no reason to believe that there were any systematic reasons for missing data, although this 
cannot be ruled out.  There are also several civilians who were recorded as having died after the war 
officially ended, primarily in the Gali regions during the “partisan war” which began in the war’s 




























The violence also suggests that most civilian deaths occurred when there was a 
shift in territorial control.  In regions that did not experience changes in control, 
deaths do not rise to the same levels.  For example, if we disaggregate the above data 
by district, we see that most of the civilian deaths spike when Abkhaz forces take 
control of Georgian held territory (Map 4). 





Zone 1, for example, spikes in October 1992 when control shifted form Georgian to 
Abkhaz.  Meanwhile, Zones 2 and 5 A, which never changed hands, did not 
experience a spike in deaths.  While we know that Georgians fled these regions, 
civilian deaths were comparatively muted.  Data for the Abkhaz side is not available, 
but I suspect it would demonstrate the same pattern.53  This also fits with data from 
other large-scale ethnic wars.  For example, the massacre at Srebrenica occurred 
during the initial takeover of the city (Honig and Both 1997).  One conclusion to draw 
from this is that preventing territorial offenses may be far more humanitarian than 
                                                 
53  The Abkhaz authorities have published a list of civilian deaths, but without dates and locations  
Pogodin, V.S., ed. 1993. Belaia Kniga Abkhazii: Dokumenty, Materialy, Svidetel'stva. 1992-1993 
[White Book of Abkhazia: Documents, Material, Witness Testimony]. Moscow: Z.S. Khalvash; R.A. 




working to separated multi-ethnic populations.  The more important conclusion for 
this study is that partition does not end ongoing ethnic civil war. 
11 How did the War End? 
The Georgian-Abkhaz ethnic civil war’s termination can be attributed to the 
coalescence of three principal factors: (i) an increase in Russian military aid; (ii) 
strategic military blunder by the Georgians; and (iii) the onset of an intra-Georgian 
civil war.  These factors created the conditions for an overwhelming Abkhaz military 
victory, securing control over all of Abkazia aside from a small mountainous territory 
deep in the Upper Kodori valley. 
11.1 Russian Support 
The Russian government was officially neutral during the Georgian-Abkhaz war, 
but its military, through a combination of corruption, sympathy, and geopolitical 
strategic maneuvering, is widely understood to have supported the Abkhaz side at an 
increasing rate as the war progressed.  Russia’s heavy involvement is accepted by 
most scholars on the topic (Cornell 2000; Goltz 1993; Mooney 1995); Russian troop 
involvement was witnessed by Georgians soldiers (personal interviews, Senaki, 
06/27/08); at least one Russian pilot was captured running bombing raids (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 1993); and Georgia’s president, Eduard 
Shevardnadze, complained loudly about Russian support during the war itself (e.g., 
Burke 1993).54  This military equipment, training, and staff support gave the Abkhaz 
increasing capability to launch a sophisticated and well-planned assault on Georgian 
positions, and tipped the scales in the Abkhaz’s favor.  In addition, it has been 
                                                 
54 It should be noted that the Russians can also be seen as supporting the Georgian side, at least 





suggested that the fighters from the north Caucasus that arrived, such as Chechens 
and Adyghe, arrived with Russian support and training (Derluguian 2005: 267-273). 
11.2 Strategic Error 
The July 27, 1993 Sochi Agreement55 ostensibly aimed at a phased 
demilitarization of Abkhazia, the return of the “legal government to Sukhumi,” and 
the resurrection of a united Georgia, all with Russia as a third-party guarantor (Sverev 
1996).  Georgia’s armed forces withdrew most of their heavy military equipment and 
troops from Zones 3 and 4 by early September.  At that point, on September 16th, 
Abkhaz forces, claiming that Georgia had not fulfilled its terms of agreement, began a 
full assault on Georgian controlled territory.  Without heavy military equipment, the 
Georgians were at a severe military disadvantage.  Russia was there to act as a 
guarantor to overcome the widespread problem of credible commitments, but in this 
case Russia acted only diplomatically, criticizing the Abkhaz assault, and did not act 
militarily to prevent Georgia from becoming the proverbial “sucker.” 
11.3 Intra-Georgian Civil War 
Importantly, an intra-Georgian civil war simultaneously re-erupted in north-
west Georgia near the Abkhaz border, impeding a successful defense of the remaining 
Zones of control in Abkhazia, much less a forceful response (Danilov 1999; Personal 
Interview, Q’arq’arashvili, Tbilisi, 07/03/08; Sverev 1996).56   Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 
the previous Georgian president who had been expelled in early 1992 through a coup, 
                                                 
55 Official title is the “Agreement on a Cease-Fire in Abkhazia and on a Mechanism to Ensure Its 
Observance.” 
56 Kharkharashvili stated that the intra-Georgian struggle meant Georgian troop defections within 
Abkhazia and the failure of Shevardnadze’s central command.  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
report that Gamsakhurdia’s forces had taken Khobi, Senaki, and Abashi by the end of August, 1993, 




returned to western Georgia during the final Abkhaz assault to mount an anti-
Shevardnadze coalition.  This fatally divided Georgia’s armed forces, with reportedly 
high levels of desertions and military pandemonium affecting Abkhazia and western 
Georgia (Personal Interview, Q’arq’arashvili, Tbilisi, 07/03/08; Suny 1994).  The 
Abkhaz forces took Sukhum (Zone 3) within 11 days, and marched to the borders of 
the pre-war autonomous territory of Abkhazia (Zone 6) three days later, effectively 
ending the war. 
In essence, a strategic blunder by the Georgian state, followed by a complete 
collapse of central Georgian authority, allowed the Abkhaz, with Russian support, to 
achieve a military victory. 
In fact, as the Georgian army retreated out of Abkhazia, Gamsakhurdia’s 
forces, set his sights on Tbilisi.  Shevardnadze, then president of Georgia and fearing 
for his political life and lacking alternatives, ironically turned to Russia for protection, 
the same Russia that, days earlier, had provided Abkhaz forces with the military 
means to defeat Shevardnadze.  Q’arq’arashvili, then Minister of Defense, summed it 
up: “First of all, we had no strategy then, it was chaos.  Second, civil war had begun 
in western Georgia.  And third, we had lost most of our military strength.” 
Evidence from Georgia’s war termination supports Fearon and Laitin’s (2007: 
2) conclusion that “civil wars will tend to end when there is a significant shock to the 
relative power or cost tolerance of one side or the other with military victory 
occasioned by a shock to one side’s relative power.”  The shock was the twin impact 




strength, plus the shock given to Georgia’s relative power when the intra-Georgian 
conflict began, which shattered its capacity to wage war. 
12 Conclusion 
I followed four steps in presenting empirical results in this chapter to evaluate 
the 2G ESD.  First, I demonstrated that the war is an ethnic civil war and that an 
ethnic security dilemma existed.  I presented evidence of the existence of real and 
perceived massacres, ethnic targeting, and large scale migration into ethnically 
defensible units.  I also demonstrated how atrocities – real or perceived – motivated 
flight and expulsion of “trapped minorities.”  This provided support for Hypothesis 1. 
Second, I examined the spatial and temporal patterns of territorial change and 
ethnic migration during the 14 months of armed combat.  This demonstrated a 
continuous homogenization of territories, exactly as the 2G ESD would predict, 
confirming Hypothesis 2.  In fact I demonstrated that the homogenization reached 
such a degree that we can safely say that the territory was completely partitioned 
ethno-demographically by Spring 1993 into militarily defensible enclaves. 
Third, and critically, despite the separation, the Abkhaz side continued to 
attack the Georgian side after the Georgian controlled territory was devoid of ethnic 
Abkhaz.  Abkhaz military leaders further explained the motivation for attack as 
fighting to recapture territory lost to the Georgians, even though they knew no ethnic 
Abkhaz lived there.  In the last major battle of the war, the Abkhaz side seized on a 
strategic blunder committed by the Georgian side and used its military advantage to 
capture the rest of Georgian-controlled Abkhazia; during the process, over 150,000 




the ethno-demographic separation, the war did not end, and a humanitarian 
catastrophe ensued.  While the ethnic security dilemma played a vital role in violence 
and migration, the end of this ethnic security dilemma did not end the war.  This 
evidence fails to confirm Hypothesis 3.  Both the Georgian and Abkhaz sides were 
intent on re-establishing territorial control over all of Abkhazia, supporting the 
alternative hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 that multiple factors influence the 
dynamics of violence during war and that the 2G ESD is too reductionist. 
This is a strong challenge to the theory that partition is an effective strategy to 
end ongoing ethnic civil wars.  It suggests that that separating populations will not 
end the war, and may not even be able to lessen the humanitarian crises posed by 
ethnic war’s violence.  After all, despite complete ethno-demographic separation, a 
humanitarian catastrophe ensued when virtually all ethnic Georgians fled Abkhazia 
under conditions of large-scale civilian victimization, and the deaths from that 
catastrophe were worse than all previous military phases of the conflict combined. 
In sum, there is strong support from this case for several key dynamics of the 
2G ESD, but not its central case that partition will end war.  While this is only one 






Chapter 4: Enduring Ethnic Civil War Termination: The Role of 




Chapter Two introduced the reader to the Second Generation Ethnic Security 
Dilemma (2G ESD), which argued that demographic separation of ethnic groups 
would end ethnic civil war.  Chapter Three provided the first empirical test of the 2G 
ESD, and, as a crucial case, raised grave doubts about partition’s ability to end ethnic 
civil wars.  In this chapter, I shift the focus of the dependent variable from ending 
ongoing violence to building long-term peace.  The literature on civil war 
termination, especially as it relates to partition, often conflates these related but 
separate phenomena, leading to muddled theories and empirical tests.  I review 
different theories designed to explain peace-building following ethnic civil war, and I 
introduce the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD), which explains 
how ethnic partition increases the likelihood of prolonged peace.  I argue that, 
regardless of how the war ends, separating warring ethnic groups into different states 
facilitates peace-building, and I draw on the ethnic security dilemma to explain how.  
In contrast to the 2G ESD, however, my theory argues that violence is not caused by 
intransigent ethnic identity, but rather renewed violence is caused by weak states, a 






Ending the violence of civil wars has bedeviled the international community for 
decades.  Yet, while convincing warring factions to reach a peace agreement and 
come to the negotiating table is a critical step, a convincing body of evidence has 
emerged to demonstrate that any initial peace achieved is only part of the solution 
(Collier et al. 2003; Toft 2006; Walter 2002; Walter 2004).  Most civil wars 
experience a recurrence of deadly violence within the first five years of peace, and 
there is evidence to suggest that ethnic civil wars in particular are more likely re re-
erupt in violence (Horowitz, Weisiger, and Johnson 2009; Johnson 2009; Licklider 
1995).  It is therefore important to understand why peace fails so frequently, and what 
solutions are available. 
In this chapter I lay out the theoretical foundations to explain how peace breaks 
down in the post-war environment and how complete ethnic partition can reduce the 
likelihood of recurring violence.  My theory, which builds on the first two generations 
of the ethnic security dilemma, is called the Third Generation Ethnic Security 
Dilemma (3G ESD).  The 3G ESD is similar to the first two generations in that it 
emphasizes the key components of demographic intermingling and anarchy as 
predictors of violence.  Whereas the 1G ESD predicted the onset of ethnic civil war 
during “emerging anarchy” (Posen 1993) and the 2G ESD predicted the end of 
ongoing ethnic civil war (Downes 2001; Kaufmann 1996), the 3G ESD predicts the 
recurrence of ethnic violence in a post-partition environment.  However, in contrast 
to the 2G ESD, which stresses ethnic intransigence as the cause of post-war violence, 
I argue that the core problem is the interaction of (i) the triadic political space created 




a shifting balance of power that creates opportunities for aggression between the post-
partition states. 
Drawing on constructivist insights, I critique the 2G ESD, arguing that even after 
ethnic civil war with high levels of ethnic targeting and massacres, the civilian 
populations can and will collaborate with a regime controlled by the enemy ethnic 
group as long as that regime maintains territorial control.  It is not the stay-behind 
minority that erupts into violence.  Instead it is the neighboring homeland state 
dominated by the minority’s kin ethnic group that causes violence, and this violence 
occurs when the balance of power between the post-war states grows unevenly, 
providing an opportunity for one state to pursue an irredentist agenda. 
2.1 WHY ARE ETHNIC CIVIL WARS PRONE TO RECURRING VIOLENCE? 
There are three reasons why ethnic civil wars are likely to recur.  The first is 
concentrated ethnic groups.  Concentrated ethnic groups are a well established 
predictor of ethnic conflict, the causes of which were discussed in Chapter Two 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Toft 2003).  As we saw in Chapters Two and 
Three, ethnic civil wars create an ethnic security dilemma that lead to increasingly 
homogenous territories of ethnic groups (Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998).  While 
the 2G ESD did not end the war, theory and evidence confirm that the wars do lead to 
increasing group concentration.  Even those that question the ethnic security dilemma 
or the intention of ethnic cleansing, agree that ethnic war separates ethnic groups 
(Downes 2004; Kalyvas 2006).    Therefore, one consequence of ethnic civil war is to 




Second, weak states are also a predictor of violence, and post-war states are, 
almost by definition, weak (Esty et al. 1995; Herbst 1996/97); this is part of the 
“conflict trap” that is at the heart of explanations for continuing violence (Collier et 
al. 2003).  In other words, weak states lead to violence, and violence leads to a further 
weakening of the state.  Third, if peace is achieved through a negotiated settlement, a 
major problem is the absence of credible commitments, discussed in Chapter Two 
and elaborated further below.  Ethnic minority militias are reluctant to disarm after 
establishing peace for fear that any promises made by the central government will be 
reneged as soon the minority does not have the ability to wage war (Fearon 1998; 
Walter 2002).  The result is the minority will likely pursue war instead of continuing 
down the path to a durable peace.  I argued in Chapter Two that the problem of 
credible commitment was even more powerful for ethnic wars than non-ethnic wars, 
which I labeled an “ethnically augmented” problem of credible commitment.  These 
three factors encourage recurrence of violence (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: How Processes Endogenous to Ethnic Civil War Increase the 





2.2 COMPLETE ETHNIC PARTITION AS A SOLUTION 
Given these difficult pressures that encourage renewed violence, partitioning 
groups offers one powerful solution.  First, partition overcomes the ethnically 
augmented problem of credible commitments by permitting warring factions to retain 
their own defensive capabilities by constructing two separate ethnic homeland states.  
Second, by establishing a separate homeland state for an ethnic group, the problem of 
ethnic concentration decreases as the group no longer is motivated to rebel against the 
center.  After all, the rebellion of ethnically concentrated ethnic groups is almost 
entirely designed to achieve independence (Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000; Walter 2006).  The 
role of state weaknesses is not resolved by partition, and this poses a risk to peace; I 
address this question separately below. 













However, to be effective, partition must completely separate the warring ethnic 
groups demographically.  Leaving significant stay-behind minorities is likely to 
increase the risk of violence because of the post-war ethnic security dilemma.  Yet, 
where the 2G ESD focuses on ethnic intransigence as the micro-foundation of 
continued violence within intermingled groups, I draw on constructivist advances that 
emphasize the possibility of inter-ethnic cooperation even following intense inter-
ethnic warfare; this approach separates ethnic preferences from ethnic behavior.  It is 
not intransigent inter-ethnic relations that lead to conflict in post-war environments, 
but rather the ethnic homeland state created by partitions that aims to “protect” its kin 
stay-behind minority to advance its political interests.  There are three main causes of 
renewed violence in this context: (i) incentives for the leadership of the homeland 
state and (ii) actions of non-state actors.  The third factor is an interaction effect: (iii) 
shifting balance of power.  Leaders will only act when they believe they can conquer 
territory without a difficult war, and for that to happen one of the states must be 





















My contribution in this chapter is fourfold.  First, I challenge two dominant 
strands within the ethnic conflict literature.  I reject the 2G ESD approach, arguing 
that its micro-foundations based on ethnic intransigence are not compatible with 
recent developments in constructivist literature.  Second, I also reject the scholarship 
that denies the relevance of ethnic identity (Mueller 2004).  Ethnic identity, I argue, 
needs to be contextualized, and I demonstrate the conditions under which ethnic 
preferences are acted upon and become relevant in the political process.  I introduce 
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the concept of “active” versus “limited” collaboration with the state, and I 
demonstrate the importance of ethnic preferences under conditions of weak states and 
shifting territorial control.  Where territory shifts to control by kin groups, I argue that 
minorities have an incentive to actively collaborate, and this further increases the 
likelihood of violence. 
Third, I present an alternative theory, the 3G ESD, maintaining a focus on the 
triadic political space, mixed-demography and shifting balance of power as the core 
causes of post-war recurring violence.  I present a solution to this problem: complete 
ethno-demographic partition, which separates ethnic groups into separate homeland 
states. I show that separation will decrease the likelihood of violence after war.  
Finally, my theory also suggests why the first years of a post-ethnic civil war 
environment are so prone to violence.  Post-partition states are weak by definition and 
state-building will often be variable, while ethnic identity is heightened from the war.  
Over time, however, the state strengthens and identity salience fades, reducing the 
risk of war. 
2.4 Overview 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the current literature on how to 
maintain peace in a post-civil war environment.  I identify specific gaps in the 
literature as they relate to partition, and I suggest an alternative theory of how 
violence recurs and how this can be avoided. 
3 Theories of How to Keep the Peace after Ethnic Civil Wars End 
Despite early statistical evidence pointing to the high recidivism rate in civil 




mechanisms to prevent it was limited until recently (Collier et al. 2003; Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000; Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Mendeloff 2004; Walter 2004).  
Explanations for why peace breaks down in post-civil war environments can be 
divided into three categories: capacity (greed), motivation (grievance), and mistrust 
(security dilemma). 
3.1 Capacity 
Capacity arguments, a prominent approach in the social science literature today, 
typically focus on (i) the ability of rebels to wage war and (ii) the ability of states to 
prevent it (Benson and Kugler 1998; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Collier 
and Hoeffler 2007).  This follows from earlier research on civil war onset known as 
the “insurgency” or “greed model,” stressing the opportunity for societal groups to 
engage in collective violence against the state (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  Post-civil 
war regions are typically awash with guns and armaments, have large numbers of 
non-state actors (the rebels) with military experience, command structures and, in the 
case of ethnic wars, a highly polarized society with salient identities that can be 
readily tapped anew.  States, meanwhile, are fragile, with weakened infrastructure, 
collapsed economies, low revenues, high unemployment, and low levels of 
legitimacy, especially among minority groups at the end of ethnic wars.  Weak states 
are unable to prevent renewed violence because they lack the coercive resources to 
suppress rebellion, and they lack the material resources to co-opt discontented groups 
and encourage collaboration. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo, which officially was at war between 1998 




leading to thousands of deaths and over 250,000 displaced in 2008 (Economist 2008).  
The causes were, in part, due to a weak central government that never managed to 
reassert territorial control, enabling rival ethnic militias, such as General Nkunda’s 
largely Tutsi militia, to pursue their goals. 
Proposed solutions focus on eliminating the “supply side” of rebellion.  One 
way is to ensure the war ends with a complete or decisive military victory, destroying 
one side’s ability to fight or convincing it of war’s futility.  For example, Sri Lanka’s 
26-year ethnic civil war came to an end in 2009 after the Sri Lankan armed forces 
decisively defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.  Given that decisive 
military victories produce long-term peace, prosperity, and perhaps democratization, 
several scholars have framed this as a “humanitarian” proposal (Luttwak 1999; Toft 
2006; Wagner 1993).  The problem with this approach is twofold.  First, waiting for 
military victory means greater civilian suffering as the war drags on; ethnic wars in 
particular appear to last longer than ideological or other civil wars (Fearon 2004).  
Second, for ethnic civil wars, there is a statistically significant correlation between 
military victory and ethnic massacres (Licklider 1995); this seems to have occurred in 
the closing phases of Sri Lanka’s civil war as well (Economist 2009). 
Others scholars have focused on post-war reconstruction, emphasizing the need 
to build state capacity either by improving the economy to provide jobs to potential 
rebel recruits or to strengthen security through police training, building the armed 
forces, or providing robust peacekeepers, each of which would make rebel success 
less likely (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 




factors related to rebel capacity, such as experienced rebel command structures and 
identity salience, may fade with time on their own, suggesting that the presence of 
peacekeepers for an initial number of years may also help overcome rebel capacity.  
This would be consistent with the empirical pattern that the risk of war recurrence 
falls with time.  While this approach can be successful, the problem is that the 
international community and individual foreign powers are typically reluctant to 
engage in long-term peace-keeping and reconstruction efforts, which are extremely 
expensive and typically mean a long-term commitment of foreign troops (Stedman, 
Rothchild, and Cousens 2002).  As we will see below, partition is offered as a 
solution where such international support is not forthcoming, where alternatives 
peace-building strategies are required because the alternative is a likelihood of 
recurring ethnic warfare and civilian suffering. 
Finally, capacity arguments, as they relate to ethnic conflicts, emphasize the 
role of group concentration.  These arguments have focused on ethnic civil war onset, 
but the theoretical explanations and empirical patterns remain the same (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Gurr 1993; Gurr 2000; Laitin 2004; Walter 2003).  The irony for central 
governments, as we saw in Chapters Two and Three, is that ethnic civil wars lead to 
increased ethnic group concentration, which further increases the risk of conflict 
renewal.  Solutions to this are almost never addressed in the literature, despite its 
clear correlation with violence.  Walter (2006), for example, has looked at 
preventative actions that states may pursue, repressing one ethnic group if it has other 
concentrated ethnic minorities in its territory, but this is not related to post-ethnic war 




We can also look to international relations theories for war recurrence since 
post-partition environments create an inter-state environment.  Werner (1999), for 
example, focuses on balance of capabilities, and particularly on the perception of 
balance of capabilities that becomes evident during the “bargaining” of war (Werner 
and Yuen 2005).  If one of the post-partition states significantly increases its military 
strength relative to its adversary, peace duration is likely to be shorter.  The solution 
to this problem is the maintenance of a balance of power, and this is part of what 
makes partition an attractive solution.  As we will see below, the problem of credible 
commitments is precisely linked to the balance of capabilities, with the minority 
rebels fearful of what the state will do after they decommission their weapons.  With 
partition each side is allowed to pursue deterrence strategies equally, seeking to build 
their armed forces and make alliances in a bid to avoid the recurrence of war (Huth 
1999). 
3.2 Motivation 
Motivation arguments typically focus on the rebels, examining why rebel 
groups would engage in post-war collective violence – the “demand side” of civil 
war.  This paradigm is dominant in the policy community and in journalistic 
accounts, and is colloquially called the “grievance” explanation of civil war, where 
groups rebel against real or perceived injustice (Gurr 1970; Gurr 1993). 
While some of these arguments echo grievance-based models of civil war onset 
discussed in Chapter Two, there are distinct differences resulting from processes 
endogenous to the war itself, creating a different set of problems and solutions.  For 




settled with agreements, and there may be grievances specific to post-war 
environments that need to be addressed, such as sharing military power (Hartzell and 
Hoddie 2003; Kydd and Walter 2002; Stedman 1997). 
Further, several accounts of ethnic conflict onset emphasize the role of the past 
(Bendor 1993; Kaufman 2001; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Petersen 2002).  These 
theories suggest that conflictual histories increase the likelihood of violence because 
they both cause unresolved grievances and because they provide conflict narratives 
that elites can use to foment hostilities and violence.  If groups are more likely to 
rebel against the state when they have conflictual histories, then post-ethnic war 
environments following ethnically-based massacres perpetrated by governments and 
militias would be particularly prone to violence. 
Solutions to the motivation approach focus on addressing grievances through 
power-sharing, such as federalism/autonomy, and other conflict regulating 
mechanisms (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Ghai 2000; Gurr 2000; Lapidoth 
1997; Lijphart 1969; McGarry and O'Leary 1993; Paris 2004).  This has been the 
American administration’s approach to Iraq since the onset of civil war in 2004 
(Biddle 2006). These solutions appear self-explanatory and seductively simple, but 
they have proven very difficult to implement following ethnic civil wars.  As 
Alexander Downes (2004, p.231) has written, “hardly any ideological wars resume 
after a settlement is implemented, whereas such agreements fail as often as two-thirds 
of the time in identity wars.”  Thus, negotiated solutions to ethnic civil wars have 
remained largely illusive. 




The realist paradigm from IR has formed the base of many theories developed 
to look at post-civil war peacebuilding.  IR scholars have suggested that the use of 
violence itself changes the dynamics between states, destroying trust, making actors 
skeptical about peace arrangements, more fearful of others’ intentions, and more 
likely to misperceive and overreact to minor breaches or accidents (Fortna 2004; Ikle 
1971).  Lacking a global sovereign that can enforce peace, states must look after 
themselves, and will therefore be highly sensitive in post-war environments. 
The literature on civil wars, echoes that of international relations, but argues 
that the situation is even worse for ethnic civil wars.  Downes (2004: 234) argues that 
post-civil war environments create nearly intractable situations because, unlike inter-
state wars, “combatants are not allowed to retain their military forces and retreat 
behind fortified frontiers.”  This is similar to the problem of credible commitment, 
but has distinct differences.  The problem of credible commitment prevents warring 
groups from reaching and/or implementing peace agreements, but says nothing about 
what happens in a post-implementation environment.  The security dilemma, 
however, exists both during and after the implementation of peace agreements.  Even 
after decommissioning has been completed, a highly sensitive “former” rebel group 
or state could turn back to violence as a strategy if it suspects the other party is 
preparing to break the terms of peace (Downes 2001). 
Rebels, for example, could regroup if they feared an increasingly repressive 
state, meanwhile states could repress if they feared rebels were planning acts of 
violence, sparking a spiral of repression and dissent, reigniting civil war.  Perceptions 




strengthen their military spending or appoint known hardliners to positions within the 
security apparatus aggravating extant suspicion among the ethnic minority.  Collier, 
Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008: 465) point to evidence that governments typically 
maintain high levels of military spending in post-war environments due to the 
perceived risk of war.  Following Sri Lanka’s military victory over the Tamil Tigers, 
the army’s chief immediately announced plans to dramatically increase the size of the 
armed forces, in an already highly militarized country (Economist 2009).  Rebels, 
meanwhile may maintain their capacity to fight in a post-war environment by 
maintaining an equipped army (e.g., Hezbollah in Lebanon), by hiding their weapons 
(e.g., the IRA during the 1990s), or decommissioning them but keeping them legally 
within reach (e.g., Maoist forces in Nepal that have their weapons locked away but 
maintain the keys themselves). 
The IR literature on “enduring rivalries” suggests that actors may rationally 
adjust their behavior based on prior interactions, and therefore groups that conflicted 
in the past see a strong likelihood that they will engage in violence again in the future 
(Goertz and Diehl 1993).  Initial research on “enduring internal rivalries” suggest that 
such dyads produce specific dynamics that differentiate themselves from other civil 
wars (Derouen and Bercovitch 2008).  Collier and Hoefler (2002: 15) in fact find 
prior-levels of conflict a significant predictor of civil war recurrence, but their work is 
undertheorized, suggesting broadly that, “Once a conflict has occurred, it creates a 
legacy of hatred, and this hatred fuels further conflict.”  If ethnic groups do adjust 




While this theory is applicable to all post-civil wars environments, the 
increased salience of identity and territory make ethnic civil wars particularly 
sensitive to the security dilemma by rupturing trust between entire ethnic groups, not 
merely rebel organizations.  Further, gains achieved through peace agreements will be 
linked to ethnic group members’ personal security, given the backdrop of a previous 
civil war.  As a result, small infractions by the state are interpreted as direct threats on 
individual security, increasing the risk of a return to war. 
Other ethnic civil war scholars focusing on problems of trust in post-ethnic war 
environments include Stuart J. Kaufman (Kaufman 2001; 2006), who refers to a 
“symbolic politics” trap: once distrust and hostility towards ethnic out-groups has 
been initiated, it becomes difficult to moderate, leading to renewed conflict even 
when that outcome is undesired by both sides.  Chaim Kaufmann’s emphasis on the 
ethnic security dilemma is also relevant for post-war situations.  Kaufmann (1998: 
122) emphasizes heightened identity, mutual mistrust, and inter-group hatred that 
occurs as a result of ethnic civil war, stressing the dangers of inter-mixed ethnic 
communities even in a post-war environment, concluding: “Solutions that aim 
to…restore multiethnic civil politics…such as institution building, power-sharing, 
and identity reconstruction, cannot work…after an ethnic civil war because they do 
not resolve the security dilemma created by mixed demography.” 
In fact, Posen’s formulation of the original ethnic security dilemma (1G ESD) 
to explain war onset, is far more promising as a theory for ethnic war recurrence.  
Examining the ethnic security in this context addresses many of the criticisms of 




identities are already established and heightened by prior collective violence; 
governments and rebels have demonstrated their threat and willingness to kill each 
other; and states remain extremely weak, verging on “anarchy,” leaving minorities to 
feel particularly vulnerable.  In fact, for Kaufmann and others, intermingled 
populations are the key ingredient that sparks renewed warfare.  Kaufmann (1996: 
169) suggests, for example, that Rwanda today should be partitioned with forced 
population transfers to separate Hutus from Tutsis; if this is not done, he concludes 
starkly, “[t]he alternative, sooner or later, is another genocide.” Thus, after peace has 
been reached (by whatever means), there may still be incentives within the minority 
group to preemptively build or maintain defensive capabilities since they distrust the 
central government’s intentions.  This, in turn, may cause the state to act 
preemptively, spiraling to violence in the post-war years. 
There are two dominant solutions in the literature to mistrust and the security 
dilemma.  First, institutional solutions are proposed, including robust peacekeeping 
operations and comprehensive peace agreements help groups overcome mutual 
suspicion, problems of credible commitment, and incentives to defect (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Hartzell 
and Hoddie 2003).  The problem with institutional solutions and peace agreements 
within a single state are several: (i) states are typically weak following civil wars, 
making implementation of agreements difficult; (ii) ethnic civil wars create group 
concentration, which increases the capacity of ethnic groups to wage war, increasing 
the likelihood of ethnic rebellion in the future; (iii) institutional solutions do not solve 




reasons just detailed, (iii) empirically, power-sharing agreements have a terrible track 
record, collapsing into conflict most of the time (Downes 2004; Licklider 1995; Toft 
2006). 
The second dominant solution to mistrust and the security dilemma is 
educational programs, re-writing history textbooks, and transitional justice programs, 
such as truth and reconciliation commissions.  These have been proposed to 
overcome mistrust, and especially group hatred (Bass 2000; Hayner 1994; Kaufman 
2006; Mendeloff 2004; Minow 1998; Pingel 2008).  The problem with these 
approaches is the time required for results.  Constructivist literature has demonstrated 
that nations and national identity are constructed and malleable, but the process of 
identity construction takes decades, at a minimum (Anderson 1983; Connor 1994).  
This is hardly a plausible solution to the problem of conflict recidivism that occurs 
within the first five years of establishing peace.  Overcoming group hatred without 
reconstructing identities may also be possible, but research on this is at its infancy 
and also appears to take decades for such positive inter-ethnic relationships to be 
internalized (Dumitru and Johnson 2009). 
4 Partition as an Enduring Solution 
A more powerful solution to the problem of mistrust and the security dilemma is 
partition.  Partition has been built into recent peace agreements for Sudan, Papua New 
Guinea, and Kosovo, and, as I argue below, separating warring parties deals with a 
number of the problems identified above.  As Downes (2004: 236), states, “solutions 
to [ethnic] wars should be based on separation.”  But “partition” can be both new 




I begin with the need for partitions of statehood and then move to partitions of 
demography; I conclude that both are necessary for durable solutions. 
4.1 Partitions of Statehood: Building Long-Term Peace After Ethnic Civil War 
Partition overcomes the post-war domestic security dilemma by permitting both 
sides to remain armed and build deterrent forces.57  Second, for similar reasons, 
partition also resolves the problem of credible commitment by removing the need for 
the minority to trust the state’s promised post-war intentions. 
Third, partition helps deal with grievance-based arguments for conflict 
recurrence.  As discussed above, ethnic civil wars are almost entirely dominated by 
separatist conflict, and therefore partitions that allow the minority to achieve 
independence satisfies this primary grievance.  Finally, partition eliminates the 
problem of ethnic group concentration as a factor for ethnic rebellion.  With 
concentrated groups no longer within the state, but with a separate state of their own, 
such conflict is no longer possible. 
Such a solution can, however, create a grievance on the opposite end of the 
spectrum, affecting the rump state, which may be motivated to reacquire territory lost 
as a result of partition.  Territorial conflicts are the major source of inter-state wars in 
the 20th Century (Huth 1996).   Further, Stinnet and Diehl (2001) find that territorial 
disputes, newly independent states, and contiguous states are all more likely to move 
down the path of enduring rivalry, and this is exactly what is created when partition 
occurs.  While true, there are clear benefits to the internationalization of the conflict.  
First, as mentioned above, is the use of deterrence, which is now open to the minority, 
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allowing its new homeland state to pursue weapons- buildup and alliances to deter the 
rump state from aggression.  Such deterrence should help avert inter-state war.  
Second, international diplomatic pressure is present in this environment, and such 
international actions have been credited, in part, with decreasing the number of inter-
state wars since World War Two. 
In addition, if the concept of “enduring rivals” applies to parties within a single 
state (e.g., Kurds in Turkey or Arabs in Israel), partition could help resolve those 
recurring domestic problems: Goertz and Diehl (1995), for example, identified “large 
political shocks,” including territorial changes, as influencing the end of  enduring 
rivalries; the same may be true for rivalries in ethnic civil wars. 
In sum, partitions that establish separate states are extremely useful, 
overcoming several major obstacles to long-term peace.  Having said that, I argue that 
partition also creates problems if it leaves significant ethnic minorities from the 
warring ethnic group.  The important question here is why and how. 
4.2 Partitions of Demography 
 
The need for demographic separation is central to my argument about partition, 
and this is shared with other scholars who advocate partition.  As Downes (2001, 
p.74) confirms, “Implementing partition without separating the groups in conflict to 
reduce or eliminate the number of minorities left behind is sure to see them cleansed, 
or for conflict over the intermingled region to continue…Thus, planned population 
exchanges should be an integral part of partition, not left to ethnic cleansing.”  
Downes, however, does not theorize about the mechanisms that link the stay-behind 




Tir (2005), in his study of secessions, also confirmed that post-secession 
violence was significantly higher if regions included ethnic minorities.  Tir’s study 
was extremely helpful empirically in identifying ethnicity as a factor, but his study 
had two limitations.  First, theoretically, Tir only examines the leadership of the state 
as the actor in conflict renewal.  I agree with Tir’s theoretical base, but argue that it 
needs to be expanded to include non-state actors that are often at the heart of violence 
in civil wars.  Tir’s analysis conflicts with the 2G ESD although Tir does not address 
this head-on.  My dissertation does, since Kaufmann’s theory is the central foil in the 
partition debate. 
Second, empirically, Tir is interested in comparing secession outcomes, and the 
universe of cases is drawn from twentieth century secessions.  I am interested in 
ethnic civil war recurrence, and therefore need to compare different outcomes of 
ethnic civil wars to determine which are more likely to recur; this is tackled in 
Chapter Five.  Third, Tir includes only fully sovereign, independent states and 
excludes de facto independent states.  For the argument at hand, internationally 
recognized sovereignty is not essential; to overcome the problem of credible 
commitment and the triadic political space, de facto independence with demographic 
separation is sufficient. 
4.3 The Standard Explanation: Ethnic Intransigence 
Most IR accounts of ethnic civil wars treat ethnic groups as unitary actors 
(Fearon 1998; Posen 1993).  The root cause of post-war conflict, as explained by 
these theories, is based on ethnic intransigence.  Identities become salient during war 




Kaufmann 1996; Kaufmann 1998).  To quote Kaufmann (Kaufmann 2007, p.3): 
“Atrocity tales continue to circulate within all the rival groups for many years after 
the end of the most intense violence, providing unanswerable arguments to hard-
liners on all sides and undermining individual trust that might allow refugees to return 
to homes in what has become ‘enemy’ territory—as well as the likelihood that the 
‘enemy’ will allow such returns.”  If war ends without complete demographic 
separation, the risk of conflict renewal remains high as these groups cannot live 
together after such intense inter-ethnic violence. 
But what of the constructivist contributions demonstrating the malleability of 
ethnic group identity (Brubaker 2004; Chandra 2006)?  Some IR theories, including 
the 2G ESD, recognize but dismiss constructivism under conditions of war, arguing 
that the unitary actor model is valid during and after ethnic wars.  Before ethnic war, 
identities may be malleable, but that the process of ethnic war itself locks in identity 
and forces members to choose sides.  There is much evidence to suggest that this is 
true, and we saw some of that in Chapter Three, which demonstrated that very few 
ethnic Abkhazians fought on the side of the Georgians and very few Georgians on the 
side of the Abkhaz.  Mixed-ethnicity families that were united before the war divided 
during it.   
4.4 Critique of the 2G ESD: Territorial Control and Ethnic Collaboration 
However, recent evidence suggests that even under conditions of war, ethnic 
behavior cannot be predicted by ethnic identity (Kalyvas 2008).  I draw on Kalyvas’s 
(2006) theory of territorial control and collaboration to explain.  Kalyvas argues that 




controls its territory: “the higher the level of control exercised by a political actor in 
an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor will be” 
(Kalyvas 2006: 111).  As Kalyvas (2008, pp.1062-1063) wrote, “Control, largely 
predicated on the judicious use of military resources…can potentially generate 
collaboration, irrespective of initially adverse preferences, including the type of 
strong preferences associated with ethnic identities.”  Positive inducements, such as 
finance may also play some role, although disincentives, such as repression tend to be 
more effective in a war environment. 
Territorial control, in other words, is more important than preferences in 
explaining behavior because people can be coerced into altering their behavior in 
ways that may not be consistent with their preferences through a combination of 
incentives (e.g., material goods) and disincentives (e.g., repression), with the latter 
particularly important during times of civil war.  While violence is of prime 
significance for translating control into collaboration, Kalyvas (2006: 124-130) lists 
six additional causal mechanisms that spawn collaboration.58  This fits with other 
rational choice explanations of dissent and control (Lichbach 1995; Wintrobe 1998).  
This  argument can be extended from ongoing war to the immediate post-war 
environment without altering any assumptions. 
If accurate, the theory suggests that even stay-behind minorities in post-
partitioned states could be prevented from organizing self-defense groups or rebelling 
against the state, as long as that state has control over that territory.  It is therefore 
not intransigent identities that lead to violence, but a lack of control (anarchy) and, as 
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I argue below, the actions of the neighboring state.  This is still predicated on the fact 
that the initial rebel militia has disappeared from the territory, and this can be 
accomplished through military defeat or partition – with the militia surviving, but 
establishing a separate homeland state. 
While Downes (2001) states that ethnic separation is required following ethnic 
civil war, he tacitly agrees, through one of his case studies, that separation is not 
always required.  When discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he stresses the 
need for ethnic separation, but when it comes to the Israeli-Arabs he suggests that 
they do not need to be transferred out of Israel.59  The Israeli Arabs, Downes (2001, 
pp.110-111) argues, have been subject to a “successful system of control which 
impeded Arab mobilization.”  This lack of mobilization means the Israeli Arabs are 
not a current risk for renewed violence, and this is in spite of the vicious violence that 
has been perpetrated by both sides of the conflict for decades. 
4.5 Incomplete Partition and the Triadic Political Space 
Even if ethnic minorities can remain within an enemy state and collaborate, 
incomplete ethnic partitions endogenously create a “Triadic Political Space,” which I 
argue poses a grave threat to peace (Brubaker 1996; Jenne 2007).  The triadic 
political space consists of the (i) stay-behind minority, (ii) the host state where the 
minority is situated, and (iii) the homeland state, dominated by the same ethnic kin as 
the stay-behind minority (Figure 2).  Within a context of weak states, which are 
virtually guaranteed by the ethnic civil war and newly created states, the opportunities 
for violence are high. 
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Figure 2: The Triadic Political Space 
 
 
4.5.1 Leadership Pursues War to Remain in Power 
This triadic political space, I argue, is the main threat to post-war peace, and 
this is for three reasons.  The first two reasons relate directly to actions of the 
homeland state.  First, in a two-level game (Putnam 1998), the homeland government 
may calculate that fighting to include the minority will expand its domestic base of 
support both by (i) rallying the domestic audience behind a nationalist cause to 
reclaim territory and ethnic kin lost in a recent war (“rally round the flag effect”) and 
by (ii) physically adding new ethnic kin  that would be grateful to be ruled by the 
homeland state (Tir 2005).  Recall that the collaboration discussed above is based on 
behavior, not preferences; the preferences of the ethnic minority and the homeland 
state would still be to live together: the stay-behind minority is collaborating with the 
new regime only under the threat of violence, increasing the chance of perceived 
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repression.  Even John Mueller (2000, p.56), who challenges the very concept of 
“ethnic war,” points out that people often face the choice of “being dominated by 
vicious bigots of one’s own ethnic group or by vicious bigots of another ethnic group: 
Given that range of alternatives, the choice was easy.” 
4.5.2 Domestic Polity Presses Government to Act 
Second, the homeland state acts as a lobby for and protector of the stay-behind 
ethnic minority.  The government may find itself under pressure from its domestic 
audience to act internationally to save the kin minority from real or perceived 
repression.  Such minority repression is likely in post-war, post-partition states, 
because weak states must rely disproportionately on security services to control 
populations as they lack more sophisticated means to co-opt populations (Kalyvas 
2006).  Further, in the initial post-war period, identity salience is high, leading to 
greater domestic pressure within the homeland state for its leadership to take action 
and “save” its neighboring kin.  In post-war Kosovo, Belgrade is under enormous 
pressure to take action and save its Serb minority within Kosovo and indeed has taken 
action to defend them (International Crisis Group 2004).  Could a government under 
these conditions fail to act while its own people were perceived to be under a grave 
threat?  This draws on key aspects within the ethnic security dilemma tradition, but 
instead of looking at civil war onset in “emerging anarchy” or civil war duration 
during “ethnic civil wars,” my theory, the 3G ESD extends these arguments to look at 
the recurrence of deadly ethnic violence. 




The triadic political space does not guarantee violence, however, it only makes it 
more likely, and I argue that the probability of violence increases with a shift in the 
balance of power between the post-war state states.  If one state gains strength, 
leaders of the stronger state are more likely to take advantage of the opportunity.  
This is especially true in the initial post-partition years while borders changes are still 
fresh and fluid. 
Each of the above factors is dependent upon a shift in the balance of power.  As 
scholars of war have demonstrated, leaders in both democratic and autocratic regimes 
face an increased risk of losing office if they begin wars they lose (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Silverson 1995; Goemans 2000).  Leaders in the post-war period will 
take advantage of opportunities that allow it to reclaim territories populated by its 
ethnic kin.  Many factors could reduce a state’s capacity to defend itself relative to its 
neighbor, including the results of the civil war itself, internal armed opposition, state 
and non-state neighboring actors. 
4.5.4 Non-State Militias 
Third, the homeland state can be used as a safe-haven for ethnic militias that 
can be used to launch attacks against the neighboring state.  Even if the state itself 
does not engage in direct intervention, safe-havens are notorious for creating and 
prolonging civil wars.  As Saleyhan (2007, p.218) has argued, “the use of external 
sanctuaries is one of the most common strategies employed by rebel groups to evade 
state repression….[and] provide an important opportunity for rebel mobilization.” 
A homeland state may covertly permit such militias to use its territory.  This is 




in a neighboring state, but nevertheless want to protect or support its ethnic kin.  
Pakistan, for example, has long supported non-state militias in neighboring India 
among its Urdu-speaking Muslim kin in Kashmir.  Weak states may also not be able 
to prevent such militias acting on its territory.  In a post-war environment where 
territorial control is weak, government security forces may simply be unable to 
monopolize the use of force on its territory or be unwilling to risk its authority by 
taking on armed political opposition groups in the initial years.  After Georgia’s civil 
wars ended in 1993, it took another 15 years before the state finally put an end to non-
state violent groups operating openly in its territory. 
This weakness approximates conditions of “anarchy” and this creates increased 
opportunities for violence.  While it may seem obvious that territorial control will not 
be in doubt following the end of war, this is far from true.  Frequently governments 
can largely “control” their territory but still have pockets of land and resistance that 
remain for years.  For example, the ethnic civil war in Indonesia between the 
government and East Timor’s Fretilin60 was largely over by the 1980s, with the 
government eliminating Fretilin’s 27,000 strong forces from the 1970s, but even in 
1987 it is estimated that 100 guerrillas still remained hiding in the mountains (Doyle 
and Sambanis 2006).  Similarly, the Soviet Union, which had already managed its 
first atomic bomb in 1949, did not manage to eliminate the last of the Ukrainian 
independence fighters that emerged during World War Two until 1953.  Finally, one 
of the causes of instability in Congo and Rwanda in the late 1990s was each 
government’s inability to reign in militias conducting cross-border raids, and these 
actors eventually drew the governments into the conflict. 
                                                 




In sum, it is not the minority itself that is causing violence, I argue, but rather 
the international environment caused by an incomplete ethnic partition and a shift in 
the balance of power between those states.  This presents a paradox: partition is 
required to solve the problem of credible commitment, the “realist” security dilemma, 
and the problem of group concentration within a single state.  Yet, such partitions 
increase the risk of violence by endogenously creating the seeds of further conflict via 
the triadic political space within an ethnically charged environment with weak state 
structures.  But if partitions are complete – if they separate the warring groups then 
the principal justification for recurring violence – protection of ethnic kin and 
irredentism – is removed. 
Without an ethnic minority, the state’s only justification for intervention is 
territorial expansion.  This is certainly a possibility, and, as mentioned above, 
territorial conflicts have been at the heart of most interstate wars last century.  My 3G 
ESD cannot preclude such violence, and also does not claim to be a guarantee against 
any deadly conflict recurrence.  Rather, the 3G ESD argues that combined partitions 
of at least de facto statehood and demography will provide the best chance of an 
enduring peace in comparison to all other ethnic civil war terminations. 
4.6 State Weakness and Identity Salience Over Time 
While state weakness is central to my argument, the extent of the weakness is 
likely to be limited in time.  While post-war states may remain fragile for years, the 
initial phase of weakness that approximates anarchy should be short-lived as 
governments take control of their land and population, penetrating society and 




“emerging anarchy,” the 3G ESD looks at conditions of “exiting anarchy” and this 
time limit helps explain why the initial post-war years are the most prone to violence 
recurrence.  As states secure control of territory and consolidate new borders, it will 
become difficult for neighboring states or non-state militias to interfere to undermine 
state stability. 
In addition, identity-salience will likely fade with time.  While much research has 
concentrated on “activating” identity, very little has researched decreasing salience 
(Brubaker 2004).  A common assumption is that the intensity of feelings decrease as 
the threat against the ethnic group decreases.  Further, as governments assert control, 
they will increasingly co-opt minorities, further decreasing the likelihood of rebellion 
either as government threats become more real or as they become stakeholders in 
society.  This does not prevent recurring violence – neighboring states can launch an 
invasion at any moment – but as the host state strengthens, opportunities decrease for 
interference and this decreases the likelihood for recurring deadly conflict. 
5 Testable Hypotheses 
Based on the above, we can draw the following testable hypotheses for the 3G ESD.  
First, and most centrally, the 3G ESD posits that separating warring ethnic groups 
into separate homeland states will increase the likelihood of a sustained peace. 
H1: Complete ethnic partitions increase the likelihood of peace after ethnic civil 
wars. 
This stands in contrast to those who focus on problems of credible commitment or the 




central role.  Therefore a rival hypothesis from the literature should be that partitions 
creating separate states alone will increase the likelihood of a sustainable peace. 
H2: Partitioning territories into separate states increase the likelihood of peace 
after ethnic civil wars. 
I explore both of these hypotheses in Chapter Five, through a cross-national statistical 
study of all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004.  I also conduct 
process tracing as part of a nested design through a case study in Chapter Six. 
While complete separation should lead to prolonged peace, the 3G ESD also 
argues that the violence of stay-behind minorities is caused by an interaction effect of 
weak states and the triadic political space.  Stay-behind minorities, by themselves, do 
not lead to renewed violence since they will collaborate with the ruling regime, even 
if it is controlled by an enemy ethnic group that committed atrocities against members 
of the minority during the war.  This is one of the key theoretical distinctions between 
the 2G and 3G ESDs. 
H3: Members of the stay-behind minority are likely to collaborate with the host 
state controlled by the enemy ethnic group as long as it maintains territorial 
control. 
 
However, the preferences of the stay-behind minority should be visible if territorial 
control shifts from one regime to another, with the stay-behind minority engaging in 
“limited” collaboration under the control of the enemy ethnic group and “active” 
collaboration under the control of their own ethnic kin. 
 
H4: Stay-behind minorities will likely engage in “limited” collaboration when 
located in territory controlled by the enemy ethnic group and “active” 





The 3G ESD argues that violence will likely recur with stay-behind 
minorities, but argues that the source is the triadic political space created 
endogenously by incomplete partitions.  I argued above that this could come from two 
sources.  First, the homeland state’s armed forces could directly intervene to capture 
territory where the ethnic minority was located.  Second, the homeland state could be 
used by non-state armed militias as a safe-haven to conduct military operations 
against the host state’s security forces.  This creates two more hypotheses to test: 
H5: Violence recurrence is likely to be caused by the homeland state’s armed 
forces direct intervention in the host state’s territory. 
 
H6: Violence recurrence is likely to be caused by non-state ethnic militias using 
the homeland state as a safe-haven to launch military operations. 
 
H7: Violence is likely to occur when there is a shift in the balance of power 
between the two post-partition states. 
  
Some of these hypotheses require fine-detailed information on who is 
involved in violent attacks, and this information is not available at the cross-national 
level.  It also requires information on state weakness, which at present is 
operationalized in datasets as including states in the immediate post-war period.  
Further, partitioned states and new states are also operationalized in large-n datasets 
as being “weak.” This prevents us from a cross-national comparison of cases of ethnic 
civil war termination in a large-n study.  All of these cases will marked as weak.  The 
type of evidence required necessitates detailed field research, and I explore this and 
other hypotheses in Chapters Six and Seven. 
6 Conclusion 
Partition offers a potential to resolve the problem of ethnic civil war recurrence.  




theoretical frameworks generating more confusion than clarity about the effectiveness 
of partition.  Scholars have not, for example, always untangled whether the issue is 
sovereignty (i.e., statehood) or demography, whether it is the realist security dilemma 
or the ethnic security dilemma, and whether the dependent variable should be war 
onset or war recurrence.  These are important, because it impacts how we think about 
partition and how we can evaluate its effectiveness. 
If the security dilemma is the driver of conflict renewal, then partitions of 
sovereignty alone may be sufficient to lower the risk of war renewal, without 
requiring population transfers once peace has already been achieved.  Given that 
forced population transfers go against normative commitments to which the 
international community has committed itself, this is not just an academic question.  
Moreover, it could shed light on the risks of reintegration efforts the international 
community is working towards in places such as Bosnia, Georgia, and Angola. 
If demography alone is the key variable, then separating populations within a 
country, relying on autonomy and internal population transfers may be enough. 
If the 3G ESD is at the heart of war renewal, then both separate statehoods and 
ethno-demographic separation are indeed required, with separate borders and 
population transfers implemented, while reintegration of ethnic groups should not be 
a policy prescription adopted by the international community. 
Disentangling statehood and demography is a priority for understanding the 
dynamics of ethnic war recurrence, and this creates room for both theory testing and 
theory building.  This forms the basis of Chapters Five and Six of my dissertation.  In 




ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004.  Chapter Six consists of case 
studies in a nested research design drawn from the dataset in Chapter Five.  I use 
process tracing through two cases of incomplete partition that result in both conflict 




Chapter 5:  Partition and Post-War Violence: Cross-National 
Evidence from 1945-2004 
 
1 OVERVIEW 
Chapter Four introduced the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G 
ESD) as a theory of post-ethnic civil war conflict recurrence and how to avoid it.  
Building on previous civil war and ethnic conflict research, I focused on (i) ethnic 
group concentration, (ii) problems of credible commitment, and (iii) the triadic 
political space as core issues likely to bring about recurring violence.  As a solution, I 
argued that demographic separation alone would not prevent conflict recurrence as it 
both increased the ethnic group’s capacity to fight and left the ethnically augmented 
problem of credible commitment unresolved.  Similarly, I argued that partitions into 
statehood alone were insufficient, because they created a triadic political space that 
would likely increase violence between the post-partition states.  Instead, partitions 
with complete ethno-demographic separation of warring ethnic groups are likely to 
produce prolonged peace.  This chapter provides a cross-national empirical test of this 
theory for all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004. 
2 Introduction 
 With the majority of ethnic civil wars experiencing conflict recurrence within 
the first years of establishing peace, we must understand how this occurs if we ever 
hope to build a sustainable peace.  The 3G ESD challenged the 2G ESD by arguing 




together after ethnic civil wars.  In this chapter we test this theory through a large-n, 
cross-national study, comparing partitions to other ethnic civil war outcomes.  I 
examine post-partition peace and violence in all ethnic civil wars during the post-
WWII period from 1945 to 2004.  This chapter serves as part of a larger nested-
design and I draw two cases from the results for in-depth process-tracing in chapters 
five and six to complement these cross-national results. 
The value of this chapter is threefold.  First, previous studies contributing to 
the debate on partition have largely remained theoretical or focused on case studies 
and policy-prescriptions (Downes 2001; Galbraith 2006; Kumar 1997; Mansergh 
1990;  Mearsheimer 2000).  Evidence has pointed to some successes, such as the 
1974 partition of Cyprus, which led to decades of peace, and some failures, such as 
the partition of British India, which led to widespread death and subsequent war. 
Second, I directly challenge both the conceptual and empirical results of the 
only large-n cross-national study purporting to test partition’s ability to end civil war.  
Nicholas Sambanis (2000) produced the first empirical study of partition using a 
large-n, cross-national database.  Based on his results, Sambanis (2000, p.479) 
concluded that “partition does not significantly prevent war recurrence [which] 
suggests, at the very least, that separating ethnic groups does not resolve the problem 
of violent ethnic antagonism.” 
Sambanis’s analysis helped to further scholarly understanding of partition’s 
relationship to ethnic civil war, but was flawed on two counts.  Sambanis explicitly 
sets out to test the second generation ethnic security dilemma (2G ESD), yet his 




wars. Instead he assesses whether partition prevents the recurrence of ethnic civil war, 
which is only part of the 2G ESD.  Equally important, the Sambanis analysis suffers 
from a methodological error because it identified new borders (i.e., de facto 
statehood) as the critical independent variable to represent partition, and not the 
demographic separation of warring ethnic groups.61  Testing the relationship between 
statehood and conflict recurrence does not capture – and therefore cannot refute – the 
position of partition advocates.  This chapter, in contrast, introduces an index to 
calculate the amount of unmixing of ethnic groups that occurs with partition, 
therefore capturing partition advocates’ core argument. 
When I test the 3G ESD, focusing similarly on conflict recurrence but with 
demography and statehood as key components of the independent variable, I find 
partition to be a uniformly effective tool in preventing a recurrence of war and low-
level-violence.  Finally, this chapter contributes to the wider debate by offering a 
staging point for further research through case studies.  This section of the 
dissertation is a nested design, and the cross-national analysis allows me to select 
cases that fit and do not fit the 3G ESD; I examine those cases in Chapters Six and 
Seven. 
2.1 Chapter Outline 
The chapter is divided into three sections.  First, I examine partition’s 
empirical record and raise critical questions about Sambanis’s main conclusion that 
partition is not particularly effective at preventing war recurrence.  Second, I propose 
an alternative variable – the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index – for testing 
whether partition is a viable solution for ending ethnic wars.  Third, I demonstrate 
                                                 




that, where the index shows warring ethnic groups were in fact separated, neither war 
nor low-level violence reoccurred for at least five years, suggesting that the 3G ESD 
is correct.  I close by highlighting two cases to explore in greater depth for subsequent 
chapters. 
3 Cross-National Statistical Testing of Partition Theory 
Sambanis (2000) compiled a dataset of all civil wars between 1945 and 1999 to 
compare the effectiveness of partition to other causes of war termination and peace 
building.62  Sambanis tested each of these independent variables, including partition, 
on three dependent variables: its ability to prevent war recurrence; its ability to reduce 
low-level postwar violence; and its ability to promote postwar democratization.  
Based on his analysis, Sambanis (2000, p.439) concluded that “although it may seem 
like a clean and easy solution, partition fares no better than other outcomes of ethnic 
civil war.”  He also concluded that “the evidence does not support the assertion that 
partition significantly reduces the risk of war recurrence.” (2000, p.473)  He went on, 
“I can point to only very weak evidence in support of the hypothesis that partitions 
help end low-level ethnic violence.…More importantly, the positive impact of 
partitions seems fragile and extremely dependent” (2000, p.478). 
The Sambanis analysis has gone some way towards resolving the issue of 
whether statehood is at the heart of the partition debate, demonstrating that such 
partitions are not more effective than other strategies at maintaining peace.  Further, I 
specifically coded his civil wars to identify ethno-secessionist wars (those that are 
more likely to be potential cases of partition) using Fearon’s coding as a guideline, 
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and found partition not be a statistically significant variable in preventing war 
recurrence for that sub-set of cases.  However, Sambanis does not include a variable 
for ethno-demographic separation, so his analysis cannot test the ethnic security 
dilemma. 
3.1 Operationalization 
Ethnic Civil War 
Sambanis used a broad definition of ethnic civil war, which allowed him to 
draw on a variety of civil war related databases.63  He based his definition on six 
criteria: the war caused more than 1,000 battle deaths; it challenged the sovereignty of 
an internationally recognized state; it occurred within the recognized boundaries of 
that state; it involved the state as one of the principal combatants; it included rebels 
with the ability to mount an organized opposition; and it involved parties concerned 
with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war 
(Sambanis 2000, p.444).64  A civil war was coded as ethnic based on other datasets, 
using case-specific source material when discrepancies emerged Sambanis 2000, 
Appendix B, p.7).65 
Low-Level Violence 
                                                 
63 For consistency, I follow Sambanis’s coding for ethnic war in as many cases as possible.  He 
categorized such wars “with reference to as many sources as I could consult for each case. I tried to 
reflect majority opinion about the coding of each case, where there was disagreement between my 
main sources.”  See p. 455.  As noted below Tajikistan was recoded. 
64 The definition is relatively uncontroversial except for its “1,000 deaths,” which does not require an 
annual death threshold, but rather “1,000 [battle] deaths for the duration of the war.” See Sambanis, 
“Appendix B: Data-Set Notes,” (Washington, D.C.:World Bank, 2000), p. 2.  For a detailed discussion 
about the use of battle deaths in the quantitative, cross-national data set, see Sambanis (2004). 




Sambanis’s definition for low-level violence relies largely on the Wallensteen 
and Sollenberg (1997) data set coding all armed conflicts causing 25 or more deaths 
but falling short of war. 
Post-War Peace 
For post-war peace, I use a two and five-year threshold since, as mentioned in 
the introduction, the first five years are deemed the most critical for conflict 
recurrence. 
Partition 
Sambanis (2000, p.445) defined partition as “a war outcome that involves 
both border adjustment and demographic changes.”  This chapter follows Sambanis 
and includes instances of both “partition” and “secession.”  Traditionally, partitions 
were understood as a “fresh division” of some territory, usually executed by a 
sovereign (often great) power occurring at the time of decolonization (Schaefer 
1990).  In my study, however, who imposes partition is relatively unimportant: the 
critical factor is whether dividing warring groups into separate entities can prevent 
war recurrence.66  Further, whether it is possible to accurately distinguish between 
secessions and partitions is unclear: Kaufmann, for example, codes Cyprus (1974) as 
a “partition” but Abkhazia (1992-93) a “secession,” even though both Turkish 
                                                 
66 Debates regarding differences between secession and decolonization also exist, although these 
debates are unhelpful for the current debate on partition: to suggest that the “separation” of Nigeria and 
the United Kingdom is similar to the “separation” of Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh conflates two 
very different events and serves only to obfuscate the partition process in the current debate of ethnic 
civil wars.  Further, current ethnic civil wars often see the language of “colonization” in a highly 
contested manner.  For example, Chechen insurgents claim to be waging a war of liberation against the 
“colonizing” center of Moscow, whereas Moscow claims the uprising is a secession and sees 
Chechnya as an integral part of the Russian Federation.  In the military campaign beginning in 1999, 
Russia labeled the Chechen insurgents no longer as secessionists but as bandits, criminals, or Wahhabi 
radicals.  For purposes of analysis, many academics put partition, secession, and decolonization in the 
same category.  McGarry and O’Leary lump “partition and/or secession (self determination)” together 
in their taxonomy, and include decolonization within it.  See, for example, McGarry and O’Leary 




Cypriots and Abkhaz were involved in separatist movements that were ultimately 
successful because of assistance from an external power (Turkey and Russia, 
respectively).67  Moreover, given that the implications of partition theory affect 
partitions and secessions equally in the minds of academics and policymakers, it is 
logical to code both. 
De Jure and De Facto Independent Statehood 
I follow Scott Pegg (1998, p.26) and others in referring to state-like entities 
that lack international recognition as de facto states, such as the state of South 
Ossetia, which is legally part of Georgia, recognized by only Nicaragua and Russia.68  
For partition theory, the importance is the state-like attributes, critical for defense, not 
the international recognition.  As Dov Lynch (Lynch 2002: 835) argues, “the key 
difference for the de facto state resides in its lack of recognized external sovereignty, 
which prevents it from enjoying membership of the exclusive and all-encompassing 
club of state.”  As a recent review summarized, while various authors disagree on 
many aspects of de facto states, there is agreement that de facto states “are 
remarkably robust, state-like entities” (Kolsto 2006: 727; Vinci 2008). 
Finally, it is relatively unimportant whether a postpartitioned entity achieves 
de jure sovereignty (as in the case of Bangladesh’s internationally recognized 
                                                 
67 See Kaufmann (1998) p. 126.  The role of Turkey in enabling the de facto independence of the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been well documented.  For the critical role of Russia in 
enabling Abkhazia’s de facto independence, see Toft (2003), pp. 87-106. 
68 “A de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership, which has risen to power 
through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient 
capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over 
which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time.  The de facto state views itself as 
capable of entering into relations with other states and it seeks full constitutional independence and 
widespread international recognition as a sovereign state.” The classical definition of an entity that 
may be regarded as a sovereign state was established at the Montevideo Contention on Rights and 
Durites of States in 1933.  The criteria: (i) permanent population; (ii) a defined territory; (iii) a 




separation from Pakistan) or de facto sovereignty (as in the case of South Ossetia’s 
unrecognized separation from Georgia); therefore both types are included.  Although 
some scholars have begun to include wars of decolonization in data sets of civil wars 
(e.g., Algeria from France and Mozambique from Portugal), this practice remains 
questionable conceptually.69  Moreover, because I am primarily interested in 
reevaluating Sambanis’s analysis, like him, I also exclude such wars.  Using 
Sambanis’s data set, I was able to reproduce his estimates. 
My Cases 
My cases differ slightly from those used by Sambanis.  First, I excluded 
Tajikistan because it did not undergo a recognizable partition during or after its civil 
war, and because most experts deemed it a regional and ideological, not ethnic, 
conflict.70  Second, I included the case of Bosnia, but where Sambanis uses the 1992 
partition, I used the 1995 partition.  The 1992 partition of Bosnia from Yugoslavia did 
not occur at the end of the war, which raged for three more years.71  I coded the 
Dayton accords72 as a partition of Bosnia between Serbs, on the one hand, and 
                                                 
69 Some civil war databases, such as those used by Fearon (2004) include wars of decolonization.  
Others, such as Roy Licklider (1995) do not.  The Correlates of War separates these into “internal 
wars” and “extrasystemic wars”.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) run their analysis both with and without 
wars of decolonization when testing for causes of civil war onset, recognizing conceptual and 
theoretical problems for both inclusion and exclusion. 
70 It was not clear from the Sambanis article, appendix, or coding notes in Appendix B as to why 
Tajikistan was coded as a partition or an ethnic civil war; Tajikistan’s separation from the Soviet 
Union occurs before its war begins.  Sambanis recognizes Tajikistan as a coding error in, “Partition 
and Civil War Recurrence.”  For Tajikistan as a regional and ideological conflict, see Payam Foroughi, 
“Tajikistan: Nationalism, Ethnicity, Conflict, and Socio-Economic Disparities—Sources and 
Solutions,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2002), pp. 39-62; and Dov 
Lynch, “The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process,” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 2001), pp. 49-72. 
71 Sambanis (2000), p.43) states, “ Bosnian partition from Yugoslavia in 1992.”  He recognizes some 
of these issues in an unpublished paper, “Partition and Civil War Recurrence: a Re-Examination of the 
Evidence.” (unpublished paper, Yale University, 2006). 
72 The General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was initialed in Dayton, Ohio, on 




Bosniaks and Croats on the other.73  The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
divided into two de facto states in 1995, each maintaining separate armed forces that 
cannot enter the other’s territory.74  This qualifies Bosnia as a partition.  As the realist 
scholars John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt confirmed at the time, Bosnia 
“produced a partition settlement.…The settlement is a veiled partition but a partition 
nevertheless.”75  Third, I excluded the 1992 Croatia case because of the difficulty of 
categorizing it as a war end.  Although there were cease-fires between the Zagreb-
based Croatian authorities and the Knin-based Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK),76 
the conflict between Yugoslavian/Serb and Croatian forces continued in many 
regions, including the Serb siege of Dubrovnik and the Croat siege of Bihac.  In 
addition, serious military operations between RSK and Croatia’s army resumed soon 
after each cease-fire.77  I therefore exclude this case from the analysis.  Given the 
ongoing violence between Yugoslavian/Serb and Croat forces between 1991 and 
                                                 
73 The inclusion of Republika Srpska partition from Bosnia also means that I added the Bosniak-Croat 
dyad as a case of ethnic war ending without a sovereignty partition.  This does not appear in Tables 1 
and 2, which look only at sovereignty partitions, but does appear in the later comparison between 
partitions and other war outcomes. 
74 The two republics are Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This is not a 
case of territorial autonomy because of the existence of separate governments with armed forces that 
cannot enter each other’s territory.  The primary conflict was between the Serb forces, on the one hand, 
and the Croat and Bosnian forces on the other, although the Croat and Bosnian forces also fought each 
other from mid-1993 until the signing of the Washington treaty of March 18, 1994, after which they 
fought together against Serb forces.  Other coding possibilities therefore include separate Bosniak-Serb 
and Croat-Serb codings for partition, but the figures for separation are virtually the same and do not 
affect the results, except to provide an additional “partition.”  Further, given the conflict between Croat 
and Bosniak forces, one could include this as an ethnic war without partition as an ending.  Again, 
these results do not affect the final results when comparing partition to nonpartition. 
75 Measheimer and Walt, “When Peace Means War,” p. 16. 
76 RSK had a separate government and armed forces. 
77 For example, see military operations in the Lika region of RSK (Operation Medak Pocket, 
September 1993), and the Maslenica and Zadar regions of RSK (Operation Maslenica, January 1993).  
By the time of the next cease-fire, in 1994, Croatian forces were already preparing Operation Flash, 




1995,78 it is more appropriate to consider this a Croatian “war of independence,” 
ending with the partition of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1995, which is what I include 
in my analysis.79  Finally, I updated all relevant variables for all cases of ethnic civil 
war through mid-2004.  This update includes the additional case of Kosovo, which 
was partitioned in 1999. 
More importantly, I introduce a new independent variable for analysis.  This 
new variable is critical because Sambanis’s definition of partition relies on the 
existence of any border and demographic changes but not the degree of separation 
between ethnic groups.  The following section outlines my alternative approach. 
4 The Centrality of Demography 
As mentioned in the theory chapter, the 2G ESD claims that demography is the 
core variable that will decide the fate of ethnic civil wars and whether they end in 
peace or violence.  Yet, as also mentioned in the introduction, several authors have 
identified concentrated ethnic groups within a single country as particularly at risk for 
rebellion, suggesting this alone would not be an effective strategy for peacebuilding 
(Gurr 1993; Toft 2003).  In fact, Laitin (2004) addressed this topic directly as it 
relates to partition, although insufficient data prevent him a direct test.  Moreover, 
Kaufmann himself stresses the need for the concentrated groups to have defense 
capabilities, which may be difficult to achieve within a single state.80  The 3G ESD 
                                                 
78 The Yugoslav National Army was heavily involved in the wars for the RSK, as was Slobodan 
Milosevic. 
79 This is, in fact, how most Croats understand the war (commonly labeled “Domovinski Rat” in 
Croatian) from 1991 to 1995.  In Sambanis’s unpublished paper (“Partition and Civil War 
Recurrence”), he excludes Croatia altogether, which I find surprising given that the definition he uses 
for partition in this paper is “an outcome of a civil war that…leads to the formation of a new state out 
of a part of another state,” which is what occurred in Croatia, where war began in 1991 by 
conventional counts. 




argues that both statehood (de facto or de jure) and demography are critical to a 
successful. 
Thus far, we have only had a cross-national test of statehood alone without 
demography.  If demography is central, and if partitioned countries with new 
minorities increase the security threat, then demographic changes need to be captured 
for use as an independent variable.  Social scientists have developed few 
demographic indicators to capture degrees of ethnic heterogeneity.  Tatu Vanhanen 
(1999), for example, created the ethnic heterogeneity index to explore the general 
relationship between ethnic conflict and ethnic division.  Daniel Posner (2004) has 
created an index based on politically relevant ethnic groups.  Neither index, however, 
can identify which groups were at war and the degree to which they separated after 
the war.  As a result, I created the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI). 
4.1 Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index 
In constructing the PEHI, I began with a state that contains a titular ethnic 
group and a minority ethnic group.  The two groups engage in a civil war and, at 
some point, their territory is partitioned in the hopes of ending the conflict.  The result 
is two countries, each with its own titular majority as well as a potentially “stay-
behind” minority from the other ethnic group.  To determine the degree to which the 
ethnic groups were separated, it requires knowing (1) the percentage the percentage 
of the minority group in the original country (recorded as OSM for original state 
minority); (2) the percentage of the original minority left in the rump state after 
partition (RSM for rump state minority); and (3) the percentage of the original titular 









































































Given the theoretical focus on demography, with an understanding that leaving 
sizable minorities on either side of a new border could increase the chances of 
renewed warfare and low-level violence, this index uses both new minorities to 
calculate the degree to which a partition and population transfers succeeded in 
separating the warring groups.  For countries with more than two ethnic groups at 
war, groups are aggregated if they fought on the same side or if they are treated as 
one by the opposing force;81 if there are separate warring ethnic dyads within a civil 
war, they can be treated as separate wars. 
To calculate the PEHI, I subtracted the new minority percentages (RSM and 
NSM) from the original minority percentage (OSM).  I then divided this percentage 
by the original minority percentage (OSM) and multiplied the result by 100.  This 
simple calculation yields the percentage change in the size of ethnic minorities 
produced by partitioning the country, thus indicating the degree of ethnic separation: 
  





The higher the PEHI number, the greater the degree of separation achieved by 
partition.  The maximum score a partition can receive is +100, indicating a complete 
                                                 
81 The Minorities at Risk Project follows a similar guideline when aggregating groups vis-à-vis the 
government.  For example, in Darfur today, MAR codes the “Black Muslims of Darfur” as a group, 
even though there are three different groups: Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit.  The same formula is used for 
the “Southerners” group in Sudan, which comprise Equatorians, Dinkas, Nuers, Anuaks, Shilluks, 
Latukas, Taposas, Turkans, Moru, Madi, and Azande.  See Minorities at Risk Project, “Assessment for 
Southerners in Sudan” or “Assessment for Darfur Black Muslims in Sudan,” (College Park, MD: 





separation of the warring ethnic groups.  This number falls as the size of the stay-
behind minorities grows relative to the original minority percentage.82 
4.2 Coding PEHI 
Timely data on minority populations in the aftermath of ethnic civil wars 
proved difficult to find.  For coding, I relied on a staple set of books and 
encyclopedias.83   The guiding principle in gathering the data was to have at least two 
credible sources provide the same numbers; when these numbers were close but not 
exact, an average was taken.  Where two sources could not be found among the 
staple, I consulted case-specific academic publications and news reports gauging 
refugee flows of ethnic groups.84  Where data were unavailable for the year 
immediately after partition, I used the first available data. 
4.3 Results 
Table 1 presents the PEHI component figures from the 17 cases of partition that 
occurred after ethnic civil war between 1945 and 2004.  For example, in Azerbaijan 
OSM – in this case, the Armenians – formed 5.8 percent of Azerbaijan’s population 
before the civil war.  After the civil war approximately 20,000 Armenians remained 
in rump-Azerbaijan, creating an RSM of 0.25 percent.  The number of Azeris found 
                                                 
82 There are different ways to calculate the PEHI.  One alternative is to look at the separation from both 
sides by including an indicator of the percentage of the original majority found in the minority region 
prior to the war (e.g., ethnic Russians in Chechnya before 1994), which I label MiM (Majority in 
Minority region), and then to calculate the index as: [(MiM+OSM) – (RSM+NSM)]/(MiM+OSM).  I 
conducted a sensitivity test using this formula, and others, and found no substantive differences in the 
results: those cases with high degrees of unmixing scored highly on all formulas. 
83 The staple set consisted of Encyclopedia Columbia, 2001; Encyclopedia Britannica, 2003; Patrick  
Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Strife  since 1945 (New York: 
Vintage, 1990);  Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World since 1945 (London: Cassell, 1995); Economist 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit available at www.economist.com; CIA World Factbook; Lexis-
Nexis Academic; and International Crisis Group reports. 
84 Refugee flows were required for some conflicts, in which case prewar minority percentages were 
used to obtain absolute numbers of the minority, and refugee numbers were subtracted from the total to 
arrive at an approximation of the minority remaining in the territory.  Where large refugee movements 
take place - many of these conflicts forced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes - exact 




in the new state of Nagorno Karabakh after the war ended was negligible 
(NSM<0.01).  The following equation reflects the PEHI for the case of Azerbaijan: 
 


















Table 1. Calculating PEHI Values for Partitions after Ethnic Civil War 
















































































































25.00 28.00 -93.43 
Note: Scores of <0.01 assume value 0 for calculation of the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index. 
The PEHI shows what was achieved with partition.  Rather than a simple 
binary code indicating if de facto statehood was achieved, the PEHI captures the 
degree to which minorities were separated.  For example, the 1963-64 partition of 
Cyprus, where Turks migrated into small defensive enclaves during intense 
interethnic war, failed to significantly divide the populations with a large number of 
Turks left outside the defensible enclaves.  According to the PEHI, this partition 
homogenized the territories by a paltry 34.6 percent, reducing the security dilemma 
only marginally.  Partition theory would expect a high likelihood of war recurrence 
under these conditions, which is what took place.  In contrast, Azerbaijan’s partition 
succeeded in separating Azeris and Armenians with a PEHI of close to 100 percent.  
As predicted by partition theory, there has been no recurrence of war. 
4.4 Examining the PEHI 
The PEHI indicates whether any one partition selected from the database 
would be considered a “complete partition” or an “incomplete partition” by partition 
advocates.  A complete partition is one in which the warring minorities are fully 
separated, leaving negligible stay-behind minorities; an incomplete partition is one in 
which the minorities are not separated, leaving sizable stay-behind minorities in either 
of the two emerging states.  For this study, any partition that succeeded in separating 
the warring parties by a PEHI of 95 percent or more is considered a complete 




guide to indicate partitions where ethnic groups have been effectively separated in 
their entirety, a critical demand by partition advocates.85 
Table 2 compares “complete” and “incomplete” partitions against the two 
main criteria established by Sambanis: recurrence of war 2 and 5 years after the end 
of a civil war, and recurrence of low-level violence within 2 and 5 years.86  This five-
year threshold is particularly significant given World Bank data (Collier and Hoeffler 
2000) and other scholarly research (e.g., Johnson 2009) suggesting that post-conflict 
countries face a 50 percent or higher risk of renewed conflict within the first five 
years of reaching peace. 
                                                 
85  This accepts the inevitability of small, residual minorities which do not alter the value of the results.  
The average size of the largest residual minorities found after “complete partitions” amounted to a 
mere 0.33 percent.  Kaufmann argues, “While peace requires separation of groups into distinct regions, 
it does not require total ethnic purity. Rather, remaining minorities must be small enough that the host 
group does not fear them as either a potential military threat or a possible target for irredentist rescue 
operations.” Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,” p. 163. 
86 Sambanis uses postwar democratization as a third criterion and finds postpartition states associated 
with higher levels of democracy.  This chapter does not address these results because they do not form 





Table 2.  Complete and Incomplete Partitions 
Country PEHI Complete Partition 
War Ended 










Ended for 5 
Years 






95.69 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bosnia (1995) 
 





No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cyprus (1963) 
 
34.60 No No No No No 
Cyprus (1974) 
 








































No Yes Yes No No 
Moldova (1992) 
 










No No No No No 
Somalia (1992) 
 






As the results in Table 2 indicate, for all partitions achieving a PEHI 
separation score higher than 95 percent, there were no recurrences of war for at least 
five years, nor were there recurrences of low-level violence for five years, with the 
sole exception of Georgia-Abkhazia.  The Georgia-Abkhazian partition, however, is 
an exception that proves the rule: the PEHI is a static number, indicating ethno-
demographic separation only once at the end of the war, but in the case of Abkhazia 
post-war migration was not static.  Within two years, ethnic Georgians began 
returning to Abkhazia, and within five years over 40,000 had returned, sparking a 
return to armed conflict in 1998.  Therefore, while low-level violence recurred, it was 
because of non-separation, adding further evidence to the 3G ESD.  If we rank the 
PEHI from highest to lowest, we find that the top 10 partitions experienced no 
conflict recurrence and no separation achieving a PEHI score above 70 percent 
experienced a recurrence of war or low-level violence, suggesting the threshold of 95 
percent could even be lowered (see also Johnson 2009).  For partitions with lower 
PEHI scores, the results are mixed, with most experiencing either war recurrence or a 
return of low-level violence. 
These data suggest that a partition that successfully separates warring ethnic 
groups produces substantially different results from partitions that do not separate the 
groups, which is what the 3G ESD predicts.  This further underscores the need to 
disaggregate partitions into those that separate the warring ethnic groups and those 
that do not.  Although the number of cases is small – there have been only six cases 
of “complete” partition – the results are consistent and unambiguous.  Given the small 




advocates cannot be faulted for the lack of complete partitions since 1945, they can 
be honest about what the numbers demonstrate. 
One case that stands out is the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict.  Although this 
partition meets the criteria established by Sambanis, with no recurrence of war or 
low-level violence between Ethiopia and Eritrea for at least five years after their 
partition, these countries did return to war in 1998, after a seven-year peace.  Partition 
advocates do not claim, however, that separating warring ethnic groups will always 
prevent a return to war or low-level violence forever into the future; rather they claim 
that it is often the best option to give peace a chance.  In addition, for this particular 
case, had more population transfers occurred at the time of partition, the tens of 
thousands of Eritreans remaining in Ethiopia would not have faced the horrific 
expulsions that occurred during the 1998-00 war (Amnesty International 1999; 
Tronvoll 2000).87 
Further, as mentioned earlier, partition advocates argue that any future war 
between partitioned states will be an improvement over a return to civil war because 
the two sovereign states will be subjected to greater international attention and 
diplomatic pressure, increasing the likelihood of war ending quickly.  Ethiopia and 
Eritrea exemplify this logic: the civil war the two sides fought lasted more than 15 
years, whereas the inter-state conflict of 1998 ended within two years following 
heavy international pressure.  Similarly, the Georgian conflict over South Ossetia in 
                                                 
87 On the civilian expulsions, Minority Rights Group reported that by early 2000 more than 54,000 
Ethiopians of Eritrean origin had been deported.  Amnesty International (1999, p.27) that “the 
expulsion of people of Eritrean origin was often carried out in an inhumane manner that amounts to 




2008 lasted just six days amidst heavy international pressure, producing relatively 
few deaths (Johnson 2009). 
A potential concern with the results of this analysis may be over the issue of 
endogeneity or whether a selection bias has taken place where cases of complete 
partition occurred in states where ethnic minorities were already compact and 
homogeneous, and thus relatively easy to separate after a war without “ethnic 
cleansing” or large population transfers.  Few communities are ethnically 
homogeneous, however, and even those ethnic groups that are territorially 
concentrated typically have a significant minority in their midst.  In this analysis, all 
of the “complete” cases involved large-scale forced population transfers during their 
wars, with the possible exception of Bangladesh.88  Militias and government armed 
forces displaced hundreds of thousands of people during the two ethnic wars in 
Georgia, during the war over Nagorno Krabakh, and during the ethnic war in Cyprus.  
In the other partition reaching a high PEHI – Bosnia (86.4 percent) – armed forces 
displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians based on their ethnic identity in what 
had been an ethnically intermixed territory. 
4.5 Stay-Behind Minorities and Peace 
There are several countries that experienced incomplete partitions – partitions 
that do not completely separate the warring ethnic groups – and yet also do not 
experience war recurrence or low-level violence within the first five years of the end 
                                                 
88 The case of Bangladesh is deceiving due to the large Bengali population that was largely separate 
from the rest of West Pakistan.  Nevertheless, Urdu-speaking Biharis were the targets of violence with 
tens of thousands of resulting deaths.  A Pakistani white paper on the topic estimated more than 60,000 




of their civil wars.  This indicates that demographic separation is not the only way to 
prevent war recurrence. 
Two dimensions to this issue are relevant to the current analysis.  First, a 
closer look at the incomplete partitions that did not experience an initial conflict 
recurrence reveal troubling insights.  The conflict over India-Pakistan (1947-48) did 
not recur in the first five years, but the “incomplete” partition, which left substantially 
inter-mixed populations, was followed by three wars over the proceeding half 
century.  The “incomplete” partition between Israel and Palestine (1948) has seen 
low-level violence and war recurrence over subsequent decades.  Moreover, it was 
arguably the reintroduction of significant ethnic intermingling after Israel’s 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 that has led to heightened conflict.  
Croatia’s “war of independence” (1991-95) also ended with an “incomplete” 
partition.  Although the degree of ethnic unmixing was not enough to be deemed a 
“complete” partition by the strict criteria outlined in the chapter, the final Croatian 
military operation of the war in 1995 forced approximately 200,000 Serbs to flee 
Croatian territory, reducing the percentage of Serbs in Croatia by almost two-thirds 
by the end of the war, and therefore substantially unmixing the populations.89 
Second, the 3G ESD does not stop at demographic separation.  As stated in 
chapter four, state building – exiting anarchy – is also a significant factor that can 
prevent conflict recurrence despite the presence of stay-behind minorities.  If some 
post-partition states are able to exit anarchy faster than others, thus reducing 
opportunities for violence, this could explain some of the peace.  Capturing state-
                                                 
89 Operation Storm led to 200,000 Croatian Serbs fleeing into neighboring Serbia and Bosnia.  See 
Amnesty International, “Croatia: Operation ‘Storm’ – still no justice ten years on” (New York: 




building for a cross-national analysis of post-war situations is almost impossible; 
certainly no cross-national data is currently available that would suit our purposes.90  
However, this provides an ideal opportunity for case-study work.  Chapter Seven 
addresses this issue by exploring the case of Moldova’s partition in 1992, which 
included large, stay-behind minorities that did not experience conflict renewal. 
4.6 Statistical examination of the PEHI 
I added the PEHI to set to the dataset to check for statistical significance on war 
recurrence.  Using binary probit, the variable warend2 (no war recurrence for at least 
two years after the end of the civil war) was regressed on the continuous variable 
PEHI only for ethnic wars that experienced partition.  The PEHI is affected by the 
prewar minority percentages; as a control, therefore, the prewar minority variable has 
also been included in the model.  The results show a positive regression coefficient 
for PEHI, as one would expect based on the theory, with a p-value significant at the 
0.1 level (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Probit Results for No War Recurrence after Two Years 
Variable 
Β z-value p>|z| 
PEHI     .01     1.56     .06 
Prewar Minority    -.03     -.91     .18 
Constant     .93     1.35     .09 
NOTE: N = 17.  β is an unstandardized coefficient; z is a z-test of β, and p is the p-value for a one-tailed z-
test. 
                                                 
90 Cross-national statistical studies to date that examine state strength or state weakness invariable 
include war as an indicator of state weakness, new statehood, or partitioned territories as an indicator 
of state weakness or state failure.  All of these indicators would place our partitioned countries as 
“weak” proving no variation on the independent variable.  We require more fine-grained data than is 





The results suggest that the greater the separation of warring minorities 
produced by a partition (i.e., the higher the PEHI), the greater the expected likelihood 
is of not experiencing a return to war for at least two years.    Given the small-n (17), 
however, these results are only suggestive. 
4.7 Alternative Explanations of Partition and Peacebuilding 
We must also consider alternative theories that might account for peace-
building in these partitioned countries.  Perhaps complete partitions have coincided 
with alternative factors that have contributed towards preventing a recurrence of 
violence.  Sambanis compiled a series of control variables for his cross-national 
analysis.  Unfortunately, if any of them are entered into the probit analysis, all results 
become insignificant; this is almost certainly due to the small n (n=17) of the dataset.  
I therefore turn to a more primitive form of “control variables” by examining whether 
other explanations can also act as sufficient conditions for peace. 
Since we are examining both (i) peace maintenance and (ii) renewal of 
violence after civil wars, theories explaining either of these should be considered as 
alternative explanations and tested against partition; further, since these post-
partitioned conflicts are at the cross-roads of civil wars and inter-state wars, theories 
from international relations should also be considered.  I draw on theories explored in 
the previous theory chapter to select control variables.  Most prominent in peace 
maintenance is the role of third parties, such as peacekeepers, in maintaining peace.  
According to these theories, peacekeepers act as a deterrent to aggression, they act to 




credible commitments between parties seeking a long-term solution to conflict (Diehl, 
Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 
2006; Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004; Walter 2002; Wilkenfeld and Brecher 1984).  I add a 
modified variable for the presence of peacekeepers to my dataset.  The original 
Sambanis variable is a 5-point scale, which I dichotomize into the presence of 
peacekeepers with sufficient strength to enforce any agreement.91 
Other scholars have examined the role of war traits, such as costs of war, and 
duration (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001; Zartman 
1985).  These theories argue that the longer the war and the higher the casualties (i.e., 
the greater the cost of war), the less likely the war will be to recur because each side 
is exhausted and does not have the appetite for war renewal.  These theories, 
however, have had mixed results in the literature, with international wars 
experiencing less likelihood for war renewal, but civil wars experiencing greater 
likelihood for renewal.  For war duration, I use a dichotomized version of Sambanis’s 
dataset, coding wars as either greater than or less than the mean length of all civil 
wars between 1945 and 2004.  The Sambanis average is seven years (84.6 months) 
for all ethnic wars, and I therefore code each conflict as short or long.92  For deaths 
during war, I do the same, coding high or low based on the mean death count at 
171,469 (civilians and soldiers).  Finally, scholars have looked at the role of war 
outcomes military victories as an aid to peace maintenance (Luttwak 1999; Toft 2006; 
                                                 
91 Sambanis’s variable is taken from Doyle and Sambanis (2000): 0 indicates no intervention; 1 
indicates mediation only; 2 indicates an observer mission; 3 indicates traditional peacekeeping 
operations; 4 indicates peace enforcement. I code the presence of peacekeeping by combining 3 and 4, 
since this is conventionally used; all other variables I code as an absence of peacekeepers. 
92  Of course much depends on the criteria one uses for civil war; using Fearon’s dataset (2004), the 
mean length of all wars is 11.5 years, but he has a stricter criteria for entry into the dataset biasing the 




Wagner 1993).  I use the Sambanis variable of War Outcome, which differentiates 
between: military victory by government; military victory by rebels; truce/informal 
ceasefire; formal settlement/treaty. 
I present the results in Table 4, permitting a comparison of the various 





Table 4. Comparing Theories of Peace-building 
Country Complete Partition 
War 




for 5 Years 







Long Few Truce No Yes 
Bosnia (1995) No Short Many Settlement Yes Yes 
Yugoslavia-
Croatia (1995) No 
Short 
Few Settlement Yes Yes 
Cyprus (1963) No Short Few Truce Yes No 
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Few Settlement No No 





As we can see, there is no single variable that can act as a sufficient condition for 
peace maintenance other than Complete Partition. 
4.8 Comparing Complete Partitions with the Alternative for All Ethnic Civil 
Wars 
A comparison of countries that experienced complete partitions with those that 
experienced other outcomes between 1945 and 2004, including incomplete partition 
or no partition at all, further reveals the benefits of separating warring ethnic groups.  
Table 5 shows a cross-tabulation of countries whose ethnic wars ended for at least 
two years.  Seventy-one percent of these wars did not recur.  Nevertheless, in cases of 
complete partition, no country experienced a return to war (100 percent).  The chi-
square test produced a statistic of 3.92 for a probability of 0.14, although three cells 
have an expected count of less than five.  Using the Fisher’s Exact Test, which can be 
used regardless of how small the expected frequency is, we find a similar statistic of 
0.162. 
Table 5. Comparing Alternatives for War Recurrence 
Did the War End 























Total 6 11 63 80 
CHI-SQUARE = 3.92 (df=2), PR = 0.141; FISHER’S EXACT: 0.162 
 
In 68 percent of the cases, countries did not experience a recurrence of war for 
at least five years, while all cases of complete partition (100 percent) avoided a 




statistically significant at the 0.05 level; again, three cells have an expected count of 
less than five.  The Fisher’s Exact is 0.053. 
Turning now to low-level violence, an even greater contrast is evident 
between complete partition and the alternative of incomplete partition or no partition 
(see Table 6).  In 60 percent of the cases, low-level violence did not end for the first 
two years.  Strikingly, for those civil wars that ended with a complete partition, none 
experienced further low-level violence during that period.  The chi-square value is 
10.06 for a p-value of 0.007, statistically significant at the 0.01 level, although three 
cells have expected counts of less than five.  Nevertheless, the Fisher’s Exact is also 
0.007.  In other words, 60 percent of ethnic civil wars experienced deadly conflict 
recurrence within the first two years, but complete partitions did not. 
Table 6. Comparing Alternatives for Recurrence of Low-Level Violence 
Did Low-level 
Violence End 























Total 6 11 63 80 
CHI-SQUARE =  10.063 (df=2), PR = 0.007; Fisher’s Exact = 0.007 
 
If we turn to the dependent variable of no low-level violence for five years, our 
results are affected by the aforementioned Georgian-Abkhaz case, where violence 
occurs, but only after ethnic Georgians returned to Abkhazia.  If we drop the 
Georgian-Abkhaz case from the dataset, the chi-square is 7.77, with a p-value of 
0.021; again, three cells have expected counts of less than 5.  The Fisher’s Exact 
is 0.024. 
These figures strongly support the position of scholars who advocate partition.  
Complete partitions that separated warring ethnic groups prevented a return to war for 




condition.  Partitions that separated warring ethnic groups have also terminated low-
level violence for at least five years.  This, too, was a sufficient condition.  This 
finding is all the more significant given that a majority of post civil war countries 
continue to experience low-level violence, a plague that haunts civilian populations 
for years after combat operations formally conclude. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined partition as a way to prevent the recurrence of 
ethnic war and low-level violence.  After reviewing theoretical issues involving the 
dynamics of ethnic war, I reexamined the first large-scale, cross-national empirical 
study of partition conducted by Nicholas Sambanis.  Sambanis relied on the presence 
of a new political border as his indicator for partition, concluding that partition does 
not significantly prevent war recurrence and should not be promoted by the 
international community.  To accurately test the 3G ESD, I constructed a new 
variable – the Postpartition Ethnic Homogeneity Index – that captures 
ethnodemographic separation and partitions into separate statehood for all ethnic civil 
war terminations between 1945 and 2004.  I found that in all cases where the PEHI 
showed a complete separation of warring minorities, there were no war recurrences 
and no occurrences of low-level violence for at least five years after the end of the 
ethnic civil war.  These results trump the alternatives of incomplete partitions and no 
partitions, providing strong evidence in support of the 3G ESD. 
The cross-national results, while important, are insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the validity of the 3G-ESD for two reasons.  First, the results 




further undermines confidence in the results.  To strengthen this finding, I therefore 
subject the theory to a more rigorous test through the case study of Georgia-
Abkhazia’s incomplete partition, using process tracing to evaluate the cause of 
violence in Chapter Six.  Second, as mentioned above, the cross-national analysis did 
not capture state strength and balance of power between the two states. Cross-national 
data for state-strength in post-war and post-partition countries is not available with 
the level of data required.  Third, there were some incidents of incomplete partition 
that did not experience violence.  I examine this puzzling result in Chapter Seven, 






Chapter 6:  Post-War Violence: Case Studies of Post-Partition 




Chapter Four introduced the Third Generation Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G 
ESD) and explained how complete partitions – partitions that ethno-demographically 
separate warring ethnic groups into separate states – increase the likelihood of an 
enduring post-war peace.  Chapter Five supported this theory with a cross-national 
examination of all ethnic civil war terminations between 1945 and 2004.  This chapter 
selects two ethnic civil war terminations from the cross-national analysis, and has two 
goals.  First, it evaluates the micro-mechanisms of the 3G ESD theory to evaluate 
how the presence of stay-behind minorities leads to violence.  I both evaluate the 3G 
ESD, which is based on the triadic political space, state strength, and balance of 
power between the post-war states, and I compare it to the rival explanation presented 
by the 2G ESD, which is based on ethnic intransigence and hatred caused by the 
ethnic civil war.  Second, I choose an outlier case, a post-partition environment with 
significant stay-behind minorities that did not experience violence renewal, and I use 
it to further evaluate and hone the 3G ESD. 
2 Introduction 
This chapter is part of a nested research design that strengthens the results of the 
cross-national study presented in Chapter Five.  The cross-national results were 
strong, suggesting that the ethnic security dilemma is a cause of renewed warfare and 




micro-mechanisms discussed in Chapter Four and therefore could not distinguish 
between the Second and Third Generations of the ethnic security dilemma as rival 
theories for conflict renewal.  This chapter fills that gap with two case studies. 
I first present a case-study from the Georgian-Abkhaz post-ethnic civil war 
partition, conducting process-tracing to determine the causes of the “Six Day War” in 
1998.  As noted in Chapter Five, Abkhazia contained a large, stay-behind minority 
and experienced renewed deadly conflict within the first five years of peace.  The 
purpose is to test the micro-foundations of the theory developed in Chapter Four and 
explore how the presence of ethnic minorities contributed to violence.  As we will see 
below, this case provides strong supportive evidence for the 3G ESD, demonstrating 
the dangers posed by the triadic political space and specifically how variable 
weakness of state institutions in a post-war environment can lead to a shift in the 
balance of power leading to renewed violence. 
This case also challenges standard accounts of ethnic intransigence within 
post-war settings by demonstrating the malleability of ethnic group behavior, 
indicating that intra-state inter-ethnic violence is not structurally determined by 
identity, but rather dependent on the ability of the state to provide credible incentives 
for minorities to collaborate.  Minority violence in the Six Day War occurred only 
after territorial control shifted to ethnic kin militias, and minority preferences were 
only visible under those conditions.  Previously, the Georgian minority population 
collaborated with Abkhaz-dominated state and there is strong evidence to suggest that 




Day War originated in cross-border attacks from Georgia involving both state and 
non-state armed forces. 
Importantly, for the argument about state weakness, the insurgents did not 
attempt to control the entire minority region, but rather attempted to control areas 
where the Abkhaz state was weak and vulnerable.  I disaggregate the Abkhaz state 
spatially and, through a case comparison of two regions within Abkhazia, am able to 
demonstrate that minority rebellion occurred only in those regions where the Abkhaz 
state was weak and territorial control shifted to kin militias; in regions where the state 
was comparatively strong, the stay-behind minority collaborated with the Abkhaz 
regime, violence was low, and deadly conflict did not recur. 
Next, I present a case-study from Moldova-Pridnestrivie, an ethnic civil war 
that ended in partition but left substantial stay-behind minorities on both territories.  
Contrary to initial expectations, there was no recurrence of violence in the post-war 
years.  This is ostensibly an outlier according to the 2G ESD, an “off-the-line” case 
that presents an opportunity to understand what other factors helped maintain peace.  
The results of my research reinforce the notion that ethnic group behavior is 
malleable and dependent on the ability of the state to provide credible incentives for 
minorities to collaborate.  Further, it stresses the role of state strength in maintaining 
the balance of power between post-partition states, which reduces the opportunities 
for violence to escalate. 
The separatist Pridnestrovian state had comparatively stronger post-partition 
state security institutions than Abkhazia for two related reasons.  First, due to unique 




consolidated its rule before the civil war began.  Second, the civil war was both brief 
and geographically confined to two regions of the country, leaving the state security 
apparatus largely intact.  With state strength relatively high, the stay-behind minority 
collaborated and violence did not recur.  On the Moldovan side, non-state militias did 
not survive the war; the one attempt to infiltrate the border, initiated by Moldovan 
state authorities, was immediately discovered by Pridnestrovie, its members were 
arrested, tried, and jailed.  Further attempts were not made. 
2.1 Contribution 
This chapter makes a contribution in four ways.  First, the chapter 
demonstrates empirically the value of the 3G ESD laid out in Chapter Four.  Second, 
the evidence strongly challenges the 2G ESD and other theories emphasizing ethnic 
intransigence.  Third, it builds on the theory chapter about 3G ESD, by raising the 
significance of post-war balance of power, paying particular attention to state 
institutional strength.  Fourth, it presents original data on the post-war situations in 
Georgia-Abkhazia and Moldova-Pridnestrovie, contributing to area studies of Eastern 
Europe. 
2.2 Chapter Overview 
This chapter is divided into four parts.  First, I introduce the methodology and 
case selection.  Second, I introduce the post-war violence in Georgia and I trace the 
roots of the violence.  Third, I introduce the second case of Moldova and provide an 
explanation for why violence did not occur despite the presence of large stay-behind 





Many leading methodologists have recommended “mixed-methods” 
approaches, involving “nested designs” of large-n statistical analyses with structured 
case studies, for the advantages each method can bring as well the “synergistic” value 
a combined approach can provide (George and Bennett 2005; Laitin 2002; Lieberman 
2005).  I heed this advice, and my cases here formed part of a nested design that 
comprises Chapters Four through Six.  My post-partition case of Abkhazia and 
Georgia is actually three case studies.  I begin by examining post-partition Abkhazia 
as a whole, where renewed deadly conflict occurred on the territory where the stay-
behind Georgian minority was located.  Second, I disaggregate the Abkhaz state 
spatially, creating a focused comparison of two regions within Abkhazia that 
contained ethnic Georgian stay-behind minorities.  One region experienced violence 
while the other did not.  Third, the Georgian-Abkhazia case is a structured 
comparison with Moldova-Pridnestrovie, comparing the post-war incidents of peace 
and violence.  My two cases help illuminate, illustrate, and develop the theory in a 
way that macro-level cross-national statistical analyses cannot. 
3.1 Case Selection 
I have used my cross-national analyses to guide my case selection in Chapter 
Six.  Georgia-Abkhazia both had a significant stay-behind minority and it 
experienced violence recurrence, providing an optimal environment to use process-
tracing to test the micro-mechanisms of the 3G ESD that the macro-level cross-
national test of Chapter Five could not capture.  As Lieberman (2005, p.435) states, 
“Small-N analyses can be used to assess the plausibility of observed statistical 




between 1945 and 2004, a focused case study is particularly helpful to evaluate the 
causal mechanisms proposed in the theory.  In addition, Moldova-Pridnestrovie was 
chosen as an “outlier” because it had large, stay-behind minorities but did not 
experience violence recurrence; this is perplexing to the 2G ESD but not the 3G ESD.  
This also provides an opportunity to develop the theory by exploring why violence 
did not recur despite structural conditions that increase the likelihood of violence.  
Finally, Moldova’s and Georgia’s partitions hold many other factors constant, 
increasing the value of the comparison.  Most importantly, as former Soviet republics, 
we are able to hold many background conditions constant, such as previous 
government security structures, conflict, and economic development.  Second, the 
conditions of the civil war were very similar in Moldova and Georgia, with capital 
cities seeking separation from the Soviet Union while separatist regions within the 
country were trying to separate from their host states to remain part of the Soviet 
Union.  Since the ethnic civil wars were separatist, it makes both cases highly 
representative of ethnic civil wars of the past 60 years.  Third, the termination of 
ongoing ethnic civil war violence was similar in both cases, with Russian military 
intervention in support of the separatist regions, with partitioning of each country, and 
with the deployment of Russian-led peacekeepers to maintain fragile ceasefires. 
3.2 Sources 
My data comes from six sources: (i) interviews with refugees and Internally 
Displaced People from all four states, (ii) interviews with insurgents and ex-
combatants from all four states, (iii) interviews with government officials from all 




(v) elite interviews with members of non-governmental organizations, such as think-
tanks and humanitarian agencies, and (vi) press reports and other secondary material, 
such as locally written histories of the conflict.  I made three trips each to Abkhazia, 
Georgia, Moldova, and Pridnestrovie for a total of nine months between January and 
September 2008. 
4 Post-Partition Abkhazia 
As described in Chapter Three, the battle between Georgian and Abkhaz 
forces effectively ended by the end of September 1993, and formally ended with the 
May 1994 Moscow Agreement, signed under UN auspices.  The territory of Georgia 
was divided in two, with Abkhaz forces controlling almost all of Abkhazia, and 
Georgian forces controlling the rest of the country.93  The ethnic Georgian population 
was absent from Abkhaz controlled territory, and there was no significant ethnic 
Abkhaz presence in the rest of Georgia. 
The Moscow Agreement provided for a ceasefire, a separation of forces, and 
the deployment of a peacekeeping force under the aegis of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), a weak, Russian-dominated successor to the Soviet Union.  
In June 1994, the peacekeeping force was deployed to the conflict zone, with a 
mandate to ensure the peace.  The forces were responsible for the region of Gal(i)94 
(see Chapter 3, Map 1, Zone 6), which acted as a buffer zone between Abkhaz and 
Georgian armies.  According to the agreement, Abkhazia could not bring heavy 
military equipment into the region and had to rely on lightly-armed security personnel 
                                                 
93 There was one region, the Kodori Gorge, which remained in Georgian hands following the war. 
94 Gal is the Abkhaz name, Gali is the Georgian name.  Since Abkhazia controls the territory at the 




to police the region.  The Moscow Agreement also provided for a UN monitoring 
mission (UNOMIG), responsible for monitoring and verifying the observance of the 
ceasefire.95 
4.1 Refugee Returns 
While war ended with a complete ethno-demographic separation, within 
months refugees began returning to southern Abkhazia.  The returns were 
overwhelmingly to the Gal region, although some returnees did venture beyond.96  
The process of returns evolved over time with several Georgians from villages along 
the border with Georgia initially conducting reconnaissance missions, assessing the 
damage to their property and livestock.  As one returnee (IG-109, May 28, 2008) said 
to me “Where else could I go?  I didn’t have anywhere, this is my home, so I went 
back.”  Others spoke of the quality of the land and their dire economic prospects were 
they to remain in Georgia (so-called Pull Factors in refugee literature). 
The returns began with a limited number of farmers returning to their land on a 
daily basis, tending their fields, and leaving before night fall.  Over time more began 
to do the same with increasing numbers establishing permanent homes there.  
Through informal channels of communication, Georgians learned it was relatively 
                                                 
95 The UNOMIG Mission had previously begun its work during an earlier ceasefire. 
96 This information is confirmed by multiple sources.  First, interviews with various organizations 
suggested this was the case: the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Danish Refugee Council, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees all 
suggested this was the case, and suggested that refugees began returning as early as 1994, which 
increased during the 1995-1998 period.  Regarding returnees beyond Gali, I visited Ochigvara in 2008 
and found a small settlement of former IDPs, mainly the elderly and it remained a small percentage of 
its pre-war size.  I also heard several personal accounts from Georgians who returned to regions 
beyond Gali and were arrested and asked to leave (Personal Interview IG-56, Zugdidi region, Georgia, 
May 29, 2008).  This policy of eviction was further confirmed by the deputy Abkhaz Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Maxim Gvinja.  Gvinja reported that if local police learn of an unauthorized return, 




safe to return to the Gal region, a region that was homogenously Georgian prior to the 
war.97  The pace of return and exact number of Georgians in Abkhazia during those 
initial years is a major source of dispute, but it is generally accepted that 30-40,000 
Georgians had returned to the Gal region by 1998, and the UNHCR suggested the 
figure could have been as high as 50,000, confirmed by other sources; one Abkhaz 
official stated to the media that this figure was reached in 1994 (Shchegoleva 1994; 
The New York Times (no author) 1998).98 
5 Inter-State Conflict: The “Six Day War” 
 
 Sometime during the first two weeks of May 1998, a large-scale invasion of 
Abkhazia took place involving non-state guerrilla fighters coming from Georgia, 
including some members of the Georgian armed forces acting in an unofficial 
capacity.99  Despite the presence of the Russian Peacekeeping force, they did not play 
a role in the Six Day War.  This suggests that Russia was complicit with the 
Georgians in the invasion, but there is no hard evidence. 
                                                 
97 As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, the ethnic Georgians from Gal are also ethnic Mingrelian.  
Depending on who’s speaking, “ethnic Mingrelian” is either an ethnic Georgian sub-group or a 
separate ethnic group.  Inhabitants of Gal typically accept they are both Georgian and Mingrelian; their 
mother-tongue is usually Mingrelian and Georgian is learned. 
98  In the summer of 1994, the Deputy Prime Minister, Enver Kapba, was reported in the Russian press 
to have stated that 45,000 refugees had returned to Gali without waiting for the quadripartite 
commission (Shchegoleva 1994; .  While this figure is almost surely exaggerated, the United Nations 
special representative in Georgia, Liviu Bota, said in a telephone interview to the New York Times in 
1998 that “[d]uring the last two years some 50,000 refugees had returned [to Gali].”  These “returnees” 
include those that live part time in Gali; for example, some come to plant and to harvest; others remain 
for only part of the year.  See also Отчет Совместной Миссии ООН По Изучению Ситуации В 
Гальском Районе (20-24 ноября 2000г), глава В, раздел II, пункт 21. 
99 I spoke with a General, whom I will call by his first name only, Rezo, who claims to have been 
given the order to fight but without uniform, which he claims to have done.  He currently works for the 
Ministry of the Interior, and several of his colleagues claimed to have fought in Gal at that time.  They 
gave precise details and locations of the combat operations.  While there story, told over two lengthy 




These ethnic Georgian guerrilla fighters quickly secured control of the lower 
Gal region, where primarily ethnic Georgians were located, and indicated irredentist 
intentions, including the raising of Georgian flags in the “liberated” territory.  
Sukhum, faced with a challenge to its territorial integrity, broke the 1994 Moscow 
agreement, and sent in its armed forces, backed by tanks, to retake the territory.  
Large-scale violence began on May 19th between these two forces.  The ensuing 
battle for territorial control lasted for six days.  Georgia dispatched Ministry of 
Interior troops, but the Georgian army and Georgian heavy military equipment were 
never deployed, and this limited the escalation of the violence. 
It did not take long for the Abkhaz, with their heavy military equipment, to 
rout the guerrillas, locals, and Ministry of Interior forces.  As one ethnic Georgian 
participant commented (IG-111, Zugdidi, June 29, 2008), “Once we realized that the 
[Georgian] tanks were not coming, we knew we would lose.  How were they planning 
to fight without heavy military equipment?”  Without the support of the Georgian 
armed forces, Abkhaz forces quickly secured the upper hand.  By May 25th, a peace 
agreement was reached in Gagra between Georgia and Abkhazia to withdraw to the 
pre-May borders, and the conflict drew to a close with Abkhaz forces securing 
territorial control in lower Gal. 
Deaths from the May conflict are heavily disputed, especially since the 
majority of fighters on the Georgian side were unofficial volunteer guerrilla fighters, 
but are likely to total in the hundreds but less than 1,000.100  In addition to the 
                                                 
100 The Abkhaz government claims it lost 26 soldiers in the operation and that hundreds of Georgian 
fighters were killed (email correspondence with the Ministry of Defense, July 16, 2009), but these 
numbers are impossible to verify and Georgian officials claim the opposite ratio (Interview with Temur 




killings, about 40,000 Georgian civilians were displaced during the conflict with 
thousands of homes destroyed.101 
6 Evaluating the 3G ESD 
The fundamental questions for this chapter are the causes of the Six Day War 
and whether and how the ethnic Georgian minority was relevant for the renewed 
violence.  My 3G ESD argues that the micro-foundations established by 2G scholars 
and others emphasizing ethnic intransigence are wrong.  The 3G ESD argues that 
violence comes from the homeland state, which acts to protect the minority in the 
host state.  Further, it argues that the ethnic minority should collaborate (on a limited 
level) with the host government as long as the host government controls the territory.  
Collaboration occurs despite the low-levels of inter-group trust because members of 
the minority respond behaviorally to threats and inducements of the controlling power 
(i.e., the host state government, in this case Abkhazia). 
The local minority population should rebel against the host government only 
if territorial control shifts from the incumbent (the host government) to the challenger 
(the ethnic Georgian insurgents).  At this point collaboration with the guerrillas will 
take place behaviorally, but I also argued that the “quality of collaboration” would 
change.  As territorial control shifts from the incumbent to the challenger, the local 
                                                 
101 Most Georgian and Western sources identify this as “ethnic cleansing,” pointing to the almost 
complete flight of Georgian civilians from lower Gal and the mass destruction of housing.  Meanwhile 
most Abkhaz sources describe the civilian flight as a normal product of warfare, where civilians flee 
when active combat is occurring.  The Abkhaz side claims houses were destroyed as part of counter-
insurgency tactics, moving house to house, throwing grenades inside in case there were waiting 
guerrillas or booby-traps.  Some Abkhaz did mention emotional reasons for destruction: for example, I 
spoke to one Abkhaz member of parliament, who had taken part in the May 1998 Gali operations, and 
he told me of much resentment among the Abkhaz for international aid that was given to Georgians to 
reconstruct their homes after the war: “Why were they receiving aid when we weren’t?  Our homes 
were destroyed too [during the 1992-1993 war], but we were put under an embargo, of course we were 
angry, and we destroyed those homes.” (IA-108, 03/05/08).  To challenge claims of ethnic cleansing, 
the Abkhaz need only point to official statements welcoming the Georgians back to Gali soon after the 




population’s preferences begin to matter, leading to “active collaboration,” meaning 
symbolic, material, and man-power support.  This active collaboration can help the 
challenger consolidate control in its battle with the host state. 
 
6.1 The Triadic Political Space 
Confirming the 3G ESD, the impetus for violence came from the homeland.  
Non-state guerrilla fighters launched their raid with at least tacit support from the 
Georgian government.  The intention was to take control of Gal and its ethnic 
Georgian residents and join it with Georgia.  Guerrilla fighters, observers, and those 
government security personnel that participated in an unofficial capacity, all 
confirmed this goal.  Some of the unofficial participants went slightly further, arguing 
that the government’s aim may have been to go further, but they confirmed that, at a 
minimum, they were to take Gal (personal interviews, Kutaisi, May 27, 2008). 
While the official version from the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) is that they 
did not control or collaborate with the guerrillas and that MoI entered to facilitate the 
exit of the Georgian population (Interview, Temur Gabisonia, Tbilisi, July 1, 
2008),102 all other sources of information point to the Interior Ministry troops being 
used to support the guerrilla movement and defend their positions.  As one local said 
to me, “And then we saw some trucks with Georgian symbols, men with Georgian 
uniforms, and we knew it was real, it was really happening, we thought we were 
finally getting our land back!” (IG-122, July 6, 2008).  The civilians I spoke with all 
uniformly spoke of those forces participating, along with the guerrillas and local 
participants, trying to prevent Abkhaz forces from penetrating lower Gal. 
                                                 




Whether being used to help establish territorial control over Gal or to help 
evacuate civilians, either way, the government sent troops across the border and 
helped defend the local population. 
Importantly, violence did not originate from within Gal itself.  In fact, in over 
30 interviews with locals who lived in Gal prior to the war, they all spoke of violence 
originating in cross-border raids.  While it is possible that these were lies being told 
by locals to avoid persecution from the Abkhaz government, the same stories were 
told by ethnic Georgians who, today, live in Gal and those that live in Georgia (i.e., 
those that lived in Gal in 1998 but lived in Georgia at the time of the interviews in 
2008).  Archival material from the Abkhaz government that details the source of 
violence (terroristicheski akty) during this period also showed that violence came 
from armed units in neighboring Georgia.  The Abkhaz government representative in 
charge of Gal during that period, Ruslan Kishmaria, also confirmed that, while some 
collaboration did exist between guerrillas and local residents, the major source of 
violence stemmed from cross-border raids (Interview, Sukhum, June 13, 2008).  
Finally, the guerrilla movements themselves, as I will details further below, spoke in 
frustrating terms about the lack of collaboration between locals and guerrillas during 
the lead-up to the war. 
 
6.2 Balance of Power, State Weakness, and the Location of Violence: 
A Spatial Comparison of Upper and Lower Gal 
While the invasion of Gal targeted only territory inhabited by ethnic Georgians, 
it curiously did not target the entire territory inhabited by ethnic Georgians, despite 




the Georgian state not have tried to control the entire territory?  As I investigated this, 
it became apparent that, due to recent historical factors, the Abkhaz territory differed 
in terms of Abkhaz state-building.  The attack on Gal occurred only where the 
Abkhaz regime was extremely weak.  It was this shift in the balance of power, with 
lower Gal remaining weak while Georgia gained in relative strength, that created a 
strong opportunity for invasion. 
In upper Gal, the Abkhaz state consolidated its control quickly in the post-war 
period and the local population collaborated with the state faster.  In lower Gal, the 
state faced a constant struggle and never managed to consolidate its rule.  In fact, one 
guerrilla fighter (IG-24 June 11, 2008), who participated in the May 1998 conflict, 
looked puzzled when I asked the date that he crossed into Abkhaz territory in May.  
He said, “We didn’t cross into Abkhaz territory, this was ours, there were no Abkhaz; 
we went to defend the territory from the Abkhaz to prevent them from attacking.”  At 
first, I thought he was making a political statement, but I later realized that he thought 
the border with Abkhazia was elsewhere since the village where he was stationed had 
no Abkhaz presence when he entered.  In other words, by May 1998, upper Gal had a 
relatively strong Abkhaz state presence, but lower Gal had an almost complete 
absence of the Abkhaz state. 
What caused this discrepancy between upper and lower Gal?  My explanation 
comes in two stages.  First, I explain how extraordinarily weak the Abkhaz state was 
at the end of the war, especially in the Gal region to which ethnic Georgians returned.  





6.3 Stage 1: State-Weakness in Abkhazia 
For Abkhazia, weak statehood was a hallmark of its first years of independence.  
Much has been written about the challenges of state-building in the former Soviet 
region (Beissinger and Young 2002; Bermeo 1992; Carothers 2002; Way 2005).  All 
of these immense challenges – economical, political, social – applied to Abkhazia at 
the end of the Soviet period, but were made immeasurably worse by the destruction 
of war, the absence of the territory’s international status, and a tight blockade 
imposed by Russia during the initial years (Croft 1996). 
Abkhazia was quite literally destroyed by the conflict and its population 
decimated.  Economically, large-scale destruction ravaged the territory’s tourism 
infrastructure, agricultural production, and tea industry – each of the region’s pre-war 
economic staples.  Further, Abkhazia was placed under economic blockade by both 
Russia and Georgia while its undefined international status prevented it from 
establishing external relations with other countries or international bodies, further 
limited its economic recovery from the war.  Demographically, the population 
declined by over two-thirds, a combination of death and flight, and this downward 
trend continued in the post-war period as locals escaped the economic collapse.  
Politically, the state had to start anew, constructing a new constitution, new political 
institutions, and new organs of power, including police and an army.  The nascent 
Abkhaz state was thus faced with exceptionally limited administrative capacity, lack 
of financial and material resources, and extremely limited man-power. 
State building efforts by the Abkhaz state in the 1990s were not monolithic.  




Georgian control throughout the ethnic civil war, yet the end of the war brought the 
region under Abkhaz control for the first time, by which time the entire pre-war 
population had fled.  Abkhaz state-building in Gal thus faced all the factors described 
above, plus it was deserted, had no administrative capacity, and contained no 
indigenous people upon whom the state could rely.  Further, Gal fell within the 
demilitarization zone, as demarcated in the Moscow 1994 peace accords.  This meant 
that the Abkhaz military was unable to enter the regions, and Abkhazia had to rely on 
a lightly armed police force to control the territory. 
In an interview with the president’s special envoy to Gal region, Ruslan 
Kishmariya (Interview, Sukhum, June 2008), I learned that Abkhazia had great 
difficulty finding enough men to even patrol the region, much less effectively police 
it.  Confirmation of the weak nature of the state can also be seen from scholars 
writing prior to 1998.  For example, Catherine Dale (1996: 94) states 
“…representatives of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia note that the Gali103 
militia is untrained and undersupplied, and some of its members plunder villages 
in search of sustenance.  There is no effective authority in Gali district but rather a 
total lack of contact between Georgian village heads of administration and the 
Abkhaz officials in Gali city; no monopoly on the legitimate use of violence but 
rather undisciplined, marauding Abkhaz militia members.” 
 
 
It is within this context that displaced Georgians began returning to the Gal region 
almost immediately following the war’s termination. 
State-Building According to International Experience 
                                                 




A recent study by RAND (Dobbins et al. 2007: xxiii) stresses that “[f]irst order 
priorities for any nation-building104 mission are public security and humanitarian 
assistance” with priority given to peacekeeping, rule of law, law enforcement, and 
security sector reform.  RAND estimates that a country needs 20 soldiers per 1,000 
inhabitants “to stabilize an internally divided society.”  In addition, the U.N. typically 
deploys one police officer per 10 soldiers and that is in addition to the existing 
structures of local police.  It is also estimated that most post-conflict societies require 
at least two of their own police for every 1,000 inhabitants, equaling approximately 
24 members of a security force (local and external) for every 1,000 inhabitants to 
stabilize a post-conflict divided society. 
By contrast, in Abkhazia’s Gal region according to Abkhaz state officials, there 
were approximately 3.5 Interior Ministry police officers for the entire Gal region per 
1,000 inhabitants (150 total).  This priority of security emphasized by RAND, the 
U.N. and other specialists on post-war situations is exactly what was missing in post-
war Abkhazia.  For the reasons outlined above – demographics, financial, and a lack 
of social capital – Abkhaz authorities faced extraordinary challenges establishing 
order and stabilizing the security situation in Gal. 
6.4 Stage 2: Low-Level Guerilla Insurgency 
The region of Gal borders Georgia, and the state weakness described above 
created an opportunity for guerrilla fighters, who crossed the unsecured border in an 
attempt to target Abkhaz security forces.  The guerrilla fighters I spoke with 
(described in greater detail below) spoke of the ease with which they crossed the 
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Inguri river into an effectively lawless no-man’s land where Abkhaz police would 
infrequently patrol.  By targeting Abkhaz security officials, Georgian guerrilla 
fighters further weakened the nascent Abkhaz state-building effort by reducing the 
pool of Abkhaz security officers prepared to patrol there. 
Ruslan Kishmaria (Interview, Sukhum, June 13, 2008) spoke of the violence and 
its affect on his ability to police the region: “They didn’t want to patrol Gal, of course 
they were scared, I lost a lot of men.”  He spoke of two attempts at ending the 
guerrilla campaign by making clean sweeps through the region.  When this failed, he 
increasingly did not police the region, placing the region increasingly into contested 
control.  Ultimately, for impoverished and demographically challenged Abkhazia, this 
led to an almost complete abandonment of areas targeted by Georgian guerrillas. 
To illustrate, I took the most comprehensive list of incidents, which came from 
the Abkhaz Ministry of Security.  I coded the incidents by date and location (village 
and region) in the run-up to the May conflict.   The pie chart below (Chart 1) breaks 
down the levels of violence by region between January 1994 and April 1998, the 
month before renewed warfare began.  Gal is the only region which contained an 
ethnic Georgian stay-behind minority. 
















As is clearly visible, the overwhelming number of incidents (64 percent) occurred in 
Gal, with limited attacks occurring in other regions of the country.  If we look at the 
incidents temporally, we can also see that the number of incidents increased over time 
in the run up to 1998, as state weakness decreased in Gal. 
Chart 2: Temporal View of Guerrilla Attacks 

























The description of security in Gal outlined above was primarily that of lower 
Gal.  If we take Gal as a whole, the region appears to be lawless and attacks 
increasing.  However, there was a dramatic difference between lower Gal, which is 
the south-western portion of Gal closer to the Black Sea, and upper Gal, to the north-
east.  Due to geographical differences between the two territories, lower Gal was 
targeted by guerrillas more, while upper Gal was left largely alone, and the Abkhaz 
state was permitted to build-up a security presence and control of the population. 
Geography is important here because during the initial post-war years, the 
guerrilla fighters crossed into Abkhazia using the easiest paths possible, and this was 
in lower-Gal.  To access upper Gal, one needs to cross a large river basin created by 
the Inguri river hydro-electric dam, whereas in lower Gal, access is across the trickle 
of the Inguri river that emerges after the dam.  Guerrillas were thus able to kill 
Abkhaz police or plant road mines and exit quickly into the safety of Georgian-
controlled territory.  As a result, Abkhaz soldiers feared the lowest section of Gal.  
The further away from this section one traveled, the safer it was for Abkhaz, and 
easier it became for Abkhaz to build a functioning administration, co-opting members 
of the local population and resisting guerrilla control. 
When I visited upper Gal in 2008, the difference was striking.  The local 
Georgian minority more readily spoke with me, were more open, and spoke more 
calmly about cooperation with the regime; the environment was palpably calmer.  
One Georgian there commented that, during the first few years after the end of the 
conflict, he hid a gun on his property and was prepared to fight.  “Back then, we 




take even a meter of land back.  But over the years we realized this was not going to 
happen, we found a compromise (obshii iazyk) with the authorities, and it’s worked 
out; I no longer keep my gun” (IG-112, 06/19/08).  In an interview with former 
Georgian State Minister, Gia Vashadze (Tbilisi, July 5, 2008), he also admitted that 
the Georgians in upper Gal managed to cooperate more easily with the Abkhaz than 
those of southern Gal (oni nashli obshii iazyk).  Without the attacks from guerrillas, 
locals collaborated and the Abkhaz built state infrastructure. 
In sum, it was a spiraling loss of control in lower Gal caused initially by a weak 
state and later by cross-border raids, encouraged by the weak state.  The Abkhaz state 
only weakly controlled its lower border with Georgia, and this permitted ethnic 
Georgian guerrillas to target Abkhaz security personnel, but they did this in lower Gal 
only, where the terrain made and border made for easier and faster missions.  
Eventually, the Abkhaz virtually stopped patrolling the lower territory, creating a 
radical shift in the balance of power between the Abkhaz and Georgians vis-à-vis this 
territory.  This shift permitted the Georgians to usurp power in an effectively stateless 
region of Abkhazia in May 1998.  In upper Gal, by contrast, there was almost no 
residual violence in the post-war period and, despite contiguous territory that could 
have been captured during May 1998, it was not targeted during the Six Day War 
because this would have meant a direct provocation with the Abkhaz state.  When the 
guerrillas did enter Abkhazia, it was only lower Gal, which the Abkhaz effectively 
did not control.105 
                                                 
105 After the war in 1998, Abkhazia changed its policy.  Vowing never let the situation occur again, 
they allowed Georgians back into the territory but under strict supervision, filtering returning 
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6.5 Ethnic Minority Collaboration in Lower Gal: Limited 
Despite the declining presence of the Abkhaz security forces in Gal, the Georgian 
minority did not assist the Georgian guerrillas in the lead up to the 1998 conflict and, 
to some extent, appears to have collaborated with the Abkhaz state.  This contradicts 
the 2G ESD theory, and stands against conventional wisdom found in the ethnic 
conflict literature. 
I met with 10-15 of these guerrilla fighters, and the leader of one of the 
factions.106  I cannot claim that this is anywhere close to a representative sample, but 
interviews with these men were in-depth (lasting anywhere from one to four hours) 
and, in conjunction with other information, I believe constitutes a legitimate source.  
Importantly, these individuals were found via disparate channels: some spontaneous, 
some arranged via journalists, some via friends.  Despite the random selection, the 
stories were almost all the same vis-à-vis the local population: the Georgian minority 
was not key to their mission’s success.  In fact, several argued that their presence 
hindered operations.  Rather, their alternative explanations were convincing and 
relatively similar across former fighters. 
Based on interviews with guerrilla fighters and journalists who used to work with 
them, a typical operation lasted three days and consisted of crossing the border.  They 
described their operations as originating in Georgian controlled territory, crossing 
into Abkhazia for 3-15 days, usually taking all necessary supplies with them, and then 
                                                                                                                                           
decline.  The situation was dire, but had stabilized in much of the country, and more resources could be 
devoted to Gal’s security, especially given the risks exposed by the Six Day War.  Even in 2008, when 
I visited lower Gal, the Georgian residents were under constant police surveillance and I was unable to 
speak with members of the minority without state security forces arriving to monitor conversations. 
106 I do not know the exact number because some who claimed to have fought may not have; at least 
10, however, gave specific details about the operations that fit with others to an extent that I believe 
they did actually fight.  Further, some of these individuals were passed to me by trusted individuals, 




returning.  Some fighters would state explicitly that they would go across to kill a 
certain Abkhaz or to “protect” Georgians that they knew would soon be required to 
pay “taxes” to the Abkhaz authorities; others would describe their activities in more 
general terms: “We would go across and do our job, and then return.” (my pereshli 
Inguri, sdelali delo, i vernulis). 
But the fighters described a change over time: “It was much easier at first, in the 
first months, when there were no Georgians – we would go across, do our job, and 
return.  When Georgians started returning the situation became more difficult.”  In 
fact, while Georgian fighters spoke about protecting the ethnic Georgian population 
by attacking the Abkhaz, they spoke of the local ethnic Georgians within Gal as an 
obstacle to their mission.  Ethnic Georgian guerrilla fighters found it far easier to 
operate in Abkhaz territory with fewer ethnic Georgians; the guerrillas said that local 
ethnic Georgians interfered (meshali) in their operations. 
Evidence from guerrilla fighters, Abkhaz officials, and the local Georgian 
population pointed to two main reasons why the fighters had limited contact with the 
local population: (i) local Georgians were co-opted by the Abkhaz, meaning partisans 
could not trust them; and (ii) reprisal attacks by Abkhaz on local Georgians meant 
that partisans had to be careful about when and where they attacked Abkhaz in an 
effort to minimize retaliatory actions.  The result was that the guerrilla fighters relied 
very little on the local population. 
Four of the fifteen guerrillas said there were safe-houses if necessary, but that 




confirmed this, saying that such homes existed and were usually those of the fighter’s 
families (IG-110, Tbilisi, 07/03/09). 
Guerrillas spoke of not being able to trust the local population since some of 
them were working for the Abkhaz.  Whether because they were under threat, had 
been bought off, or simply were against the guerrilla movement, some local 
Georgians would contact Abkhaz authorities when they saw Georgian guerrillas.  
“We didn’t know which Georgians were ours and which were theirs,” was how one 
fighter stated it (IG-126, Atara, 06/11/09).  Another fighter explained how, after a 
couple of years, they began speaking only Russian amongst each other so that if 
locals saw them, they would not pay attention, assuming they were Abkhaz or 
Russians (IG-129, Zugdidi, 05/29/09).  Some ethnic Georgians, in other words, were 
collaborating with the Abkhaz regime, at least in the role of informants, and this 
prevented the guerrillas from using the local population for support. 
Specifically, they stated that they could not trust the local population, that 
“traitors” (predateli) were always present, and no one knew who they could trust.  
“We couldn’t sleep in houses there, even if we trusted the person – a neighbor might 
see, or someone passing by, and they could make a phone call [to the local 
administration].”  One fighter (IG-76) recounted a story of meeting, accidentally, a 
local Georgian while walking through a heavily forested region of Gal.  “He saw us, 
and I told him just to keep quiet, to say nothing, and we carried on.  Just to be safe, 
we picked up our pace and moved in a different direction for three kilometers and 
waited.  Within 30 minutes, Abkhaz had arrived and started a massive fire in the 




intelligence strategies by the Abkhaz were successful enough to eliminate an obvious 
advantage.  Ruslan Kishmaria (Interview, Sukhum, June 13, 2008), the Abkhaz 
president’s special representative for Gal spoke specifically of these strategies to co-
opt locals.  While they were losing control of the territory, they were nevertheless 
able to obtain intelligence from the local population until the May 1998 events. 
In addition to the lack of trust, several fighters said that locals were not used 
because of retaliatory attacks.  Whereas some guerrillas claimed, for example, to 
initially protect the local Georgians when Abkhaz forces would come to collect taxes, 
they later ceased such operations.  The guerrillas learned quickly that a strike against 
Abkhaz forces would lead to reprisal attacks against the village, resulting in torched 
homes and sometimes killings. This was confirmed by Abkhaz government officials, 
who referred “responding to provocations” and giving an “answer” (otvet) to attacks 
by Georgian guerrillas.  As a result, the fighters claimed to avoid contact as much as 
possible with the locals.  This fits with stories of other guerrillas who told me that 
they would sleep in forests, not among civilian homes. 
In sum, the Georgian minority in Abkhazia did not support the Georgian guerrilla 
movement emanating from Georgia and, if anything, engaged in limited collaboration 
with the Abkhaz authorities.  Despite the widely held assumption that ethnic 
Georgians in Abkhazia would support Georgian guerrilla fighters and oppose the 
Abkhaz state, evidence from the local population, from the guerrilla fighters, and 
from the Abkhaz authorities suggest otherwise.  Fear of punishment or possibly the 
lure of financial gain led some ethnic Georgians to refrain from collaborating with the 




6.6 Ethnic Minority Collaboration in Lower Gal: Active 
This situation changed dramatically when the guerrilla movement shifted 
strategies from isolated military operations to an attempted irredentist seizure of 
power.  As claimed in the theory chapter, while preferences and behavior do not 
necessarily overlap, preferences do have an impact on the “quality of collaboration.”  
When the Georgian guerrillas seized power in May 1998, the reaction of the local 
population was dramatically different from that observed under Abkhaz rule.  In fact, 
the Georgian fighters relied on the support of the local population to seize power. 
Abkhaz authorities had virtually no presence in lower Gal by 1998, and the 
guerrilla movements decided to take full control, almost certainly with the backing 
and coordination of Tbilisi.  From eyewitness accounts and from statements of both 
Abkhaz and Georgian officials, the local population indeed supported the guerrilla 
movement at this point in a qualitatively different way than the limited support they 
demonstrated under Abkhaz rule.  Portraying themselves as liberators, and claiming 
support from Tbilisi, the guerrillas arranged meetings within each village to organize 
Gal’s seizure and enlist the local population’s support. 
In terms of man-power, the local population assisted in digging trenches, manning 
posts, and preparing food for those fighting.  Materially, the locals donated food and 
tools.  Symbolically, locals erected Georgian flags and made statements in support of 
the Georgian state and against Abkhaz authorities.  The locals I spoke with who were 
in Gal at the time spoke of widespread support and a change in the atmosphere.  “We 




Georgian control.  You should have seen it, the mood changed, everyone was 
helping” (IG-122, Tbilisi, July 6 2008). 
This is radically different from what was experienced under Abkhaz rule, where 
some Georgians collaborated but in a very limited manner.  This suggests that, 
indeed, while behaviorally collaboration can occur under any regime, the quality of 
that collaboration will be different and that depends on the underlying preferences of 
the population. 
6.7 Summary of Post-War Abkhazia 
Post-war Abkhazia experienced deadly conflict renewal for two reasons.  First, 
the incomplete partition created an ethnic homeland state for the Georgian minority 
located in Abkhazia.  The state, and actors within it, took actions to support the 
minority.  There were non-state actors, such as guerrilla fighters that acted on behalf 
of the minority to reassert Georgian territorial control.  When the guerrillas invaded 
Abkhazia, the targeted only regions with a homogenous ethnic Georgian population, 
and the minority actively supported the irredentist move.  The Georgian state, when 
conflict occurred in 1998, also participated, providing partial military support.  
Without those actors – the minority and the homeland state – the conflict would not 
have occurred. 
The second cause of renewed violence was the opportunity for invasion.  The 
invasion occurred because of a radical shift in the balance of power within one region 
of Abkhazia: the Georgians only invaded after the Abkhaz state security presence in 
lower Gal had become virtually non-existent.  By contrast, in upper Gal, where the 




more a state and security presence, there was no invasion.  These two factors – the 
triadic political space and the Abkhaz state failure in lower Gal – are interlinked, and 
the first is highly unlikely to have occurred without the second. While the theory 
stressed balance of power, in this particular case, balance of power shifted because of 
a failure of state building in lower Gal. 
7 Moldova-Pridnestrovie 
I now turn to the “non-event” of Moldova, reinforcing the importance of 
maintaining the balance of power relative and state-strength in avoiding inter-ethnic 
conflict renewal.  Both Pridnestrovie and Moldova were relatively strong, and this 
unusual situation in a post-war, post-partition state reduced the likelihood of conflict 
recurrence. 
7.1 Historical Background of Moldova-Pridnestrovie (1500-1990) 
Until 1812, Moldova and Pridnestrovia were historically separate territories, with 
Pridnestrovie part of the Russian empire and Moldova a semi-autonomous 
principality under the Ottomans.  In 1812, Moldova became part of the Russian 
empire, and remained until the end of World War I, when Moldova joined Romania 
and Pridnestrovie became part of the USSR.  After a series of border changes during 
World War II, Moldova became part of the Soviet Union with Pridnestrovie, together 
forming the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.  This situation remained stable until 
the unraveling of the Soviet Union, when calls from some Moldovans to join 
Romania were met with calls from some Pridnestrovians to remain within the Soviet 
Union.  The 1989 census had 65 percent of the Moldovan population as ethnic 




second language and have little knowledge of Romanian.  In Pridnestrovie itself, 
ethnic Romanians were 39.9 percent of the population and Slavs were 53.8 percent of 
the population. 
8 Moldova and Pridnestrovie: Early State Consolidation 
The case of post-partition Moldova further confirms the importance of state-
building to avoid ethnic civil war recurrence.  Despite large stay-behind minorities 
located in both rump-Moldova and the newly created Pridnestrovian Moldovan 
Republic (Pridnestrovie), Moldova has not experienced any post-war violence since 
its termination in 1992.  As I identify below, the Pridnestrovie authorities managed to 
consolidate control before the war began and its security organs were not damaged 
significantly by the war, allowing it to retain state strength in the post-war years.  
Moldova, meanwhile, did not experience violence on its territory and likewise was 
able to retain state strength established before the war’s onset. 
8.1 The War 
Moldova’s ethnic civil war broke out between the central government, 
dominated by ethnic Romanians, and Pridnestrovie, a separatist region on its eastern 
border with Ukraine between the rivers Nistru and Bug, a territory dominated by 
Slavic people, primarily ethnic Russians and Russified Ukrainians.107 
                                                 








The Correlates of War project identifies December 13, 1991 as the start date of 
the war.108  On this date, Pridnestrovie authorities surrounded a police station which 
had pledged allegiance to Moldovan authorities in Chisinau.  This led to the first 
major clashes of the war.109  Soon after, Pridnestrovie security forces took steps to 
control the Dubossary regional government and began to secure control of territory 
located on the west bank of the Nistru in the city of Bendery, where Slavs were 
demographically dominant within regional government offices. 
The two regions that remained contested at the start of 1992 were Dubossary, 
a city in the middle of Pridnestrovie that threatened to divide the aspiring secessionist 
entity in half, and Bendery, a region dominated by Slavs but located on the west bank 
of the Nistru river.  These two areas were the core theaters of violence during the war. 
Clashes in Dubossary began in March 1992 with Pridnestrovie forces 
attempting to secure complete control of the cities police precincts.  Part of what 
made Dubossary contested was the geography of neighboring villages, which were 
close to the Moldovan side of the Nistru river, allowing Moldova authorities to more 
easily reinforce troops in and around the village Cocieri.  By June, a ceasefire was 
announced with Pridnestrovie authorities in control of the Dubossary and its 
surroundings, although several tiny villages on a peninsula of land remained under 
Moldova control (and remain as such until the present day).  As a ceasefire was 
established in Dubossary, fighting erupted in Bendery, with Moldovan and 
Pridnestrovie forces clashing over control of the city and its environs beginning June 
19.  This was the most serious and lethal phase of the war and ended only when 
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Russia’s army, which had been stationed in Pridnestrovie since the Soviet period, 
intervened to establish a ceasefire. 
Active combat operations ran for approximately five months, killing 
approximately 1,000 people and displacing well over 100,000.  COW codes the war 
as officially ending on July 21, 1992, when a peace agreement was signed between 
Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s president, and Mircea Snegur, Moldova’s president. 
8.2 Moldova’s Civil War as Ethnic 
Today, Pridnestrovie remains an unrecognized de facto independent state.  
Most expert opinion today view this unresolved “frozen conflict” as a political, not 
ethnic.  However, that same expert opinion recognizes the central role of ethnicity 
that existed leading up and during the war.110  More importantly, most sources from 
that period clearly demonstrate a fissiparous situation that separated along ethnic 
lines. 
Language, for example, was one of the main rallying points for each side in 
the lead up to the violence.  Ethnic Romanian politicians, for example, attempted to 
strengthen the position of Romanian language in society after decades of 
Russification.  Some of the largest protests surrounded a language law that placed 
Romanian as the official language for Moldova and stipulated that those 
communicating with customers must speak Romanian.111  However, it was not 
uncommon for ethnic Slavs to respond to a Romanian-speaker with the phrase, 
“Speak to me in a human language,” which meant speak to me in Russian.  In the 
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Interview, Chisinau, MD Aug.12, 2008 
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streets of Chisinau it was also not uncommon to see protest placards reading 
“Suitcase, Train Station, Russia,” encouraging ethnic Russians to leave the country.  
The International Crisis Groups estimates that, as a result of Moldovanization and 
De-Russification, ethnic Romanians occupied 90 percent of leadership positions 
within the government and state administration as the country approached 
independence in 1991 (International Crisis Group 2003).112 
As the violence began, many people from each side of the conflict sought 
safety within the territorial confines of regions dominated by their ethnic kin.  While 
no firm numbers exist to demonstrate the degree of migration, there are some 
indicators.  For example, of the faculty members who fled the main university in the 
separatist region, 100 percent were ethnic Romanians: not a single Slavic member of 
the faculty moved to the Moldovan capital.  Of all the police and refugees I spoke 
with, it was rare to find ethnic Slavs moving to Chisinau or ethnic Romanians moving 
to Tiraspol.  Further, of all the displaced volunteers that did not return to 
Pridnestrovie after the end of the war, I did not meet or hear of a single ethnic Slav – 
they were all ethnic Romanians.113 
Further, when it appeared as if Moldovan forces would reach the separatist 
capital, Tiraspol, the panic among the civilian population was largely confined to 
ethnic Slavs, most of whom fled to neighboring Ukraine.114  Among the dead soldiers 
fighting for the separatist side, fewer than 10 percent could be identified as ethnically 
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113 Based on conversations with seven separate refugees, including the organizer of the a pressure 
group representing the displaced. 
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Romanian based on last names.  In addition, no regional soviets dominated by ethnic 
Moldovans that voted to join the separatist Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic; all of 
them were dominated by ethnic Slavs.115  Finally, during the actual fighting, support 
for Pridnestrovie came from Russia (both the Russian army and Cossacks), while 
foreign support for Moldova, to the extent it existed, came from Romania. 
8.3 Stay Behind Minorities 
As we saw in chapter five, Moldova’s partition was “incomplete,” scoring -108 
on the PEHI.  This negative score resulted from the high number of stay-behind 
minorities in both Pridnestrovie and Moldova.  Pridnestrovie contained about 40% 
ethnic Romanians at the end of 1992 while Moldova contained about 30% ethnic 
Slavs.  As we saw, however, there was no recurrence of violence during the first five 
years.  Further, the war displaced over 100,000 people, possibly as high as 200,000, 
who fled mainly along ethnic lines, with ethnic Romanians fleeing to Moldova and 
ethnic Slavs fleeing to Pridnestrovie or beyond to Ukraine.116  However, as soon as 
the war ended the vast majority of these refugees returned to their homes.  Again, 
unlike the case of Georgia, there was no recurrence of violence. 
When the war ended with the July ceasefire, there was an expectation that 
fighting would resume.  As Time’s correspondent (Church 1992) to the region wrote 
                                                 
115 Based on conversations with several historians and archivists at the State University of 
Pridnestrovie as well as the History of Pridnestrovie.  Importantly, the narrative of the conflict 
emphasizes that ethnic Moldovans (read: Romanian speakers) supported Pridnestrovie and were also 
opposed to the rise of Romanian fascism that occurred in Chisinau at that time.  It would therefore be 
in their interest to demonstrate Moldovan dominated regions that voted to join Pridnestrovie. 
116 Based on various expert opinions in Moldova and backed by Facts on File World News Digest, 
September 3, 1992, “Moldova Said to Prepare For Union with Romania; Shaky Peace Imposed in 
Separatist Area.”  The Norwegian Refugee Council reports up to 51,000 internally displaced people 
and 80,000 refugees.  Another report stated that at least 102,000 people were displaced during the 
conflict.  See  
Nantoi, Oazu. 1999. Report on the Problem of Internally Displaced Persons in the Republic of 
Moldova. Chisinau.  However, records from a survey conducted in 1999 on the displaced have been 




at the time, “there is serious doubt [the ceasefire] will hold.”  How is it that an ethnic 
civil war that ends in a partition with significant stay-behind minorities does not 
experience any renewal of violence?  As the theory chapter outlined, the 3G ESD 
places an emphasis on the Triadic Political Space, which would predict violence in 
this case.  However, it also emphasized the role of state-building and opportunities for 
violence – the role of “exiting anarchy.”  As I outline below, I argue that Moldova 
and Pridnestrovie avoided violence, in part, because the strength of each state was 
relatively high at the end of the war, decreasing the opportunity for violence. 
Two factors led to Moldova’s relatively strong post-partition states.  First, due 
to factors unique to Moldova’s situation, Pridnestrovie authorities managed to secure 
territorial control before the separatist war began.  As I will detail below, 
Pridnestrovie forces were able to consolidate control in 1989-1990 during an 
interregnum when the Soviet forces were not active yet Moldova was not 
independent.  Thus, most of the territory never became contested and never shifted 
between one force and another.  Second, the state security infrastructure in both 
territories was not severely affected by the war, leaving it capable of maintaining 
territorial control in the post-war period.  State strength was maintained through the 
war because the war itself was relatively brief and geographically concentrated in 
only two urban regions of the country. 
8.4 Pre-war Secession 
Much has been written about Moldova’s separatist war and its consequences.  
What is less known about this separatist struggle, however, is that the war itself was 




lost territory.  Tirspol, in 1992, was defending its de facto independent status.  
International Crisis Group (2003), for example, reports that, “The 14th Army [i.e., 
Russia] intervened in the fighting there on 20 June. While this helped to establish a 
cease-fire, it also secured Transdniestria’s de facto independence.”  I argue that 
Pridnestrovie had obtained de facto independence long before 1992. 
The federal states comprising the Soviet Union began seeking increased 
autonomy in the late 1980s (Beissinger 2002).  As Moldova gained control over its 
legislature in 1989, pressing for increased use of Romanian language and the 
possibility of joining neighboring Romania, authorities in the Slavic dominated 
Pridnestrovian region began uniting behind a movement to remain within the Soviet 
Union (King 2000).117  Regional “workers’ councils” in the eastern territory of 
Moldova were dominated by ethnic Slavs, who readily identified with authorities 
Moscow, not the increasingly nationalist authorities in Chisinau.  The adoption of a 
language law in 1989, which promoted Romanian to the status of official language, 
was a focal point of protests throughout the eastern region, uniting non-Romanian 
speakers to resist Moldovan independence efforts.  The most important of these was 
the Unified Council of Working Collectives (Ob’edinennye Sovet Trudovykh 
Kollektivov), formed August 11, 1989 from several workers collectives in the eastern 
region of Moldova. 
When Moldova declared its sovereignty in June 1990, officials in Tiraspol 
responded with their declaration of independence from Moldova, forming the 
Pridnestrovian Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (PMSSR) as a constituent part of 
                                                 
117 The territory of Pridnestrovie had been an autonomous region within the Soviet Union during the 





the Soviet Union on September 2 of the same year (Associated Press 1990).  PMSSR 
parliamentary elections were organized in on November 25, 1990 and Igor Smirnov 
was elected president of PMSSR by parliament on November 29.   By this point the 
separatist authorities had already formed military detachments by stealing arms from 
local Soviet weapons depots (King 1994).  In May, 1991 a PMSSR Ministry of 
Interior and prosecutor’s office were formed and parliament issued an order for all 
policemen on PMSSR territory to obey authorities.  Municipality after municipality 
and region after region throughout the eastern territory pledged allegiance to the new 
authorities in Tiraspol over the following year.118  When Moldova declared 
independence from the Soviet Union on August 27, 1991, PMSSR ordered all Soviet 
military units to obey PMSSR jurisdiction, which was largely followed.  Many of the 
factories in that region had predominantly Russian speaking workers while 
management teams were subordinate to Moscow; this further encouraged the 
workers’ collectives to side with Tiraspol authorities rather than subordinate 
themselves to Chisinau. 
Several regions in the center of the nascent PMSSR, however, were dominated 
by ethnic Romanians and refused to submit to Tiraspol’s new authorities.  Those 
regions were coopted through a combination of intimidation and force, with several 
police stations, courts, and state prosecutors’ offices surrounded by militia loyal to 
                                                 
118 Interviews with authorities in Pridnestrovie today claim this was entirely voluntary, based on fears 
of Moldova uniting with Romania as well as a desire to remain within the socialist framework of the 
USSR.  It is, of course, impossible to gauge the degree to which these municipalities joined voluntarily 




Tiraspol, forcing pro-Moldovan authorities to leave the territory or switch allegiance 
(Socor 1992).119 
In any other country, such blatantly provocative actions by separatist 
challengers would result in military action from central authorities to subdue them.  
However, Moldova was not yet independent and Chisinau therefore did not control an 
army or state-wide interior ministry troops.  Rather, interior ministry troops and the 
army were controlled by Moscow, and Moldova’s police forces were controlled at the 
municipal and district level.  As such, Chisinau did not have a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force had no means with which to prevent Tiraspol establishing 
parallel state structures.  Chisinau could have appealed to Moscow to send in its 
forces – in fact it rejected such an offer from Moscow (New York Times 1990) – but 
the newly elected legislature was more concerned with its own intentions to separate 
from the Soviet Union and therefore was reluctant to bring additional Soviet troops 
on to its territory.120 
This is not to suggest Moldova made no attempts prior to the war’s onset.  
Evidence of Pridnestrovie’s territorial control was evident already on November 2, 
1990, when Chisinau dispatched Moldovan police to the town of Dubossary on the 
east side of the River Prut.  As they attempted to cross the bridge, gun-shot fire 
began, resulting in at least three deaths (Carney 1990).  Soon after, Pridnestrovie 
                                                 
119 There were reports of police stations being surrounded by PMSSR security forces, as well as the 
publication of names of Moldovan police who refused to pledge loyalty to PMSSR (Trudovoi Tiraspol, 
November 27, 1991). 
120 Negotiations between Chisinau and Comrat, capital of a separate secessionist struggle in Moldova’s 
south did result in the deployment of 500-800 Soviet Interior Ministry troops.  See The Advertiser, 
October 30, 1990, “New nationalist push erupts in the USSR”; Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast 
October 30, 1990, “Correspondent Report”; TASS, November 2, 1990, Friday “Urgent – Emergency 
Imposed in 3 Moldavian Cities”; The New York Times, November 4, 1990 “EVOLUTION IN 





began institutionalizing its own militia, the Republican Guard.  Only in a few small 
regions was control still contested by the start of 1992, and it was in those two 
regions that actual violence began.  Moldova began forming its own army only in 
spring 1992 (Creanga 1998, p.118).121  According to key actors involved in the 
events, it was only after this inchoate military began to form that more decisive 
military actions were taken by Chisinau against the separatist Pridnestrovie 
authorities (Personal Interview, Viorel Cibotaru, August 4, 2008). 
The important conclusion to draw from this section, however, is that the regime 
itself had established control over most of Pridnestrovie before the start of the ethnic 
civil war.  This is significant as part of the explanation for why violence did not recur 
despite the presence of large stay-behind minorities. 
8.5 Isolated war 
The second reason why we do not see a recurrence of violence is because the 
war itself was short and isolated, leaving the structures of government power in 
Pridnestrovie and Moldova almost entirely in tact.  In spring 1992, the heaviest period 
of the conflict broke out but even this was isolated to two urban centers, Bendery and 
Dubossari.  Fighting was fierce, but remained isolated.  The damage, therefore, to the 
security apparatus of the state was minimal and did not impact the vast majority of 
the territory under Moldovan and Pridnestrovie control. 
With territorial control secured as the war ended, the opportunities for shifting 
territorial control over to Moldova were significantly diminished.  First, the Moldova 
state was able to monopolize the use of force on its rump territory, preventing illegal 
                                                 
121 The army was formally established September 3 1991, but this was only a presidential declaration 




armed formations from attempting to destabilize Pridnestrovie.  According the then-
head of the Moldovan Secret Service, Moldova did try to destabilize Pridnestrovie, 
but this initial attempt failed as the men were arrested by Pridnestrovian security 
forces (the so-called Illiascu affair).  Realizing their inability to penetrate 
Pridnestrovie easily, and the complicated consequences of such actions, the 
government discontinued such approaches (Interview, Plugaru, August 23, 2008).  
Second, with a strong state, stay-behind minorities collaborated with state authorities 
on each side, regardless of their individual preferences.  If Moldova had wanted to 
retake territory, it would have meant certain warfare with an inconclusive result.  
Both territories were relatively equal in strength and there were no “easy targets” for 
Moldova to reclaim.  As with the case of Abkhazia-Georgia, it appears that state 
strength was critical in maintaining the balance of power between the two territories. 
Pridnestrovie’s situation, however, also stands in stark contrast to Abkhazia, 
where the war itself devastated the Abkhaz state, where security force personnel were 
weak, and where armed insurgents interfered with Abkhaz state-building efforts, 
preventing them from securing effective control over lower Gal in the years 
proceeding the ceasefire.  When Georgia finally invaded Abkhazia, it invaded a 
territory all but abandoned by the Abkhaz state. 
9 Conclusion 
Both Pridnestrovie and Abkhazia had large stay-behind minorities during their 
post-war, post-partition periods, but only Abkhazia experienced renewed large-scale 
violence.  The 3G ESD emphasizes the triadic political space and the role of the 




emphasis on intractable inter-ethnic conflict is incorrect.  The first conclusion to draw 
from these cases is that the 2G ESD is incorrect: Pridnestrovie’s ethnic Romanian 
minority remained peaceful and collaborated with the state; I also disaggregated 
Abkhazia’s state and demonstrated that one homogenously Georgian region remained 
peaceful and collaborated with the Abkhaz state.  Therefore, ethnic identities, despite 
ethnic war, do not deterministically lead to renewed conflict when minorities remain 
within a state controlled by the “enemy” ethnic group. 
The critical factor, I argued, was the state’s ability to maintain territorial 
control, which allows it to induce minority collaboration, usually through threats of 
retaliation for non-collaboration.  In addition, even in the region of Abkhazia where 
the minority rebelled, the minority itself had been collaborating with the Abkhaz 
state, at least minimally, between 1994 and 1997; it was not until the Georgian 
guerrillas took territorial control that the local population participated in the rebellion 
against the Abkhaz state. 
To support the 3G ESD, I demonstrated that Abkhazia’s Six Day War 
emerged from the neighboring Georgian state, which was used as a launching pad for 
an irredentist invasion by non-state and state security personnel.  Coming back to 
state-building, this violence was almost certainly a result of Abkhaz state weakness 
that left lower Gal, a territory with a homogenously ethnic Georgian population, 
virtually without an Abkhaz presence in 1998.  The opportunity to take the territory 
was high, and the guerrillas took control of lower Gal without a struggle.  The 
guerrillas did not attempt to invade a neighboring and territorially contiguous region 




presence.  In other words, violence erupted only where there was a shift in the 
balance of power over a certain territory, where Abkhaz state-failure occurred 
following the war.  This case study lends great weight to the 3G ESD’s emphasis on 
the triadic political space, but suggests that greater weight should be given to the role 
of opportunity for conflict renewal.  Had the Abkhaz state been able to build up its 
strength, protect the border, and pose a greater security threat to the invading 
Georgians, it is unclear that an invasion would have taken place; after all, the 
guerrillas did not take over all of Gali despite the minority presence; they only took 
the part without an Abkhaz security presence. 
This emphasis on opportunities became clearer with the case of Pridnestrovie.  I 
argued that two unique factors surrounding Pridnestrovie’s secession – (i) its state 
consolidation prior to the war and (ii) the limited and geographically concentrated 
nature of the war – allowed it emerge from the war and partition in a relatively strong 
position.  The security apparatus and state institutions were strong, encouraging 
minority civilian collaboration, and making any attempts to destabilize the country 
militarily difficult.  If Moldova had sought to reclaim territories dominated by ethnic 
kin Romanians, it would have meant certain warfare with Pridnestrovie and Russia; 
the Moldovan state was not prepared to engage in such direct military confrontation. 
The results from this chapter overwhelmingly reject the 2G ESD as an 
explanation for post-war violence.  The results are strongly supportive of the 3G 
ESD.  The case studies provide complementary evidence to the cross-national 




I now turn to the concluding chapter to summarize the results of the dissertation, 




Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
1 Introduction 
I began this dissertation by looking at how scholars of civil war proposed to end 
Iraq’s ongoing ethno-religious civil war in 2006 and 2007.  In a hotly contested 
debate, opinions were divided as to the most effective and humanitarian approach.  
Most controversially, several scholars proposed partitioning Iraq and its people into 
three homelands, arguing this would end the violence and minimize human suffering.  
The proposed solution of partition was based on theoretical arguments as well as 
empirical evidence from ethnic civil wars during the post-WWII period.  But this 
solution also presented a puzzle for the literature: the puzzle of ethno-demography 
and its relationship to violence. 
My dissertation addressed this puzzle of ethno-demographic violence and 
presented a new theory of how partition reduces the likelihood of violence, 
addressing key questions in the civil war literature.  These questions included: (i) 
Does partition end ongoing ethnic civil war violence?; (ii) Does partition prevent 
ethnic civil war recurrence?; (iii) How does partition prevent war recurrence?; (iv) 
Why do some wars ending with large stay-behind minorities not experience conflict 
renewal? 
2 The Puzzle of Ethnic Demography 
The puzzle of ethnic demography arose from the literature because both 
theoretical and empirical evidence demonstrated that homogenously concentrated 
ethnic groups were both more likely to cause violence and more likely to end 




statehood (de facto or de jure) and (ii) by jettisoning the second generation ethnic 
security dilemma (2G ESD) which incorrectly predicts the end of war via group 
concentration. 
First, as several scholars have identified, ethnic group concentration is likely to 
increase the risk of ethnic violence when that group is located within a sovereign 
state.  The literature has not successfully resolved how group concentration leads to 
increased violence but there is a consensus that it does lead to violence.  Group 
concentration may be a proxy for capability, either physically providing a base from 
which to wage war against the central state or psychologically providing members 
with the will to fight.  Ethnic group concentration lowers the risk of violence only 
when statehood is included.  By separating groups into separate states, the risk of 
violence decreases significantly since the ethnic rebel groups achieve their main aim 
– statehood.  Second, as I argue below, partition does not end ongoing warfare, but 
rather helps prevent conflict recurrence.  Therefore the puzzle of group concentration 
is resolved with concentration not ending violence, but rather preventing the 
recurrence of violence; and this prevention is only successful if it includes both 
demographic concentration and partitions into separate states. 
3 The Questions Addressed in the Dissertation 
3.1 Does partition end ongoing ethnic civil war violence? 
The 2G ESD argues that separating warring ethnic groups during ethnic civil 
wars into defensible enclaves or separate states will end the violence.  I demonstrated 
that research designs to date had failed to empirically test the core theoretical 




(Samabanis), had only looked at ethnic civil war terminations to test whether this 
correlated with demographic separation.  This approach is methodologically flawed 
as it excludes an entire set of cases that are crucial to an empirical test.  In order to 
test whether partition leads to civil war termination, one must select ethnic civil wars 
from a sample of ongoing ethnic civil wars to determine whether partition will bring 
the war to an end.  Further, as other critics noted, there had not been a systematic test 
of partition: advocates of partition had relied on self-selected cases, raising questions 
about objectivity. 
The only systematic empirical test of the 2G ESD, conducted by Nicholas 
Sambanis, failed to accurately test the theory on two counts.  First, the independent 
variable used was statehood, not demography.  The core argument of the 2G ESD is 
based on demographic separation and is ambivalent about statehood.  This means that 
the Sambanis test does not capture and therefore cannot test the 2G ESD.  Second, the 
Sambanis test, like Kaufmann’s, also suffers from a conceptual flaw focusing on the 
wrong dependent variable: Sambanis used a universe of cases based on wars that had 
already ended.  Once again, the empirical test did not include ongoing wars, 
preventing it from testing whether partition would lead to war termination. 
To correct this, I used the crucial case of the Georgia-Abkhaz ethnic civil war 
(1992-1993) in Chapter Three and I tracked violence and migration patterns during 
the ongoing war.  Much as the 2G ESD would predict, the ethnic civil war led to 
ethno-demographic separation, with ethnic groups fleeing territory controlled by rival 
ethnic militias and seeking safety among ethnic kin groups.  This suggests that the 




prediction of the 2G ESD – that such separation would lead to war end – was not 
confirmed.  The war continued for several months, and even escalated in spite of the 
separation leading to the type of humanitarian catastrophe that this solution is 
expressly designed to prevent.  The 2G ESD has many merits, but it is reductionist in 
its sweeping conclusions and does not consider other theoretical explanations of 
violence during war.  In other words, the answer to the question is no, partition does 
not end ongoing ethnic civil war.  In the case of Georgia-Abkhazia, the main 
explanation of continued violence was based on realpolitik, and the war escalated due 
to a shift in the balance of capabilities and because of a strategic error on the part of 
the Georgians, permitting Abkhazia to secure a military victory over the Georgian 
armed forces. 
3.2 How does partition prevent war recurrence? 
Instead of arguing that partition ends ethnic civil wars, I argued that partition 
was an effective solution to prevent ethnic civil war recurrence.  I drew on the three 
theoretical foundations to build my theory, which I called the Third Generation 
Ethnic Security Dilemma (3G ESD).  Most fundamentally, as the name suggests, I 
drew on previous generations of the ethnic security dilemma that focus on anarchy, 
uncertainty, and inter-mixed ethnic demography.  However, I corrected previous 
theoretical flaws.  The First Generation ESD (1G ESD) was an explanation for war 
onset, but could not explain which groups would go to war.  By focusing on post-
conflict recurring violence, we already have heightened identity salience and enemy 




ethnic civil war.  The theory, therefore, fits better as an explanation for post-conflict 
recurring violence. 
Second, the ethnic security dilemma called on groups to be separated in order to 
end the violence but was ambivalent about the role of statehood.  The key ingredient 
was ethno-demographic separation that permitted self-defense for concentrated ethnic 
groups.  Such a solution does not provide long-term stability or security for those 
pockets of ethnic groups within the country.  I therefore bring statehood into the 
theory as a key component of peace maintenance.  Creating two sovereign states both 
eliminates the need for the minority to rebel against the center and it permits each 
side to build up deterrent mechanisms that will prevent further conflict.  While it 
provides no guarantee of peace, it creates the best possible environment for peace to 
survive.  This can be achieved with de facto and de jure statehood, although some 
other authors have claimed that de jure sovereignty is more likely to produce long-
term peace; those claims were not tested here (Chapman and Roeder 2007; Kaufmann 
1998). 
Moreover, another key insight to emerge from the civil war termination 
literature since 1998 has been the problem of credible commitment.  By forcing one 
party to the conflict to disarm, the conflict is paradoxically likely to continue.  The 
disarming party is probably going to look forward and see that, once disarmed, any 
agreement reached with the center can be reneged and the disarmed party will have 
no leverage.  By bringing statehood into the equation, we negate the need to disarm 




Third, as with the 1G ESD, the role of mixed-demography remains a core 
concern for conflict recurrence in the post-civil war environment.  Once the violence 
of war has initially ceased, even if the territory had been divided into separate states, 
the presence of significant ethnic minorities within territory controlled by a warring 
ethnic group remains a high-potential for renewed violence.  My 3G ESD, however, 
differs from the 2G ESD, which relies on intractable ethnic animosity as the micro-
foundations of renewed violence.  I argue that intractable ethnic animosity is not a 
credible explanation for violence and that intra-state inter-ethnic violence is unlikely 
to occur once a state has established territorial control.  Research has shown that 
collaboration will occur even during ethnic war as long as sufficient incentives exist. 
As we saw in the case of post-war Abkhazia and Pridnestrovie, minorities 
collaborated with the authorities in the post-war environment despite war-time 
atrocities targeting the minority groups.  In the case of Abkhazia in particular, despite 
a low-level insurgency originating from Georgia to defend the minority, enough 
minority members collaborated with the Abkhaz state that guerrilla fighters did not 
rely on the support of their kin members inside Abkhazia: guerrillas were afraid of 
traitors among the Georgian minority and/or were afraid of reprisals committed 
against the Georgian minority by the Abkhaz state.  Only when territorial control 
shifted to complete Georgian control in May 1998 did the minority collaborate with 
the ethnic Georgian armed forces. 
As noted by the theory, there was a difference in the “quality of collaboration” 
between how the Georgian minority collaborated with the Abkhaz and the Georgians: 




Georgian control there was “active” collaboration, included material, symbolic, and 
man-power support.  This, I argued allows us to see the relevance of ethnic identity, 
where preferences do matter.  Collaboration may occur under any regime, but the 
preferences of individual members affect the quality of that collaboration. 
Rather than intransigent ethnic identities being responsible for conflict, the 3G 
ESD focuses on the triadic political space created by incomplete partitions and a shift 
in the balance of power between those states that creates an opportunity to reclaim 
territory populated by ethnic kin. 
Neighboring homeland states pose a danger for violence on two fronts.  First, 
non-state militias can use the homeland as a safe-haven to launch attacks on the host 
state where the minority is located.  Second, the homeland government can covertly 
or overtly support such militant activities, producing a boost in capabilities for violent 
action.  We saw evidence of both: guerrilla fighters and state security personnel in 
official and unofficial capacities entered Abkhazia in an attempt to retake control 
parts of Abkhazia containing ethnic Georgian populations. 
The leadership of the homeland state may get involved for a variety of reasons 
related to its desire to maintain power, including its desire to expand its domestic base 
of support through acquiring new land with a loyal population, or due to pressure 
from its domestic audience to protect ethnic kin facing real or perceived repression.  
Especially in the initial post-war period when identity salience is high, the risk of 
involvement form the homeland is significant.  My case study could not identify the 
reasons for the Georgian state to be involved – evidence for this was simply not 




The triadic political space alone, however, is not a guaranteed recipe for 
violence.  Since the leadership of the homeland state is interested in maintaining 
power, it is unlikely to launch an irredentist war unless it is reasonably sure it can 
win.  Therefore there needs to be a shift in the balance of power that increases the 
likelihood of victory for the homeland state.  In the two cases of partition I presented, 
it was the success and failure of post-war state-building that led to the absence and 
presence of violence, respectively.  The ability of the host state, where the minority is 
located, to conduct post-war state-building was critical to avoiding conflict. 
In Abkhazia, not only was the war itself extremely destructive in terms of 
infrastructure damage and loss of human life, the region of Gal in particular, where 
the stay-behind minority was located, was left in ruin.  These challenges to Abkhaz 
state-building were compounded by (i) the lack of security personnel working for the 
Abkhaz state, (ii) the cease fire agreement which established a buffer zone near the 
border with Georgia preventing the Abkhaz from using heavy military equipment in 
its southern district, (iii) the stringent economic blockade against Abkhazia imposed 
by Russia and Georgia in the initial post-war environment, and (iv) the cross-border 
raids by Georgian guerrillas that killed Abkhaz security personnel and created an 
atmosphere of fear and intimidation. 
I also disaggregated the Abkhaz state to focus attention on the role of state 
building in creating or eliminating opportunities for violence.  As we saw in 
Abkhazia, the Georgian attack on Abkhazia during the Six Day War in May 1998 did 
not include all areas of the ethnic Georgian minority, despite this being a contiguous 




Abkhazia only in those areas where Abkhaz state-building efforts had failed and the 
territory – lower Gal – was almost completely devoid of an Abkhaz presence.  An 
opportunity for retaking territory had presented itself to the Georgians, and they took 
it. 
By contrast, the Abkhaz state had slowly managed to build up state institutions 
in upper Gal, which was also populated by ethnic Georgians.  In 1998, the 
opportunity for attack there was significantly reduced because the Abkhaz security 
presence well established.  The 1998 invasion never attempted to enter upper Gal, but 
confined itself to regions virtually abandoned by Abkhaz security personnel. 
The ability to establish strong states in a new state following a civil war are 
extremely challenging.  As a result, violence will be far less likely to emerge in states 
that are both partitioned and demographically partitioned, removing stay-behind 
minorities.  I called this type of partition “complete partition” indicating that ethnic 
groups were completely separated.  Partitions that leave behind significant stay-
behind minorities were labeled “incomplete partitions.”  While it is possible to have 
incomplete partitions and maintain peace, the chances of success without a large 
security presence are minimal. 
3.3 Does complete partition prevent conflict recurrence empirically? 
Empirically, complete partition, as the 3G ESD predicts, does prevent recurring 
deadly post-war violence.  I gathered data on all ethnic civil wars that ended in 
partitions separating territory into separate states to assess the degree to which ethnic 
groups were separated.  Using this novel variable, I demonstrated that every single 




partition that completely separated the warring ethnic groups) violence did not recur 
for at least five years.  This stands in stark contrast to the 60 percent of all ethnic civil 
war terminations that experienced deadly conflict renewal within the first five years 
of achieving peace.  There was one civil war – Georgia-Abkhazia – that experienced 
conflict renewal, but this occurred only after ethnic minorities returned to the 
territory, demonstrating the danger of “stay-behind” minorities. 
I followed the cross-national study with a case study of post-war Georgia-
Abkhazia to use process-tracing and understand the causes of conflict renewal.  At 
first glance, the patterns of violence appeared to support the 2G ESD, with violence 
occurring exactly in the same geographical region as the returning minority.  
However, a closer examination of the violence revealed that the attack originated 
from armed groups in Georgia and that the Georgian minority in Abkhazia only 
began collaboration after territorial control shifted to the Georgian side.  Further, it 
was only in regions with extreme state failure, where the balance of power between 
the Abkhaz and Georgian states shifted, that Georgia attempted to conquer territory. 
3.4 Why do some wars ending with large stay-behind minorities not experience 
conflict renewal? 
 
The results of the cross-national test revealed strong support for complete 
partition, but also revealed some initially perplexing results.  There were several 
ethnic civil wars that ended in incomplete partitions yet did not experience conflict 
renewal.  According to the 2G ESD, this is not possible.  An incomplete partition 
must lead to renewed violence because of the intransigent ethnic animosity created by 
the ethnic civil war.  According to the 3G ESD theory, however, this is possible if 




As mentioned above, Abkhazia also had regions containing stay-behind 
Georgian minorities that did not experience conflict renewal, even when an armed 
uprising that challenged Abkhaz territorial integrity occurred in a contiguous 
territory.  I argued that effective state-building had deterred Georgian aggression and 
reduced the opportunity for violence in those regions. 
Similarly, using Moldova as a case study, I discovered that an incomplete 
partition and state-building had been achieved before the ethnic civil war began.  I 
demonstrated that Pridnestrovie, due to unique circumstances that surrounded the 
collapsing Soviet Union, had actually seceded and established its nascent statehood 
presence before war onset in 1992.  The armed secessionist movement against 
Moldova gathered strength in 1989 while Moldova was still a Union Republic in the 
Soviet Union.  Where most countries would counteract a secessionist movement with 
force, Moldova did not have an army of its own and refused the support of the Soviet 
Army at the time, fearful that its presence would be used as a pretext to prevent its 
own secession from the USSR.  By the time Moldova gained independence at the end 
of August 1991, Pridnestrovie was already effectively independent with its own 
security organs.  Moldova’s army was established in late 1991 but was not a 
functioning institution until 1992, when the war began. 
With a short war that was geographically confined, Pridnestrovien and 
Moldovan statehood was comparatively strong in the post-war period.  This ensured 
that (i) the minority collaborated with the state, (ii) there were fewer opportunities to 
achieve irredentist ambitions without provoking an all-out war from Moldova’s side, 




post-war states maintained a monopoly on the use of force within their respective 
territories. 
With the security apparatus in place, the borders were effectively guarded and 
the ethnic-Moldovan population continued to collaborate with Pridnestrovien 
authorities.  On the Moldovan side, while the country was not a paragon of state 
strength, order was in place and independent guerrilla formations were not permitted 
to develop.  In short, the balance of power between the two sides remained relatively 
equal and opportunities for violence were heavily curtailed. 
4 Summary 
In sum, my dissertation came to three key conclusions.  First, ethnic separation 
during war does not end ethnic civil wars.  The 2G ESD was weak theoretically and a 
crucial case study (Georgia-Abkhazia) demonstrated its faults empirically.  Instead, 
extant theories in the literature, especially realpolitik, did a better job of explaining 
the end of ongoing warfare for my case study.  Second, I stressed the need to 
conceptually disaggregate the term civil war termination, differentiating between an 
end of ongoing violence and the recurrence of violence since recidivism is such a 
central problem for ethnic civil wars.  The 2G ESD also claims to explain conflict 
renewal, but I also argued that it fails as an explanatory framework for conflict 
renewal.  Theoretically, the 2G ESD cannot explain how ethnic minorities collaborate 
peacefully within post-partition states dominated by enemy ethnic groups.  The theory 
fails to differentiate preferences from behavior and assumes that incompatible 
preferences will lead to violence.  Building on other constructivist work in the field 




behind minorities will collaborate as long as states are significantly strong.    My two 
case studies (Abkhazia and Pridnestrovie) demonstrated this pattern empirically. 
Third, partitions that separated territory into distinct states help resolve some key 
problems that bedevil peacebuilding but are unlikely to produce long-term peace 
unless they (i) separate the warring ethnic groups demographically and (ii) maintain a 
balance of power between the post-war states.  My case studies identified the 
difficulties of post-war state building as areas of particularly concern, where balance 
of power could shift.  This is part of the 3G ESD, which focuses on conflict renewal 
amidst weak states and a triadic political space.  Conflicts are likely to recur where (i) 
a homeland state (or elements within) seeks to “protect” its kin minority in a 
neighboring state and where (ii) states are weak creating several opportunities for 
violence to erupt.  Since incomplete partitions endogenously create both triadic 
political spaces and weak states, the likelihood of violence is high.  By contrast, 
partitions that include ethno-demographic separation are likely to produce peace that 
lasts beyond the critical first five years.  Indeed, cross-national evidence from the 
post-World War Two period suggested this to be the case with no complete partition 
experiencing recurring violence within the first five years of establishing peace.  
While complete partitions are no guarantee against renewed warfare, they reduce the 
chances of conflict significantly. 
5 Policy Implications 
There are four policy conclusions that come into clear relief from this 
dissertation.  First, and most obviously, pursuing partition as a solution to ongoing 




humanitarian solution.  Despite the results in Chapters Five and Six that complete 
partitions prevent deadly ethnic conflict recurrence, the results from Chapter Three 
clearly demonstrated that partition during ongoing violence was not a sufficient 
condition to end the conflict. 
In terms of Iraq, the accelerating speed with which religious targeting and 
displacement occurred between 2005 and 2007 strongly suggested the emergence of a 
security dilemma between the Shi’ite and Sunni communities, where families whose 
homes were in the “wrong” area were threatened with death if they did not leave.122  
Partition advocates painted a stark picture in their calls for US involvement in 
implementing partition.  The question faced by the US, they said, was whether they 
want to permit this separation to be organized by unregulated communal militias 
under conditions of large-scale violence, or whether they want to facilitate this 
process under less inhumane conditions through organized population transfers.  
However, without the promise of peace, partition should not be considered as a policy 
option. 
While partition may not end ethnic civil wars, Chapters Four through Six suggest 
that a policy of partition in a post-war environment does provide the best chance for 
long-term peace, and this forms the second policy implication from the dissertation.  
Once the violence of ethnic civil wars has subsided, implementing partition may be a 
durable solution to prevent conflict recurrence.  For example, as of mid-2009, the 
Iraqi ethnic civil war had de-escalated significantly, although this was still an ethnic 
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civil war by any social science measure.  If the trend continues, however, partition 
may be an option to consider in the future.  Moreover, by not partitioning Iraq, the 
chances of renewed violence may remain high.  The ethnic security dilemma during 
the Iraqi civil war did lead to large-scale ethnic unmixing, increasing ethnic group 
concentration throughout the country.  As mentioned in the introduction, much 
evidence in the political science literature suggests that group concentration increases 
the long-term risk of ethnic rebellion, and this means that the risk of violence in Iraq 
remains high unless the territory is partitioned.  Should the U.S. then pursue partition 
if the violence of war ends? 
Such considerations raise a second question rarely discussed is the literature: how 
does an international actor implement a partition strategy?  Most importantly, Iraq is 
not divided into homogeneous regions, despite claims to the contrary.123  There are 
large geographical regions of the country that are relatively homogeneous, but there 
are nevertheless several densely populated, multi-ethnic regions in the center of the 
country that would need to be demographically separated under any partition plan, 
not to mention multiethnic flash-point cities elsewhere in the country, such as 
Kirkuk.124  How to accomplish that in a way that protects civilian lives is a major 
challenge. 
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Any announcement of a decision to partition the country would almost 
certainly lead to a large increase in the number of families in mixed regions seeking 
refuge in “their” new states, emboldening local militias that are pressing for 
separation.  While the U.S. and Iraqi forces could attempt to minimize the violence 
that such a mass migration might encounter, the ability of the military to ensure the 
safety of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis on the move, given the difficulty in 
providing even basic security, is highly questionable.  In this case, the decision to 
partition could make the situation considerably worse for civilians, thus taking away 
the humanitarian rationale of partition advocates. 
Because partition without the separation of ethnic groups does not 
significantly increase the likelihood of securing peace, two options are available: 
redrawing borders or transferring populations.  Population transfers pose at least two 
problems.  First, the implementation of such transfers may sound procedural, but the 
reality would be far from it.  Let us imagine, for example, that considerable numbers 
of minority group members refuse to move to their new home state.  Would the U.S. 
or Iraqi military be prepared to use force to deport those civilians, the very civilians 
that partition is supposed to protect?  Unmixing populations can require great force, 
as the twentieth century has demonstrated.  One solution to that problem is to keep 
transfers “voluntary,” where civilians are given the choice to move to “their” new 
state or remain a minority within the other group’s new state.  Given the uncertainty 
of life under a new state dominated by an enemy group following intense warfare, 
most members of the minority group would likely move.  If such “voluntary” 
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transfers do not materialize, however, then U.S. military force against civilians would 
become necessary.  If the U.S. is not prepared to use deliberate force against Iraqi 
civilians then partition should not be considered. 
What about redrawing borders?  Given the risk of violence associated with 
incomplete partitions and the benefits associated with complete partitions, the 
international community should give serious consideration to redrawing borders if 
that would produce a complete partitions.  Since the ethnic security dilemma during 
war leads to ethnic group concentration, this may not be as difficult to achieve as it 
might initially appear. 
The saliency of this point is evident in debates over Kosovo’s final status.  Post-
1999 Kosovo is an example of an incomplete partition and, based on the results here, 
a final status agreement that does not transfer Serb-controlled regions (or Serbs 
themselves) back to Serbia will not provide the much desired peace dividend offered 
by complete partition.125   Indeed, in spite of the presence of international 
peacekeepers, clashes in 2004 led to large-scale interethnic violence and the ethnic 
cleansing of Serb villages.126  The international community should therefore give 
serious consideration to the further partitioning of Kosovo into homogeneous Serb 
and Albanian regions before withdrawal.127  The resulting Serb region would almost 
certainly join Serbia, while Kosovo would become independent.  These results should 
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European states.  See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Dutch Minister Says Partition of Kosova 
Acceptable”; and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Russia Rules Out Crossing ‘Red Line’ on 




also be noted for the partitions of Sudan and Papua New Guinea, where referenda on 
independence are being established for the near future.  Drawing borders to 
correspond with ethnic group concentration is highly likely to facilitate long-term 
peace. 
Finally, one other alternative to population transfers exist for incomplete 
partitions: building up strong state institutions in the post-partitioned states.  Given 
that this encourages minority collaboration, reduces the opportunities for violence, 
and does not require the morally dubious practice of population transfers, it is an 
admirable approach.  For Iraq, given the strong financial and institutional support it 
receives from the U.S. and others in the international community, this has a good 
chance of succeeding.  In Bosnia, another case of incomplete partition, a commitment 
by the international community to establish strong state institutions has meant that a 
reversal in ethnic cleansing has begun to take hold without any associated conflict 
renewal. 
The fourth and final policy implication emerges from the theoretical and 
empirical results of Chapters Two and Three.  These should be strong cautionary tales 
for any policy-maker drawing on social science research.  Despite a decade of 
research on partition, with much evidence demonstrating support, an appropriate 
methodological test had not in fact been conducted.  Proxy variables and convenient 
short-cuts were used for an empirical test, and this led to superficial results that 
incorrectly provided support to partition as a means to end ethnic civil wars.  Before 




evidence to decide whether, indeed, the evidence provides legitimate support for the 
theories at hand. 
6 Areas for Future Research 
I conclude with some promising areas for future research.  First, the PEHI 
index could be extended to incorporate not only the presence of minorities, but their 
location and territorial concentration after partition.  Several scholars have identified 
group concentration as a powerful predictor of rebellion, and Barry Posen has argued 
that the location of minorities may increase the security dilemma risk.128  For 
example, minorities living near a state’s borders might increase the likelihood of 
renewed violence.  Another empirical test that would help clarify the ethnic security 
dilemma and the role of demography is to track the size of minorities within states 
that experience ethnic civil war but do not end in partition.  If a minority is eliminated 
(e.g., through death or expulsion), this should eliminate the ethnic security dilemma.  
Similarly, the theory would hypothesize that the smaller the minority after ethnic civil 
war, the less the chance of ethnic war recurring.  This would allow a large-n test with 
robust statistical results. 
Second, the frequency of militarized interstate disputes among postpartitioned 
states could be compared to that of all other states to see if these new dyads are more 
or less at risk of interstate warfare.  This would involve extending the initial five year 
time horizon chosen for this study to examine the long-term impact of partition. 
Third an examination of ethnic reintegration after ethnic war could be made to 
evaluate the timing of and the degree to which returning populations risk reigniting 
violence.  While all wars produce high levels of displacement, the degree to which 
                                                 




displaced populations return, even after ethnic cleansing, is surprisingly variable both 
across cases and temporally in the years following the end of ethnic wars.  Many in 
the international community are normatively committed to the idea of multiethnic 
societies and yet are confounded by the realities of protracted refugee problems and 
intransigent postwar communities long after the war has ended.  Does lack of 
reintegration stem from a top-down process led by political elites, or a bottom-up 
process led by local communities?  Do returns increase or decrease the risk of war 
and violence?  Answers to these questions are of great theoretical interest for 
questions of conflict, war, and identity salience, as well as of extreme practical value. 
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